Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses

Graduate School

1977

A Biographical Sketch of Francisco De Paula Sanz, Spanish
Colonial Official.
Christopher Thomas Williams
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses

Recommended Citation
Williams, Christopher Thomas, "A Biographical Sketch of Francisco De Paula Sanz, Spanish Colonial
Official." (1977). LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses. 3142.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/3142

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.

INFORMATION TO USERS

This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While
the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document
have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original
submitted.
The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand
markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.
1.The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document
photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing
page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages.
This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent
pages to insure you complete continuity.
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a targe round black mark, it
is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have
moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a
good image of the page in the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being
photographed the photographer followed a definite method in
"sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper
left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to
right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is
continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until
complete.
4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value,
however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from
"photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver
prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing
the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and
specific pages you wish reproduced.
5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as
received.

University Microfilms international
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 USA
St. John’s Road, Tyler’s Green
High Wycombe, Bucks, England HP10 8HR

77-28,707
WILLIAMS, Christopher Thomas, 1948A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF FRANCISCO DE PAULA
SANZ, SPANISH COLONIAL OFFICIAL.
The Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College,
Ph.D., 1977
History, Latin America

Xerox University Microfilms, AnnArbor, Michigan48106

©

1977
CHRISTOPHER THOMAS WILLIAMS

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OP FRANCISCO DE PAULA SANZ,
SPANISH COLONIAL OFFICIAL

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Latin American Studies Institute

by
Christopher Thomas Williams
B.A., Hendrix College, 1970
M.A,, Louisiana State University, 1972
August, 1977

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I wish to thank my major professor, Dr. Jane
DeGrummond, for directing this dissertation, and Dr. Paul
Hoffman for helping to improve it.

Dr. Leonard C&rdenas

read the manuscript and suggested improvements.
I must acknowledge my gratitude to the late Don
Armando Alba, Director of the Archivo de la Casa de la
Moneda in Potosi, for suggesting this topic to me in 1974.
Dr. Gunnar Mendoza, Director of the Archivo Nacional de
Bolivia, was also helpful during the research phase of
this project, as was Dr. Alberto Crespo Rodas, Director of
the library of the Universidad Mayor de San Andres in La Paz.
I appreciate the assistance of Dr. Eduardo Martird of the
Law Faculty of the University of Buenos Aires.

Mr. Brian

Coutts, a graduate student of Dr. Hoffman's, doing research
in Seville, aided me by sending microfilm copies of docu
ments in the Archivo General de Indias.
My work was facilitated by two fellowships for which
I am grateful.

A Fulbright-Hays fellowship financed my

investigations in South America, and a fellowship from
Louisiana State University.gave me "aid and comfort" during
the actual writing.
Finally, I am deeply grateful to my wife Sarah for
her patient help, support and encouragement.
ii

TABLE OP CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS......................................

ii

LIST OF T A B L E S ......................................

iv

LIST OP ILLUSTRATIONS................................

V

ABSTRACT...........................................

vi

ABBREVIATIONS.................................

i*

INTRODUCTION........................................

x

Chapter
I.

POTOSI IN THE 18th CENTURY: DECLINING
FORTUNES OF A BOOM T O W N ..................

1

II.

POTOSI AND THE BOURBON REFORMS.............

28

III.

SANZ BEFORE COMING TO POTOSI...............

44

SANZ'S EARLY EFFORTS TO INCREASE
PRODUCTION AT POTOSI......................

83

IV.
V.

POLEMICS OVER THE MITA.....................

116

SANZ'S EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN PRODUCTION
IN POTOSI 1797-1808 ......................

152

VII.

SANZ AS A REACTIONARY IN UPPER P E R U ........

181

VIII.

EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION....................

208

VI.

APPENDIX...........................................

219

BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................

221

V I T A ...............................................

228

LIST OF TABLES*
Table
1.

Page
PotosI Production Figures Under Sanz
and Under His Two Immediate
Predecessors ................................

178

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Illustration
Graph I.
Map I.

Page
Estimated Potosi Silver
Production,.. 1550-1810.................

The Viceroyalty

of Ri6 de la P l a t a .......

v

11
218

ABSTRACT
The Bourbon Kings of Spain worked to enhance their
governing capabilities during the eighteenth century.

They

borrowed m o d e m institutions such as the intendancy from
their relatives in France, and used them to improve adminis
tration in Spain.

Charles III, on the advice of his

enlightened ministers, began extending the reforms to Spain's
empire in order to increase colonial revenues.

Among these

reforms was the creation of a Viceroyalty of Rio de la
Plata in 1776.

Six years later, Spanish authorities applied

the intendancy system to the new viceroyalty.

The operation

of this new administrative unit was an experiment in
colonial management and an attempt to strengthen Spain's
tenuous hold on her colonies.
Francisco de Paula Sanz, the subject of this study,
held several important positions in the Viceroyalty of Rio
de la Plata during all but a few months of its existence.

A

brief examination of his career would therefore be helpful
toward understanding how a Spanish colonial official
actually dealt with local and viceregal issues, and how
policies emerged from bureaucratic conflicts and maneuverings.
Sanz was appointed Director of the Royal Tobacco
Monopoly for Rio de la Plata in 1777, the year after the

viceroyalty was established.

He set up the machinery for

the Monopoly in Buenos Aires and then spent three years
traveling throughout the different provinces to establish
branches and to inspect facilities.

Following his return to

Buenos Aires, Sanz was named Superintendent General of War
and Finance for the viceroyalty.

During his five years as

superintendent, he clashed with his superior, the viceroy,
over the prerogatives of their offices.

This disagreement

was one reason why the superintendency was incorporated into
the viceroy*s office and Sanz was made Intendant Governor of
Potosi, far to the north in Upper Peru.
Sanz arrived in the once wealthy mining town in
December 1788.
production.

His major task there was to increase silver

To accomplish this, he encouraged the adoption

of modern methods of mining and refining and sought financial
aid for the members of the mining community.

He also

expended great efforts to defend the mita, the system of
forced Indian labor which benefited Potosi miners.

The

Audiencia of Charcas and its liberal Fiscal, Victorian de
Villava, tried to malign and diminish the service in the
1790's.

But Sanz's public treatises and private maneuverings

helped to preserve the institution for another fifteen years.
The Indendant Governor continued to work through the
next decade to increase the yield of the Cerro Rico (Rich
Mountain) of Potosi.

He secured government loans for mine

operators when the area was threatened by drought and the

lack of mercury.

In 1809, after these crises had subsided,

the Audiencia of Charcas deposed its president.

Sanz

organized and led an armed invasion that threatened the city
of La Plata— the first royalist maneuver against Upper
Peru's struggle for independence.

The following year,

radicals in Buenos Aires deposed the viceroy and set up a
governing junta.

Sanz helped to organize a defense against

the expeditionary force that the junta sent to subdue Upper
Peru.

The rebels were victorious, and Sanz was captured and

executed becoming one of the first casualties of Spain's
struggle to retain its empire.

viii

ABBREVIATIONS
AGI - Archivo General de Indias, Seville, Spain.
AGN - Archivo General de la Naci6n, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
ANB - Archivo Nacional de Bolivia, Sucre, Bolivia.
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the
highlights of the long career of Francisco de Paula Sanz,
who consecutively held three different positions in the
Spanish Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata:

Director of the

Royal Tobacco Monopoly, 1777-1783; Superintendent General of
War and Finance, 1783-1788; Intendant Governor of Potosi,
1788-1810.

The last twenty-two years in Potosi will be

emphasized.
Sanz came to the new world during a period of
optimism.

The thirty-two-year-old Spanish official had been

exposed to concepts of the Enlightenment, and was eager to
serve his King in the effort to rebuild Spain's decaying
Empire.

The very creation of the viceroyalty where Sanz was

to serve was a part of a plan by Charles III and his advisers
to reform and improve the efficiency of the Spanish colonial
system.

These reforms and the system that they supplanted

will be discussed early in this study in order to set the
stage for Sanz's arrival in Buenos Aires in 1777.

Important

incidents and issues that he faced will then be described in
chronological order.

Changes in Sanz's style of responding

to succeeding issues will show his growth and development as
a royal official, from his first dispute with tobacco growers
x

in Paraguay to his futile effort to block invading revolu
tionaries from entering Upper Peru.
*

*

*

*

*

Few historians today would agree with Thomas
Carlyle's statement that "biography is the only true
history."

On the other hand, the simplifications that are

necessary to make history intelligible often depict the
operations of nations as the products of monolithic and
unanimous choices by leaders and functionaries.

An examina

tion of the career of a functionary in any political system,
however, will quickly show that these simplifications can be
inaccurate.

Tracing the development of Sanz’s bureaucratic

modus operandi will demonstrate that the actual policies and
practices which emerged for the viceroyalty under the
reforming Bourbons were often syntheses of bureaucratic
conflicts and maneuverings. The impact of Sanz and of other
personalities on the viceregal government depended on their
connections, skill and persistence, all of which Sanz had
and used.
Most writers who deal with the late colonial period
and the independence movement of Argentina and Bolivia
mention Sanz.

However, their treatment of him varies

greatly, depending on their nationality and orientation.
Royalist Spanish historians for example, treat Sanz as one
of their own sacrificed to the enemy.

Two such writers.

AndrSs Garcia Camba and Mariano Torrente, characterize Sanz
as a royalist martyr and his executioners as cruel
assassins.

At the same time, Argentine historians view Sanz

in a very different light.

To Gregorio Funes and Vicente

Fidel Ldpez, he was the corrupt and incompetent beneficiary
of colonial nepotism who tried to obstruct their nation's
revolutionary beginning.

Bolivian authors Modesto Omiste and

Jos6 Fellman Velarde take a less passionate view of Sanz and
portray him as an efficient and well-liked administrator who
unfortunately got in the way of the independence movement.
Since his career coincided almost exactly with the
existence of the viceroyalty, Sanz is a major character in
John Lynch's study of the intendancy system in the Rio de la
Plata.

In this work Sanz appears as a belligerent and

embattled bureaucrat.

But no study of the period emphasizes

Sanz's entire career, and because of the diverse and con
flicting portrayals of so important a figure in the vice
royalty, such a study is warranted.
*

*

*

*

*

Research for this project was carried out between
1975 and 1977.

Printed documents were valuable in learning

about Sanz's career.

Transcriptions of Villava’s and Sanz's

arguments about the Potosi mita by Ricardo Levene and Maria
del Carmen Cortes Salinas, respectively, formed the basis
for the chapter dealing with that dispute.

The Instituto de

Investigaciones HistOricas of Potosi published documents
dealing with the mita, some of which were written by Sanz
and the Potosi azogueros. Eduardo Martirfi published the
Cddigo Carolino, a law code that Sanz helped to prepare, and
which provides some insights into his values.
Field research was carried out in Bolivia and in
Argentina in 1975 and 1976 under the auspices of a FulbrightHays research fellowship.

Some of the useful books, journals

and newspapers consulted in South America would not have been
available in the United States.

Most of the information,

however, was acquired from documents in the Archivo Nacional
de Bolivia in Sucre, the Archivo de la Casa de Moneda in
Potosi and the Archivo General de la Naci6n in Buenos Aires.
Moreover, overland transportation between Potosi, Sucre
(formerly La Plata) and Buenos Aires along some of the same
roads that Sanz traveled, added another dimension to this
study.

Other sources consulted in the preparation of this

dissertation include microfilm copies of pertinent documents
in the Archivo General de Indias in Seville.
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Chapter X
POTOSI IN THE 18TH CENTURY:

DECLINING

FORTUNES OF A BOOM TOWN
When Francisco de Paula Sanz started for Potosi in
1788, the city had already existed for nearly two hundred
fifty years.

The name Potosi had long been known around the

world as a synonym for great wealth because of the rich
silver deposits there.

The Cerro Rico (Rich Mountain), the

source of most of this wealth, had come to symbolize not
only the great profit that Spain gained from her colonies,
but also the great suffering endured by her indigenous
subjects to produce that profit.

All mineral wealth is

exhaustable, however, and when Potosi's last colonial
governor arrived, the local economy, dependent for a quarter
millennium on the intensive extraction of silver from one
mountain, had reached its nadir.

Production and population

were low, corruption and discontent were high, and, as Sanz
slowly made his way northward across the difficult terrain
from Buenos Aires toward the "Imperial City of Potosi," many
difficult tasks awaited him.
Potosi is located on the edge of the Altiplano in a
bleak, cold region at an altitude of about 13,700 feet.

The

forbidding climate was often cited as the reason why no
Creole child survived beyond two weeks after birth in
Potosi, until Nicolas Flores became the first in 1598, more
than fifty years after Potosi's founding.

Pedro Vicente

Canete attributed the high incidence of infant mortality to
poor ventilation and to the unhealthy vapors from coal
braziers.

Nevertheless, wealthy Potosi women often traveled

to more comfortable altitudes to pass their period of
pregnancy and to have their babies.1
The pious Bartolomfe Arzans de Orsua y Vela, a selfappointed chronicler of Potosi's history, stated that before
the arrival of the Spaniards in 1545, the Indian town of
Cantumarca was located about a quarter league from the site
of Potosi, and that there were several other Indian towns
nearby.

Altogether, about 2,500 Indians lived in the area

near the Cerro Rico.

A short distance away, the famous

lagoon of Tarapaya was a bathing place for the Incas.

More

over, other baths and springs existed in the area, and
Arzans, ever attentive to the sensational or supernatural,
noted that "The Bano de Chaqui, which is seven leagues from
this Villa, is healing for the 'French sickness' and for
various other ailments, but it does not help those with

Pedro Vicente Canete, Historia Flsica y Politics de
la Provincia de Potosi, ed. Gunnar Mendoza (La Pazs
Fundaci6n Universitaria "Simdn I. Patino," 1952), p. 32.
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internal tumors.

The land at the base of the Cerro Rico

where the town was later built was described by Arzans as
"damp and marshy."
The precise Pedro Vicente Cafiete depicted the setting
more exactly:
The surroundings of Potosi are, as far as the
eye can see, completely composed of hills, mountains,
ravines, slopes, and crevices, and although it is.
difficult to perceive the countryside as horizontal,
the poor quality of the soil is notable.
On all sides, one sees a cordon of extremely high
mountains: to the southeast, those which now form
with their gorges, the basins of lakes . . .; to the
west, other mountains forming a chain of ridges,
extend to the southeast; to the north, those (mountains)
which one crosses to go to Chuquisaca by a road which
they call Laderillas (hillsides) because its narrow,
craggy course goes along the skirt of a mountain for a
distance of one league, until it reaches a small plain
called el Tambillo; to the south, is the famous Cerro
de Potosi, like a column supporting the ridge running
from southeast to northwest. Between the Cerro and the
mountain with the lakes,, is a large pass through which
the road from Buenos Aires comes, touching the rim of
the Cerro. Many believe that the Cerro is the tallest
peak in the region, but such statements have been
proven false by measurement.3
The Indians who lived around the Cerro Rico were
aware of its mineral wealth, according to legend.

In

Arzans's version, the Inca Huayna Capac, en route to his
mining centers of Ccolque, Porco, and Andaccaua, saw the
Cerro and remarked on its size and beauty saying, "This
mountain doubtless contains much silver."

The Inca then

^Bartolom^ Arzans de Orsua y Vela, Historia de la
Villa Imperial de Potosi, 3 vols. (Providence, Rhode Island:
Brown University Press, 1965), 1:33-35.
^Canete, Historia Fisica, p. 7.

ordered his vassals to begin mining on the hillside.
Equipped with tools of flint and strong wood, the Indians
obeyed.

After probing to locate the lodes, they prepared to

extract the rich ore.

As they were poised to open the veins,

they heard a loud noise that made the whole mountain shake,
and a great voice told them, "Do not take silver from this
mountain, because it is destined for other masters!" The
frightened miners related the story to their king saying,
"Potocsi,11 which means great and terrifying noise.

Arzans

gave the word another possible etyomology, citing Antonio de
Acosta in Historia de Potosi. who wrote that it was derived
from orcco Poctocchi, which in Quechua means, "mountain that
sprouts silver."^
There are several slightly differing versions of the
story of the European discovery of silver at Potosi.
Arzans's is the most complete.

Again

All of the stories agree

that an Indian shepherd named Hualca (also spelled Gualpa,
Gualca, etc.), who was included in a repartimiento made to
Captain Jaime Villarroel, made the initial discovery.

Arzans

wrote that Gualca, in pursuit of far-ranging llamas was
obliged to spend the night in the marshy area that would
become Potosi.

"The night was dark and so he had to stay on

the Cerro de 'Potocsi' since he had been guided there by
divine providence, it was now time for humans to be given
the silver of that rich mountain."

Gunnar Mendoza, however.

^Arzans, Villa Imperial, 1:27.

states that there is evidence that the Incas had worked the
mines in the Cerro Rico before the Spaniards had come,
although Gualca may have been the Indian who first showed
the silver to the Spaniards.

At any rate, Gualca’s landlord

Villarroel was told of the discovery, and made the first
claim at Potosi in 1545.5
Other Spaniards were attracted by the news of the
discovery, and Potosi became a boom town that stimulated the
development of the rest of the continent.

By 1559, just

fourteen years after the discovery of silver on the mountain,
the population had reached 50,000 (10,000 Spaniards and
40,000 Indians).

These figures represent seventy percent of

the European population and four percent of the Indian popu
lation of the entire territory of the Audiencia of Charcas
which was created in that year.

This sudden and large con

centration of people created a great demand for food, tools,
and transportation animals, but Potosi's immediate surround
ings were too high and cold to produce sufficient food, or
to raise livestock.

This demand, therefore, immediately

stimulated agricultural and cattle production elsewhere,
first in the Valley of Chuquisaca, and subsequently in
Cotagaita, Paria, and Chayanta.

La Paz became an important

commercial center and depot, supplying Potosi with potatoes
from the Lake Titicaca region and with coca from the Yungas,
to the north.

5Ibid.

South of Potosi, the city of TucumSn was

6
founded in 1565, and its first inhabitants began raising
mules to replace llamas as beasts of burden at Potosi.
During the same period, factories were set up in La Paz and
Chuquisaca to furnish Potosi leather goods, furniture,
silverware and liquor.®
The legal entry ports until 1776 for the vast
quantities of European goods consumed in Potosi were Callao
and Arica, and they were the legal exit ports for the silver
mined in Upper Peru.

Mule trains that transported the

exports and imports passed through La Paz, a major stopping
place.

Huari, the site of a traditional fair and Colquechaca,

another settlement, were linked by roads to Potosi, as were
Paria and Sicasica, important sources of Indian workers.

A

road was soon opened from Potosi to Chayanta, another
important source of labor.

n

This communications network helped the city to grow
and prosper at a phenomenal rate.

In 1611, the viceroy

ordered that a census be taken in the city of Potosi.

That

census revealed a total population of 160,000 inhabitants,
more than in any other city in the New World at that time.
This figure included 76,000 Indians, 40,000 Spaniards, 38,000
O

Creoles and 6,000 Negroes.0
The ore first mined at Potosi was that found near
the surface of the Cerro Rico.

(La Paz:

Once this surface ore was

®Josfe Fellman Velarde, Historia de Bolivia. 3 vols.
Editorial "Los Amigos del Libro," 1968), 1:120-23.
^Ibid.

8Ibid.

gone, the miners bored into the sides of the mountains
seeking continuations of the veins, and in the 1560's just
twenty years after excavation was begun, tunnels of two
hundred fifty yards had been dug.

The Florentine miner

Nicolas de Benino had the first adit cut into the mountain,
320 yards long, and others were soon constructed.

The

purpose of the adits was to provide the laborers with access
to the work areas at the inner extremities of the tunnels or
to smaller tunnels which branched off of the main adit.
The earliest tunnels were near the peak of the cone-shaped
mountain, because at the higher levels the distance from the
surface to the veins was less.

Further down the hillside,

the Indians had to dig progressively longer tunnels to reach
the ore until, during Sanz's administration, a tunnel 2,200
yards long was completed.

Q

All of the processes involved in the production of
silver were labor-intensive.

The first step, the removal of

the ore from the mines, was done by small groups of workers.
They walked up the mountain and entered the adits or tunnels,
and walked back to the fronton or work area.

Here, the

barreteros (pickmen) broke off chunks of rock which were
loaded into leather shoulder-bags called botas, and these
were carried by apirios who then made their way to the

9D. A. Brading and Harry E. Cross, "Colonial Silver
Mining: Mexico and Peru," Hispanic American Historical
Review, LII:4 (November, 1972), 551.

8
surface, aided where necessary by rickety wooden ladders.^
Next the ore was transported in like manner down the
mountainside to be refined.

During the first years after the

discovery of Potosi, most of the refining was done by Indians
(hired by the Spanish) who used the primitive methods of
their ancestors.

This was possible because the first ore

mined was relatively free of impurities.

The rocks taken

from the mines were first ground up in marays or basic
mortars made of stone.

The pulverized ore was then heated in

a wind furnace called a quaira which burned straw or llama
dung.

Since the silver and the impurities melted at dif

ferent temperatures, they could be separated.

This method

of refining rapidly became inadequate as the high-grade ores
were depleted, so that by the 1560's a severe decline in
production was apparent. 11
When the Cerro Rico was discovered in 1545 mine
owners were able to attract an abundant work force by
offering a salary of nine pesos per six-day week.

The free

laborers who worked in the mines at that time were called
mingados. and for the first twenty years after the discovery
of Potosi, they remained the only source of labor.

Exhaus

tion of the richer veins near the surface, however, forced

lOcanete, Historia Fisica. p. 165.
1^-Eduardo Martir6, El CQdigo Carolino de Ordenanzas
Reales de las minas de Potosi, y demas provineias del Rxo
de la Plata (1794) de Pedro Vicente Can.ete (Buenos Aires:
Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1973), p. 14.

the mineowners to hire more workers in order to dig deeper
into the hillsides, and to refine poorer quality ores.

The

entrepreneurs saw their profits begin to shrink and they
reacted by lowering the weekly salary of the workers from
nine to seven pesos.

This measure exacerbated the problem by

causing workers to leave Potosi.

The mine owners then

appealed to the authorities, declaring that they would not
be able to continue their production if some effective form
of help were not forthcoming.
Abuses in the mita service became apparent as the
rich ore from the mountain was depleted and it became neces
sary to search at greater depths.

This concerned the Crown

and royal functionaries, especially when the deputy from the
Silver Amalgamators1 Guild (members of which were later
called azoqueros) conveyed the needs of the mining center to
the viceroy in 1561, making it known that the mining industry
had greatly deteriorated and diminished because of poor
government and incorrect mining techniques.
Partly in response to this appeal and also to carry
out orders from Philip II, the energetic and progressive
Viceroy of Peru, Francisco de Toledo (1569-81), set out in
October, 1572, on a five-year inspection tour.

Early in

1572, while Toledo was in Cuzco, he was approached by Pedro
FernSndez de Velasco who offered to show him how mercury was

^Alberto Crespo Rodas, "La Mita de Potosi, "
Revista HistOrica (Lima), XXII (1955-56), 178.
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used to extract silver from the ore, a process invented in
New Spain and known as the "patio process. ” F e m & n d e z de
Velasco ground up silver ore, induced amalgamation with
T^
quicksilver, and produced fine white silver.
This process
was adopted for Potosi and consequently, production increased
rapidly at the mining center (see production graph).
Refiners could not utilize ore which had been thrown on the
slag heap earlier because of its poor quality.

The techno

logical advantage of mercury amalgamation stimulated new
activity in and around the Cerro Rico, but it also raised
the costs of mineral production even higher.

More Indians

had to be hired to attend the process, and the expensive
mercury had to be transported to Potosi from distant
Huancavelica.
The mine owners again turned to Toledo for assistance,
and the Viceroy visited Potosi for three months in late
1572, and early 1573, to observe the problem firsthand.

He

was greeted with an opulent celebration, but quickly turned
his attention to investigating the operations there.

He

found corruption and disorganization in the royal exchequer,
and later he remarked on the deplorable state of the mines,
particularly the lack of safety precautions.
Toledo was also aware of the deep concern often
expressed by the Crown for the welfare of Indian subjects.

13Arthur Franklin Zimmerman, Francisco de Toledo,
Fifth Viceroy of Peru, 1569-1581 (New York: Greenwood Press,
1968), p. 131.

Graph I
Estimated Potosi Silver Production, 1550-1810
(millions of pesos)
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Sources: D. A. Brading and Harry E. Cross, "Colonial Silver Minings Mexico and Perd
Hispanic American Historical Review, LII:4 (November, 1972), 569; Peter J. Bakewell,
"Registered Silver Production in the Potosi District, 1550-1735," Jahrbuch Fur
Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas, XII (1975), 86;
Joaquin Blanco Antolinez, "Proyecto Econdmico" (Unpublished Manuscript, Potosi, 1808)
ANB, Rucik 256.
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As early as 1512 Diego Columbus was charged, in the Laws of
Burgos, with removing Indians from native villages to Spanish
settlements
. . . with the least possible harm to said chiefs and
Indians, to this end encouraging them with praise and
[we] command them most earnestly to do this with care,,
fidelity, and diligence, with greater regard for the
good treatment and conservation of said Indians than
for any other respect, desire or interest.
King Ferdinand the Catholic went on to specify that Indians
engaged in mining should work for five months of the year
only, and that after this period, they should rest for forty
days.

Ferdinand's grandson, the Emperor Charles V, during

whose reign Potosi was discovered, was equally concerned with
the treatment of the Indian.

The New Laws, promulgated by

him in 1541, stated:
Whereas one of the most important things in which
the Audiencias are to serve us is in taking very special
care of the good treatment of the Indians, and the pre
servation of them. We command that the said Audiencias
enquire continually into the excesses or ill-treatment
which are or shall be done to them by governors or
private persons . . . [and that] the Audiencias take
special care that they [Indians] be not laden or in
case that in some parts, this cannot be avoided, that
it be in such a manner that no risk of life, health,
and preservation of the said Indians may ensue from an
inordinate burthen; and that against their own will and
without their being paid, in no case be it permitted
that they be laden, punishing very severely him who
shall act contrary to this.l*
Although mining silver and gold was known to the
Indians before the arrival of the Spaniards, they did not

i^Lewis Hanke, ed.. History of Latin American Civili
zation: Sources and Interpretations, 2 vols. (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1973), 1:138.
15Ibid.
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place nearly as high a value on the metals as did the
Europeans.

Traditionally they had been farmers, and many

resisted leaving their farms for the mines, especially after
the wage was lowered from nine to seven pesos.

When Toledo

arrived in Potosi, the mine owners pointed out this resis
tance to him and called it laziness, requesting that he
establish a coercive labor system.

They indicated that in

order to sustain and improve silver production, at least
4,500 workers would be needed in addition to the voluntary
workers already in Potosi.

Toledo favored providing the

mine owners with the workers they had requested, but he was
faced with the royal constraints already mentioned.

He had

to establish a system that would provide an adequate labor
supply for the mines of Potosi, one that guaranteed fair
wages and prohibited abuse of the workers.

The system that

he ultimately devised was called the mita (from a Quechua
word meaning shift or turn), and it was based on the strict
control the Incas had over their vassals.

The paternal Xnca

state had been concerned with the welfare of its subjects,
but at the same time, it had been oppressive and rigorous.
To obtain what was desired from the vassals, the Incas had
demanded large contributions in labor and in kind.

Proponents

of the Toledan System often pointed to this fact, calling
1 /r

the new system more humane than its predecessor.4-0
To obtain the required number of workers, it was

•^Zimmerman,

Francisco de Toledo, p. 195.
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necessary to bring Indians from parts of the area between
Cuzco to the north and Tarij a to the south? from the Pacific
coast to the Amazon lowlands.

But within this area there

were lowland zones with tropical climates# and it was believed
that the inhabitants of these regions should be excluded from
the labor contribution so that they would not have to undergo
the brusque change of climate entailed in the move to
Potosi.

Therefore, sixteen provinces were obligated to con17
tribute mitayos or mita workers,
and fourteen others were
exempted because of their climatic conditions.
There were approximately 95,000 eligible Indians in
the subject provinces when the mita was begun# but only 4,500

were needed at a time.

In order to lessen the work respon

sibility of each Indian, only one-seventh of the full 95,000
or about 13*500 Indians actually went to Potosi at any given
time, and each seventh was supposed to serve for one year.
The mine owners were to pay the travel expenses of the
mitayos to Potosi.

Actual expenses for workers from the more

distant provinces could exceed nine pesos, but owners were
required to pay only five pesos. 18
Once the workers had arrived in Potosi# they began a
three-week work cycle, with a third (4,500) working in the
mines and refineries, while the remaining two-thirds (9,000)
either rested or hired themselves out as mingados. After

17Canete, Historia Fisica. p. 151.
•^■Qlbid.
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the 13,500 mitayos had spent one year in Potosi, they were
free to return to their homes and to stay there for the next
six years, or they could stay in Potosi as minqados.

Only

men between the ages of eighteen and fifty were subject to
the mita, so that no Indian would have to go to Potosi more
than three or four times, and once there, he would have to
work only one week out of three.
Furthermore, in accordance with Emperor Charles V's
decree of December 25, 1551, the viceroy ordered that the
mitayos be paid in bars of assayed silver from the mines,
and if this were not available, unassayed silver could be
substituted.

In Potosi, the mitayos1 salary was fixed at

three and a half reales per day for labor in the mines.
Indians who ground the ore or who worked in the smelters
were to receive three reales, and all other mita workers got
two and three-fourths reales per day. Mita workers were to
iq
be paid in advance every week.
The day of payment was
later fixed as Monday to prevent weekend debauchery.
The differential between what volunteer workers were
paid before the mita was established; i.e., nine pesos (72
reales) per week (about 13 per day) and later seven pesos
(56 reales) per week (about 10 reales per day) versus three
and a half reales per day under the mita, clearly indicates
that the mita workers were paid less than the full market
value of their labor.

Most of these workers went to Potosi

•^Zimmerman, Francisco de Toledo, p. 184.
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only because they were compelled to do so.

The mita, there

fore, was a kind of government subsidy in the form of
artificially cheap labor awarded to the mine owners to help
sustain their production.
The mita created a situation in which to abuse the
Indians was both easy and profitable.

The greed of the

Potosi miners was insatiable; and the ignorance and lack of
organization of
mining regions

the Indians,

as well

from metropolitan centers of

allowed that greed to be exercised.
can be shown by

as the

the repeated

remotenessof the

authority,

That abuses were common

efforts

occasionally ofviceroys, to prevent them.

of the

Crown, and

Philip II,

on

January 10, 1589, ordered that the Indians be worked
moderately, and that their health be maintained.

Concerned

about fairness in the payment of Indians' wages, he decreed
five years later that daily wages should be "competent and in
proportion to the Indians’ work."

He also ruled that the

mine owners should pay the Indians' transportation costs to
and from Potosi, and that royal officials should see that
these expenses were paid.

Philip charged the town justices

(justicias del pueblo) with accompanying the mitayos to the
work site and with defending their interests in any dispute
over wages.

The same law was issued twice more by Philip III,

and again by Philip IV.

In 1620, Philip III described and

forbade an abuse that was to continue after his reign:
Many Indians assigned to work in the mines do not
work in them because the mine owners to whom they have
been assigned release the Indians from the responsibility,
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and each week, the owners collect a certain amount
of money [from the royal treasury] for each Indian
they have excused, saying that with this money, they
will hire other workers: and although it is true
that some actually do this, it is more common that
these mine owners simply keep the money, and there
is no one to work, so that Our Royal Fifths diminish:
We order the viceroys and Audiencias to proceed
against those delinquent in this manner, not only
depriving them of the use of Indian laborers, but also
punishing them corporally and fining them.20
Viceroy Conde de Lemos made vigorous efforts to end
abuses of the mita.

Arriving in Peru in 1667, he began by

re-establishing work days lasting from "sun to sun." This
permitted the Indians to come down from the Cerro Rico
after work and sleep in their houses, instead of remaining
in the shafts.

"It is not silver that is sent to Spain," he

wrote to the King, "but the sweat and blood of the Indians."
He also ordered the abolition of the practice of allowing
Indians to pay money instead of serving in the mita.
assessment of the situation in 1669 was bleak:

His

"The Indians

have been gravely hurt and oppressed, settlements failing,
work periods not adhered to, their occupation reduced to
slavery."

The death of Conde de Lemos two years later

weakened the enforcement of his reforms, and cleared the way
for the immediate return of wrongdoings.21
Abuses of the mita system continued and increased in
the 18th Century, and the rule prohibiting night work was
disregarded,

canete described a night's work in the mines

20Recopilaci6n de las leyes de los reinos. de las
Indias {Madrid, 1791).
21Crespo Rodas, "La Mita de Potosi," p. 181.
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in the late 1700's:
One bad night in the mines is enough to break
even a robust and healthy man. But for these
wretches {the mitayos) all nights are bad. Over
loaded with ore, they ascend and descend from caverns
filled with horror and danger, and which resemble
chambers of demons. The mineral vapors cause harm
and combined with the abrupt temperature change
incurred when the sweat-soaked Indians leave the hot
mines for the freezing climate outside, they make the
workers look like dead bodies. Their morning rest
period consists of breaking up the ore they have
removed during the night, twenty or thirty bagsfull,
weighing about four arrobas each.22
During Sana's administration, an article appeared in
the Mercurio Peruano which described conscription for the
mita:
The Indians who go to the mines of Potosi depart
from their villages somewhat desconsolate, for they
know quite well that they may contract in the mines
asthma or choco. which may quickly prove fatal.
Their day of departure is extremely sad: the con
scripts parade before the priest who awaits them at
the church door holding a cross. He blesses them
with the customary prayers; then he says Mass, for
which they pay, in order to ask the Almighty for a
happy end to their journey. Afterwards, they go out
to the square accompanied by their priest, relations
and friends? and amidst mutual embraces and tears,
they bid farewell, and followed by their children and
wives, they sadly take the road. The grimness and
melancholy of this scene is increased by the beating
of drums, and the sound of church bells tolling for
prayers.23
The mita then, was a system that was established soon
after the founding of Potosi, to provide the mine owners with
cheap labor.

Viceroy Toledo based the mita on Inca

^Canete,

Hi3toria Fisica. p. 167.

23John Lynch, Spanish-Colonial Administration, 1782
1810. The Intendant System in the Vicerovalty of the Rio de
la Plata (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), p. 178.
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antecedents, and it was designed to have as few disruptive
effects as possible on the individual Indians or on the
native communities by limiting the time each Indian was to
work and by subjecting only a seventh of the population of
the subject provinces to the service at any given time.
Avarice and the corruption of royal officials, however,
nullified the mitigating provisions of the mita and the
service in actual practice degenerated into the kidnapping
and enslavement of the Indians who could not pay the corregidores to exempt them.
Silver production in Potosi began to decline again
when other mines were discovered, particularly after 1640.
It continued to decline steadily throughout the eighteenth
century, despite desperate efforts to improve the methods by
which the silver was exploited.

Mining technology did not

progress, and remained linked to the patio process for
refining metals, which by the 1700's was uneconomical and
rudimentary compared with more recently developed European
techniques.

Moreover, because subterranean archetecture was

not adequate, mines were virtual caverns where faulty drain
age and the lack of air in the galleries hampered and
endangered the workers.
By 1779, the situation had worsened and Visitador
Jorge Escobedo wrote to Jos6 de Galvez that the mining center
suffered great poverty, "as much because the mines are flooded

Z^Martird, El Cddigo Carolino, p. 21.

as because of the ignorance of those who instruct in the art
of mining."

More outlandish efforts to increase production

included attempts to locate the "source of silver," a large
deposit of rich ore thought to exist within the mountain,
but Canete ruefully wrote in 1797, "We should not hope to
strike the source of silver which some believe to be hidden
within the Cerro. because if it were there, some signs of it
would have appeared already."

He concluded that with

excavations going down more than 700 varas. and with so many
tunnels that "they cross each other like holes in a sponge,"
it should have been discovered.

Furthermore, in addition to

legitimate miners, cajchas— thieves more or less tolerated
by the government— criss-crossed the tunnels, and neither
they nor the established miners found any traces of the
O C

imagined wealth.
Despite such wishful thinking, mining in Alto Peru
never returned to what it had been during the great days of
Viceroy Toledo.

Between 1585 and 1624, an average of

1,700,000 pesos was produced annually at the Cerro Rico de
Potosi.

From 1600 to 1735, production fell steadily,2® and

by the mid-eighteenth century, the Mountain was producing
only about 250,000 pesos per year.27

25canete, Historica Fisica, p. 64.
2®Peter J. Bakewell, "Registered Silver Production
in the Potosi District, 1550-1735," Jahrbuch Fur Geschichte
von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas, XII
(1975), 86.
27Martir6, El COdigo Carolino, p. 21.
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Potosi's population dwindled along with her silver
production.

Where 160,000 inhabitants had lived in the

1600's, only about 25,000 remained in the late 1700's.2®
The Indian population fell more noticeably than did the
European population, creating severe labor shortages.

The

15,000 mitayos originally assigned to work at Potosi were
reduced to 3,500 by the early 1770's . ^

In an officxal

report dated March 31, 1788, Governor Juan del Pino Manrique
stated that there was such confusion and disorder in the
provinces that officials sometimes failed to send the proper
list with the assigned mitayos, and often did not even com
plete their quotas of Indians.

He warned that if these

defects were not "cut off at the roots," they would reduce
the mita to a state of "irreparable decadence."

Pino

Manrique recommended that officials in each partido (province)
send their full quotas immediately, under the supervision of
qualified and well-paid captains, who would assume respon
sibility for delivering the Indians to Potosi.2®
Manuel de Balvas, capitan mayor de la mita de Potosi.
informed Pino in an official report that same year that "the
Cerro Rico has suffered since the year of the revolutions

28canete, Historia Flsica, pp. 26-27.
29Alonso Carrion de la Vandera [Concolorcorvo], El
Lazarillo de Ciegos Caminantes (Lima: 1773; reprint ed.,
Madrid: Ediciones Atl&s, 1959), p. 341.
30pino Manrique to Audiencia of Charcas^"sobre los
vicios y defectos que la mita padece desde el ano de la
rebelidn general de 1780," Potosi, March 31, 1788, ANB,
Minas vol. 129.

from vices and defects which harm the public and the Royal
Revenue."^1

These "vices and defects" included failure of

some of the provinces to send their full allotments of
workers, and the appointment of uncultured poor men as
capitanes enteradores (officials who transported and cared
for the workers during the journey to Potosi).

Finally, he

complained about provinces that permitted Indians to sub
stitute payments for service in the mines, saying that the
mine owners, being satisfied with these payments, did not
work their holdings.
Balvas called the mita the principal support of the
happiness of the state, without which mining could not
progress, and he warned that unless the aforementioned
wrongs were corrected, mining would become so decadent that
it could never be re-established.

He concluded that the

Indians were showing "more and more independence, " and that
unless action were taken, another civil war would ensue.^
The response of the Indians themselves to the forced
labor system included several ways of avoiding it.

Those

threatened with the mita often paid the azoquero instead of
serving.

This was expensive, because the mitayo had to pay

the mine owner enough to hire a minqado to replace him, which

3lBalvas was referring to the year 1780, when a
general Indian uprising led by Tupac Amaru and the Catari
brothers devastated much of Upper Peru (see below).
33Balvas to Intendant Governor Galvez y Valenzuela
of Chuquisaca, Potosi, February 26, 1788, ANB, Minas vol. 129.
33ibid.
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necessarily cost considerably more than a mitayo would earn.
Another response of the natives was simply to run away to a
province that was exempt from the mita.

Because of exten

sive flight, the population of the subject provinces dropped
drastically.

As early as 1612, the President of the

Audiencia of Charcas complained about the depopulation of
the sixteen provinces subject to the mita.

In order to make

up the deficiency of available workers, the time cycle for
serving in Potosi was reduced in 1620 from seven to two
years, and once the workers were in Potosi, their rest period
was reduced from two weeks to one.

In 1628 an oidor of the

Audiencia of Charcas, after a visita to the obligated
provinces, wrote that two-thirds of the Indians attributed to
the towns by the census were missing.

Depopulation was even

more evident in the eighteenth century.^
Another escape measure taken by some Indians was to
enter the service of an hacienda as a yanacona or tied
laborer.

Yanaconas were exempt from mita service.

In spite

of these occurrences, the villages were still required to
supply the same number of mitayos, or at least as many workers
as possible.

Pino Manrique blamed these difficulties on the

bad treatment that the mitayos received despite his own
efforts and the many laws protecting them.

He noted that

Indians were overworked by the mine owners, and as a result,
OC

many were becoming sick.

^Crespo Rodas, "La Mita de Potosi," p. 179.
35Ibid.
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Indian resistance to the mita sometimes resulted in
direct action.

On several occasions during the Colonial

Period, there were armed uprisings, specifically against
forced labor.

In the second half of the eighteenth century,

for example, Juan Santos led a fourteen-year rebellion, an
uprising occurred in Arequipa when a customshouse was
established, and a serious conspiracy was discovered in
Cuzco.
By far the most serious and best-organized Indian
uprising in Spain’s colonies occurred between 1780 and 1783,
and it affected much of the South American continent.

Jos£

Gabriel Tupac Amaru, a cultured Indian of high birth, and a
native of the Peruvian town of Tinta, sparked the smoulder
ing resentment into open rebellion in 1780, and served as
the leader of the movement during its early months.

Jos£

Gabriel, himself a cacique who governed the Indians and
collected their tribute payments, was frustrated in his
efforts during the 1700's to be declared the rightful
Marqu6s de Oropesa by the Audiencia of Lima.

While in Lima,

in 1777, he also presented petitions to the viceroy asking
for relief from the mita for his own cacique ship and for
several others nearby, saying that providing workers for the
mines depopulated the region and created hardship.

He asked

that the viceroy enforce the many mitigating laws that
applied to the mita, to end the maltreatment of the Indians.
The superintendent of the mita in Potosi denied any wrong-
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doing, and Tupac Amaru's humanitarian efforts were also
blocked.^
In 1780, while Tupac Amaru was awaiting the outcome
of his litigations, a dispute arose between the bishop of
Cuzco, Juan Manuel Moscoso y Peralta, and the Corregidor of
Tinta, Antonio de Arriaga, over the treatment of Indians.
Arriaga was reportedly cruel in his dealings with the natives,
and Jos6 Gabriel and his followers, frustrated in their
attempts to achieve better treatment for the Indians within
the legal system, captured the corregidor and executed him.
The uprising quickly spread to other parts of Peru and into
the new Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata.
A separate but strikingly similar rebellion was in
the making in Chayanta province, adjacent to Potosi, and a
source of many mita workers.

Tomas Catari, the instigator

in Chayanta, was also a high-spirited Indian who sought
redress in the Spanish courts for his grievances.

He was an

enemy of the cacique of his village, Macha, and accused him
of dishonest collection of tribute.

Presenting his case in

Potosi, Catari won the right to collect tribute himself, but
when he showed the order to the corregidor of Macha, it was
disregarded, and Catari was imprisoned.

When he was released,

Tom&s journeyed to Buenos Aires to present his case to the
Viceroy, who ordered that he be reinstated as tribute col
lector.

(Norman:

Returning to Macha, Catari began to collect the

Estelle Fisher, The Last Inca Revolt
University of Oklahoma Press, 1966), pp. 28-52.
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tribute, but was soon arrested by the unusually corrupt
corregidor Joaquin Aids.

Supporters of Catari freed him and

he went to La Plata to ask for help from the audiencia, but
was arrested a third time, sparking his followers to rebel
openly. TomAs ’s brother Dclmaso led the Indians who surrounded
Aids's house and forced Tomds 1s release. The Indians then
killed many Europeans in Macha, respecting only priests.
During his freedom, TomAs Catari declared the
tribute decreased, and the mita and repartimiento and other
taxes extinguished.

Word traveled quickly and the Cataris

gained many supporters.

The brothers knew of the activity

of Tupac Amaru to the west and north, but it is uncertain
whether the two groups communicated.

The insurrection spread

throughout Peru and the northern part of the Viceroyalty of
Rio de la Plata.

The cruel execution of Tupac Amaru in

Cuzco, and the death in battle of TomAs Catari served only
to solidify the rebels, and to gain them more adherents,
among them, opportunistic Creoles.

In Oruro, for example,

the Creoles conspired with the Indians to overthrow the
Europeans, and in early 1781, all of the Europeans in that
city were murdered and their houses were looted.

Potosi

avoided this fate only because of the preparations of
Governor Jorge Escobedo, who mobilized and fortified the city.
Puno, Sorata, La Plata, Cuzco and La Paz were all besieged,
with heavy casualties.

In La Paz, one-third of the popula

tion was lost in two sieges which together lasted six
months.

The revolt was finally quelled in 1783, after much
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death and destruction, and the flight of many of the sur
viving Europeans.37
Upper Peru was weakened and devastated by the insur
rection; the Indian population, vital to the generation of
wealth, was decreased.

Many of the managerial class, the

peninsulars, were either killed during the insurrection, or
fled to other parts of the Empire.
During the ten-year period before S anz's arrival at
his post in Potosi, the Spanish Government made an extensive
effort to reverse the lack of productivity caused by cor
ruption and war.

Sweeping reforms in the administration of

the colonies had been instituted even before the rebellion
of 1780-83, among these reforms were the creation of the
Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata in 1776, as well as the
installation of the intendancy system.
affected Potosi.

37Ibid.

All of these changes

Chapter XI
POTOSI AND THE BOURBON REFORMS
Spain's power had reached its zenith under Philip II
(1556-1598), and after his reign, it began to decline.
During the next century, Spain suffered military and economic
setbacks.

In Europe, Spain lost the Netherlands, Portugal,

Cerdana, and Rousillon.

In the New World, other European

states set up colonies in the Lesser Antilles, the English
captured Jamaica in 1655, and buccaneers harassed Spanish
possessions in America.

Spain itself suffered a decline in

population during the first part of the century, and since
the 1560’s, a shortage of workers in the manufacturing
districts had necessitated increasing dependence on imported
manufactured goods.

In rural areas, depopulation accounted

for a drop in agricultural production.

Charles II, the last

Hapsburg king of Spain, was physically and mentally unsuited
to rule.

He reigned from 1665 until his death in 1700; and

because of his weakness, several factions at court, including
those with French and Austrian leanings, vied to gain influ
ence and control, neglecting the welfare of the country.
These problems continued and worsened until 1680,
after which date Charles i l ’s government made some attempts
28

to solve them.

Among the steps taken was the creation of

the post of Superintendent General of Hacienda, in 1687.
The Superintendent General was to be a kind of financial
overseer for the kingdom, following the pattern in France.
Four years later superintendents were established in each of
Castile's twenty-one provinces.1

These reforms were largely

stillborn, however, because of national and international
concern about who would inherit the Spanish Empire once
Charles died without heir.

Although a genetic defective,

Charles had enough wits to act to preserve his patrimony by
bequeathing it to Philip of Anjou, the grandson of Louis XIV.
After Charles II's death, the will was contested by England
and Holland, and the War of the Spanish Succession followed.
The encounter terminated with the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713,
and Philip of Anjou, a Bourbon, was recognized as Philip V
of Spain.
French influence became apparent as Philip V (17001746) began his long reign.

He asked Louis XIV to send an

expert to help reform the financial administration of Spain;
and Louis d'Orry, the man he sent, helped to shape Spanish
economic policy.

An improvement resulted as factories were

built and nascent industries were protected.

Philip took

advantage of the relatively peaceful period to unify the
nation.

By reducing internal customs barriers, he promoted

•^Luis Navarro Garcia, Intendencias en Indias (Seville
Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos de Sevilla, 1959),
p. 7.
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commerce.

Greater unity was achieved by ending the special

privileges of Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia, and by merging
their recalcitrant cortes with the cortes of Castile.
Philip further centralized his control over the government
when he followed the Bourbon policy of appointing single
ministers to fulfill specific responsibilities rather than
delegating authority to committees (juntas) as the Hapsburgs
had done.
Another measure to tighten royal control over Spain
and later over the entire Empire was the adoption of the
intendancy system.

This was a most extensive change in the

administration of the government, and it had as its model
the system developed in France during the first half of the
sixteenth century.

Louis XIV later made the intendants de

justice, police, et finance his principal royal officials in
the thirty-four generalities, or political divisions of
France.

These officials held supreme power in their dis

tricts and helped to consolidate royal authority.
Philip V, trying to accomplish the same end in Spain,
established the system in 1718, with an intendant in each of
the newly created provinces to oversee the government and
one to oversee military finances.

However, the cfedula that

established the new offices was '/ague in its delegation of
judicial powers.

Confusion over jurisdiction between the new

2John Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration, 17821810, The Intendant System m the Viceroyalty of the Rio de
la Plata (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), p. 2.

31
intendants and the traditional officials, the corregidores,
resulted.

Clashes occurred over authority in the provinces,

which culminated in a March 1, 1721, decree by Philip V that
revoked the judicial powers granted in the 1718 ordinance.
The decree also reduced the responsibilities of the provin
cial intendants to merely seeing to the orderly collection
of taxes.

In spite of this decree, Philip was dissatisfied

with the traditional system of financial administration.
Spanish towns suffered abuses under the system of tax farming,
and the King wanted more control over revenue collection,
but the system remained as it was for the rest of his reign.^
Ferdinand VI tried to make revenue collection more
efficient by increasing the power of the intendants in 1749.
But this time, he made sure that there would be no conflict
with the corregidores.

He abolished the office of corregidor

in all provincial capitals and gave the intendants the power
to exercise their functions, including their judicial
function.
The intendant system in Spain underwent several more
changes during the last half of the eighteenth century.

In

1766, the function of corregidor de capital de provincia was
again separated from that of intendant, because the inten
dants were unable to handle the workload.

In 1780 and 1787,

the Grown created provincial and local committees to ease
the burden.

In 1799 the powers of the corregidor were again

^Navarro Garcia, Intendencias en Indias, p. 9.

shifted to the intendant.

The Spanish Bourbons strengthened

the office of intendant by adding the duties of policia to
his functions.

His duties in this area were to encourage

and foment mining, industry, agriculture, and shipping, and
roadbuilding. The policia duties of the intendants formed
the basis of Spain's hopes for economic recovery.^
Meanwhile, in the colonies, administration remained
much as it had been since the sixteenth century.

Philip V,

noting the inefficiency with which the Empire was managed,
had toyed with the idea of imposing the new system on the
colonies, but he had not acted.

Ferdinand VI, however, had

appointed an Intendant of the Navy and Shipbuilding in 1756
for Havana.

Later, Charles III (1759-1788), who brought

considerable managerial talent with him to the throne, was
also interested in reforming colonial administration.

After

the Seven Years War, on February 14, 1765, a junta of com
mercial experts proposed several remedies to the Crown to
improve the administration of the colonies, and to increase
revenue collection.

Their first recommendation was that

Spanish cities other than Cadiz be granted the privilege of
trading with America.

Charles III promptly followed this

advice, and a royal decree of October 16, 1765, opened the
ports of Cuba, Santo Domingo, Margarita, and Trinidad to
trade not only from Cadiz, but also from Seville, Alicante,
Cartagena, Malaga, Barcelona, Santander, Coruna, and Gigdn.

^Ibid., p. 12.
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The King also abolished the palmeo, tonelada, and other
duties, and he replaced them with ad valorum taxes.
Thirteen years later, the entire Empire, except for New
Spain and Venezuela, was opened to trade with the mother
country, and the two exceptions were included in 1789.'’
This reform met demands in Cuba for freer commerce.
The British had occupied Havana in 1762, during the Seven
Years War, and demonstrated that with good management the
port could handle more commerce and produce more revenue
than it had done in the past.

To help supervise the new

arrangement in Havana, an intendancy was created in 1765.
The new intendant was given charge of treasury and war
matters on the island, while the captain-general remained as
political chief.

The transition was smooth except for the

reluctance of the incumbent bureaucrats to relinquish their
control of revenue.

Bourbon authorities, nevertheless, were

sufficiently satisfied with the results of the experiment to
be interested in extending the system to other parts of the
Empire.^
Before attempting to apply the intendancy to other
colonies, royal authorities sent Jos6 de Galvez on his now
famous visita to New Spain in 1767.

Included in the visitor's

instructions was an order to
. . . ascertain . . . whether it will be useful and
conducive to the good of my service and of my vassals

5Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration, p. 19.
6Ibid., p. 51.
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to establish one or more intendancies in New Spain
on the same model as those of Spain, or with some
limitations or amplifications.7
In Galvez's report to the Grown dated 1768, he decried the
corruption and poor administration of the governors,
corregidores, and alcaldes mavores in Mexico, and he recom
mended that the existing system be placed by intendancies.
High salaries for intendants, he reasoned, would attract
better officials, and would eliminate much of the dishonesty
practiced under the unpaid corregidores and alcaldes
mavores.Q
Galvez's suggestions were approved, and in 1768
Galvez and Viceroy Carlos Francisco de Croix cautiously
began to establish the system in Mexico.

Only two governors

were given intendancy powers, and there was no general
ordinance that formerly applied the system as there had been
in Spain.8
The new form of government met with opposition in
Mexico for the same reasons it had been opposed in Spain and
in Cuba— -it threatened the positions of established bureau
crats.

The next viceroy, Antonio Bucareli, was an able

opponent of the new system, and through his efforts, its
general application in Mexico was forestalled for 18 years.

7Herbert Ingram Priestley, Josfe de Galvez. VisitorGeneral of New Spain (1765-1771) (Berkeley: University of
Califomia Press, 1916) , p. 411.
8Ibid.. p. 292.
9Navarro Garcia, Intendentes en Indias, p. 25.
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After the attempt to establish the intendancy system
to the entire viceroyalty of New Spain had met with resis
tance, Spanish authorities created two local intendancies in
the territory:

one in Sonora and the other in California.

An intendant of Sonora, Pedro CorbalAn, was appointed in
1771, and actually served until the general application of
the system in 1786.

An intendancy was created in California,

but because of Galvez's illness, no one took the office
until 1786.10
Meanwhile (1768-1783), the Portuguese were showing
aggressiveness under Pombal, and together with their British
allies, they were eyeing the weaker fringes of the Spanish
Empire.

Adjacent to Portuguese territory, the sprawling and

sparsely populated Rio de la Plata was particularly vulner
able.

It was envied not only because of its value for

livestock production, but also as a potential inroad to the
heart of Spanish South America.

To strengthen this flank,

Tom As Alvarez de Acevedo, the Fiscal of the Audiencia of
Charcas in 1771, proposed to the Crown the creation of a new
viceroyalty which would include the province of Cuyo (to be
separated from the captaincy-general of Chile) and the
districts of Paraguay, Buenos Aires, and TucumAn.

Viceroy

Manuel de Amat y Junient of Peru expressed a similar opinion
in July, 1775, adding that a new viceroyalty would need a

10Ibid., p. 26.

36
source of revenue to succeed. 11
These recommendations reached Charles XIX at a time
when he was concerned with boundary disagreements with
Portugal, particularly in the Banda Oriental. Taking
advantage of the distraction of the British in North America
in 1776, Charles mounted the largest military expedition
that Spain had thus far sent to South America to capture the
Portuguese colony of Sacramento.

Pedro Cevallos, a veteran

soldier and former governor of Buenos Aires, headed the
force. Cevallos convinced the king that he also would need
political authority to be an effective military leader, and
that in order to strengthen his position, he would need more
resources than Buenos Aires and Paraguay contained.

Cevallos

was therefore granted the title of viceroy in 1776, and his
jurisdiction included not only Buenos Aires and Paraguay, but
also Tucumin, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Potosi, and the
entire territory of the Audiencis of Charcas.

At the same

time that Cevallos was made viceroy, the quartermaster of his
expedition, Manuel Fernandez, was given charge of the finances
of the region.

When the new viceroyalty was permanently

incorporated in October, 1777, Fernandez was named superin
tendent and Juan Jose Virtiz y Salcedo was named to succeed
Cevallos as viceroy.

Virtiz served from 1778 until 1784.

12

Cevallos, in an effort to foster economic development
in the new viceroyalty, decreed in July, 1777, that gold and

^Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration, p. 38.
•^Ibid., p. 43.
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silver bullion could not be exported from the Viceroyalty of
Rio de la Plata to Peru.

He also authorized free trade

between the cities of the viceroyalty.

Previously, Upper

Peruvian silver had been required to flow to Lima to pay for
European imports and manufactures, and trade between Buenos
Aires and Upper Peru had been illegal.

Now Potosi silver

was attracted to Buenos Aires by the lower prices of imports
there (because of more direct shipping), and by the avail
ability there of mules, hides and cattle.

This arrangement

was convenient for both Buenos Aires and Upper Peru:

the

former could now legally get silver needed for foreign
exchange, and the latter could get imports and manufactures
more cheaply than before. 13
The Viceroyalty of Peru, meanwhile, was stripped of
over half of its territory, including its richest silver
mines.

It was left out of the stimulating and lucrative new

trading arrangement, and its government naturally opposed
the changes.

In 1779, Viceroy Manuel Guirior of Peru wrote

the Council of the Indies that the creation of the new vice
royalty was a mistake because merchants and common people
were apprehensive about property that they held within the
boundaries of the new viceroyalty.

Furthermore, he indicated

that the division of Peru would cause rivalry over mining
rights, and it would weaken the military strength of both

13
Jose Fellman Velarde, Historia de Bolivia, 4 vols.
(La Paz: Editorial "Los Amigos del Libro," 1968), 1:72.
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viceroy alt ies.^

The protest from Peru was in vain, however,

and Lima did not regain her exclusive and profitable right
to sell imports in Upper Peru.^
Royal authorities perceived an opportunity to extend
the intendant system to the newly created Viceroyalty of Rio
de la Plata because it lacked population and an entrenched
bureaucracy to resist administrative reforms.

Charles III

issued the Ordinance of Intendants for the Rio de la Plata
Viceroyalty in 1782.

The document contained two hundred

seventy-six articles, a preamble, and an index.

The first

eleven articles explained the new system, and the rest dealt
with each of the four administrative divisions of the
intendancy.

The final article established the Ordinance as

the legal code for the entire colony and nullified any
contradictory laws made earlier.
include eight intendancies:

The new viceroyalty would

Buenos Aires, Ausncidn, Tucum^n,

Santa Cruz de la Sierra, La Paz, Mendoza, La Plata, and
Potosi; and three provinces: Mojos, Chiquitos, and
16
Misiones.
The Patagonia Coast and the Malvinas Islands
were later incorporated into another intendancy, and jurisdiction over the intendancy of Puno was transferred to

14Ricardo Levene, A History of Argentina, trans.
William S. Robertson (New York: Russell & Russell, Inc.,
1963), pp. 82-83.
15Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration, p. 40.
•^Ordenanza General Formada de Orden de S.M., y
Mandada Imprimir y Publicar para el qobiemo e Ins truce i6n
de Intendentes, Subdelegados y dem&s empleados en Indias
(Madrid: La Imprinta de la Viuda de Ibarra, 1803).
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Buenos Aires from Lima for a short period.
Proceeding cautiously, Spanish royal authorities
postponed formal establishment of the Ordinance in the Rio
de la Plata area, but secretly sent copies of the Code to
Viceroy V6rtiz and to Superintendent FemSndez, as well as
to the President of the Audiencia of Charcas, and to the
Governors of Potosl and other important districts in the
viceroyalty for their opinions and suggestions.
were positive and frank.

Reactions

In,a joint reply, vertiz and

Fernandez indicated that for the reform to succeed, qualified
men had to be appointed as intendants and subdelegates, and
that reforms would be less abrupt and more palatable if the
new officials retained their old title of governor.

They

also suggested that mestizos and mulattoes be exempted from
paying tribute as Indians, since many individuals of those
groups had resented these payments enough to join the Indian
insurrection of 1780.

V6rtiz privately expressed displeasure

with the division of his duties and powers and with sharing
them with the superintendent. Many of the official's sug
gestions were taken into account as the Ordinance was issued.
The intendant governors received their titles in November,
1783, and the superintendent remained a fixture. 17
The new arrangement in Upper Peru would bring funda
mental changes to Potosi.

The Ordinance declared that gold

was now to be smelted at the Money House, and since there

-^Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration, pp. 59-61.
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was no assayer in Potosi capable of the task, instructions
had to be requested from Lima.

Mindful of the recent Indian

insurrection, the Grown, in an effort to break with the past,
changed the name of territorial divisions from provincias to
partidos, and substituted the title subdelegado for the hated
offices of corregidor and alcalde mayor.

But, "like the

former officials [the subdelegados], will administer justice
and fulfill the same obligations and duties that are partic
ular to their districts."

The subdelegates were also to be

subordinate to their intendants, and to observe the new
Ordinance.18
The Ordinance provided for more than just a super
ficial change of terminology.

The repartimiento of goods to

the Indians, a much-abused system by which officials compelled
natives to buy merchandise— often unneeded and usually at
inflated prices— was strictly prohibited.

The extension of

this prohibition to intendants, subdelegates, other royal
employees, and even to priests, and the provision that even
necessary goods could not be distributed in this way,
indicates that misusage was extensive.

Legitimate commerce

was liberalized and intendants and subdelegates were to guard
against fraud.

Reemphasis of the laws protecting Indian

welfare, however, did not mean that the natives were free to
return to idleness.

The mita was retained virtually intact,

and "in conformity with past laws, officials shall stimulate

18Ordenanza General.
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Indians to application and industry, preferring persuasion,
rewards and other humane means, and when these fail, the
punishments employed shall in no way deprive the natives of
good treatment or liberty." 19
In Potosl, Juan del Pino Manrique, the incumbent
governor, was retained as intendant when the Ordinance was
established.

Pino, an Andalusian lawyer, and career colonial

civil servant, had been appointed Governor of Potosi in 1781,
in the midst of a raging Indian insurrection.

He had

fortified and prepared the mining city for an attack, and
thariks to his efforts, Potosi had avoided siege or invasion.
The next challenge he faced was to oversee the application
of the administrative reforms in Potosi beginning in 1782.
In the secret report 20 that Galvez had requested concerning
the application of the Ordinance, Pino Manrique described
the decaying state of affairs he saw in Potosi, indicated
that reform was a proper course of action, and suggested a
drastic change for the administration of Upper Peru.
Pino Manrique wrote that being governor of Potosi was
like being "a minister exiled to Siberia, " because of the
inclement weather.

High prices and the remoteness of the

place added to the discomfort.

He complained about confusion

and disorder in the region which made cheating and malfeasance
easy to conceal.

"The people lack appreciation for honest,

19Ibid.
29Pino Manrique to Galvez (Informe reservado), Potosi,
February 16, 1783, ANB, Minas Vol. 129. The remaining quota
tions in this chapter were taken from this report.
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regular work, and merit has lost its esteem because of
neglect. . . . Confusion is valued since it hides the cor
ruption, ignorance, and lack of method in business . . .

it

[confusion] absolves the negligent and protects the corrupt."
Pino Manrique saw the Ordinance of Intendants as a
way to improve the situation, regretting that it had not
been proposed a hundred and fifty years earlier and that "it
comes after disorder, confusion, and the lack of intelligence
. . . have been allowed to proceed for so many years."

He

reasoned, "Just because something has been done for two
hundred years is not a reason to continue erring."

He wrote

that it would be practically impossible to govern America
with the exactness of government in Europe, but that the best
medicine for the problem seemed to be the new Ordinance if
applied in the correct dosage and "with the care and prudence
that the long infirmity and the old ills of the patient
require."
The unusual proposal that the Governor made was to
establish the capital of the new viceroyalty not in far-away
Buenos Aires, but in Cuzco.

Cuzco would be more appropriate,

he argued because customs, dress, ways of thinking, and
commerce differed so much between the lowland Buenos Aires
and Upper Peru.

Cuzco, being a part of Upper Peru, was more

suitable as the seat of government.

Furthermore, Upper Peru

terminated in Jujuy, four hundred leagues from Buenos Aires,
and communication would always be difficult.
declared:

Pino Manrique

43
I affirm, and it can be documented, that in Buenos
Aires, they understand nothing about Peru, and since
the viceroyalty has been established, not one appro
priate decision has been made there concerning Upper
Peru. . . . They have done nothing to matriculate
Indians [for the mital or about tribute. It is under
standable that they never know about these things
because those who serve in that city have no other
Knowledge about Peru than what they can perceive from
a distance of four hundred leagues.
Pino's suggestion to change the site of the capital
was not followed, but he continued to serve ably in his post
in Potosi until 1788, when he was appointed alcalde de
crimen of the Audiencia of Lima.

He later served as an oidor

of that audiencia.
The Bourbon Reforms in the Viceroyalty of Rio de la
Plata changed the structure of government there.

It was

recognized that the success of the effort would depend on the
quality of the men appointed to the newly created positions.
Pino Manrique, a hardworking and well-trained functionary
who did not fear change, had set a high standard for Potosi's
next intendant, Francisco de Paula Sanz.

Chapter III
SANZ BEFORE COMING TO POTOSI
Francisco de Paula Sanz y Espinosa de los Monteros
was born in Malaga and was baptized soon afterwardr on
July 5, 1745, in the Parroquia de los Santos Mdrtires of
that city.

His parents, Don Josd Sanz and Dona Maria

Manuela Espinosa de los Monteros, had been married in the
same church twelve years earlier.

His legitimacy was thus

established and was reaffirmed in his mother's will of
December 7, 1777.

According to testimony of the Escribano

Real y del Ayuntamiento (City government) de la Villa de
Biar, near M&laga, Sanz's family was classified as nobility
on both sides, and they were entitled to consideration as
“Magnificos Nobles y Caballeros Ciudadanos," a distinction
reserved only for illustrious families.

The records of the

Ayuntamiento of Mdlaga show that on March 18, 1773, Sanz was
listed as a noble on the rolls of that city because his
parental grandfather had been a noble.

On the same day

Dona Maria Manuela was also ranked as being of noble lineage.
Sanz, therefore, qualified as a noble by blood from both
lines of kinship.

His nobility made Sanz eligible for

membership in the prestigeous Royal and Distinguished Order
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Charles III which entitled him to a pension.

The documenta

tion that Sanz presented for membership in the Order traced
his ancestry on both sides for several generations.

On

April 23, 1780, the King awarded Sanz the Supernumerary
Cross of the Order.1
The summary of documentation in Spain indicates that
Sanz was descended from nobility and that he was legitimate.
Legitimacy, however, was only a legal term, and it did not
necessarily bear out biological facts.

Under law, if a woman

was married at the time she gave birth, her husband was the
legal father.

It is possible, therefore, that Don Jos6 Sanz

was not Francisco de Paula's real father.

A rumor persisted

that Sanz was not only illegitimate but also that he was the
bastard son of King Charles III.

The source of this belief

is unknown, but several authors have upheld it.

Gabriel

Rene-Moreno wrote that Sanz was "reputed to be of royal
Blood.1,2 The earliest reference to Sanz's royal heritage,
and perhaps the source of the rumors, is found in Francesco
Becatini's biography of Charles III, in which he noted that
when Charles left Naples for Spain on October 6, 1759, a
squadron of sixteen Spanish ships carried him and his
entourage.

Charles III, his wife Maria Amalia de Saxonia,

1
Adolfo Morales, "La Discutida filiacidn del
Goberaador de Potosi, D. Francisco de Paula Sanz," La Raz6n
(La Paz, Bolivia), February 8, 1948, sec. 2, p. 2.
2Ibid
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and their son Charles Antonio Diego, later Charles IV,
embarked aboard the F6nix. The other children sailed aboard
the Triunfante.
On the same ship, in the care of his tutor, was
Don Francisco de Paula, the bastard son of Charles
III and a Neopolitan princess. This child was
carefully educated in Madrid in the bosom of the
royal family and was later sent to America on an
important mission.3
The sensational story spread, especially after Sanz's
death.

During the War for Independence, a legend-clouded

figure named Juan Huallparrimachi fought alongside Juana
Azurduy de Padilla against the royalist regime that his
alleged father had died defending.

Huallparrimachi, born in

Potosi in 1793, was reputed to be the fruit of an illicit
union between Sanz and Marla Sahuaraura, an Indian woman who
claimed to be descended from Inca royalty.

The union of

European and Indian royalty provided a rallying point to
attract supporters to the revolutionary cause, and this was a
possible motive for publicizing Sanz's alleged royal
parentage,4 but Morales found no records of Huallparrimachi's
baptism.
People sumamed Sanz in Sucre and in Potosi have
claimed to be related to the Governor and thus to his supposed
royal father.

Sanz was married to Dona Manuela Cespedes and

had only one daughter, Maria Josef a Sanz y C6spedes.

(Madrid:

Maria

^Francesco Becatini, Vida de Carlos III, 2 vols.
J. Doblado, 1790).
^Morales, "La Discutida Filiacidn," sec. 2, p. 2.
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Josefa later married royalist colonel Jos6 Ignacio del Rio,
so Sanz left no legitimate male heir to bear his name.

Con

fusion has resulted from the fact that there was in La Plata
another Spaniard named Francisco de Paula Sanz.

This man

left many descendants, some of whom confused their ancestor
with the intendant Governor of nearby Potosi, and helped to
propagate the idea of his royal filiation.'*
It is not likely that Francisco de Paula Sanz was
actually a bastard prince of Spain.

His mother and father

had lived in the same small parish in Malaga for at least
twelve years before his birth, and Charles III had been in
Naples for fourteen years at the time of Sanz's birth.

It is

doubtful that Dona Maria Manuela Espinosa de Sanz would have
left home after nearly twelve years of marriage, traveled to
Naples, become pregnant by the King, and then hurried home to
have her son and to baptize him in Malaga.

But there is

another reason to reject the idea that Sanz was Charles Ill's
son, and that is the King's austere life-style and his
celebrated devotion to his queen, Maria Amalia of Sajonia.
Moreover, Charles III maintained a "chaste w i d o w e r h o o d . I f
Sanz did have such a lofty origin, he presumably could have
found an occupation in Spain that was more comfortable and
less dangerous than the positions he held in the Viceroyalty

5Ibid.
^Humberto Vasquez-Machicado, "Un Comentario MAs
Sobre la Filiacidn de Paula Sanz," La Raz6n (La Paz, Bolivia),
February 22, 1948, sec. 2, p. 1.
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of Rio de la Plata.

Also, if Sanz's career in the service of

the king had depended on Charles III, it would not have
progressed for twenty-two years after he died, as it did.
Another rumor later circulated in Buenos Aires and
Upper Peru that Sanz was the illegitimate son of Jose de
Galvez, Minister of the Indies.

vasquez -Machicado related

that Bernardo Gonzalez Arrili, an Argentine author, put forth
this idea to explain Sanz's advancement in colonial administration despite accusations of corruption and incompetence.

7

It also seems doubtful that Galvez was Sanz's father, because
if this were true, Sanz probably could have gotten a more
profitable position, and then returned to Spain for a more
comfortable life.

Moreover, Sanz's career continued for a

generation after Galvez died in 1787.
If those who succeeded Galvez had suspected Sanz's
honesty they certainly would not have sent him to Potosi, the
major source of specie for the entire viceroyalty, as
intendant governor and director of the mint.

But Sanz was

sent to Potosi the year after Galvez died, and he remained
governor there until his own death in 1810.

Nationalistic

Argentine writers like Gonzalez Arrili, Gregorio Runes, and
Vicente Fidel L6pez, often villified royalist officials,
especially those like Sanz, who had actively fought against
independence.

In any case, although Sanz’s legitimacy or

bastardy can never be irrefutably proven, it does not appear

7ibid.
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probable--judging from the information available and from the
i

events that occurred— that he was the son of either Charles
III or of Jos6 de Galvez.
Sanz was educated in Spain and reached maturity there.
This young Andalucian nobleman saw a career opportunity
materialize suddenly in 1776, when Charles III established
the viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata.

Hundreds of colonial

positions were created, and educated peninsulares had good
prospects of filling them because Bourbon authorities esteemed
competence and European birth.

Sanz promptly made known his

desire to serve in the new colony, and he obtained an
important appointment there.

A royal cfedula dated October 31,

1777, San Lorenzo, stated:
Since I have established my Tobacco Monopoly, the
provinces of Buenos Aires and the others that com
pose the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata, and
considering the talents, instruction, and other good
qualities possessed by Don Francisco de Paula Sanz,
I have resolved to name him Director of that Monopoly,
with an annual salary of 3000 pesos: Therefore, I
command that the Viceroy, Governor and Captain General
of the Provinces: that when this C6dula be presented
by . . . Sanz [those officials] shall install him as
director of the Tobacco Monopoly and that he shall
serve according to his instructions . . . and that he
shall be paid his 3,000 pesos annually from the royal
treasury.°
On the ship coming to America, Sanz met Francisco de
Paula Saubidet, who had been appointed cajero escribiente
(treasury accountant) by the corregidor of Huaylas, in Lower
Peru north of Lima.

Sanz persuaded Saubidet to become his

®Real C6dula, San Lorenzo, October 31, 1777, AGI,
Tomas de Razbn, tomo 1, foja 9.
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assistant director, and to accompany him in his travels.
Later, in 1794, Saubidet served as General Administrator of
Tobacco and Playing Cards when the subsequent director was
ill and unable to serve.
Centralization and better organization were hall
marks of the Bourbon reforms in the colonies.

Tobacco pro

duction and distribution, and the sale of playing cards were
activities that, if well organized and carefully administered,
could produce considerable revenue for the Crown.

Earlier

government attempts to control tobacco distribution had met
resistence.

Sanz, after he had arrived in Buenos Aires,

attributed this to the "decadence, bad faith, and tyranny"
of the officials involved.

He noted that many tobacco

administrations throughout the territory had ceased to exist,
leaving nothing but a "universal hatred not only for local
tobacco officials, but also for the entire Monopoly."

The

new director studied tobacco records for the past two decades,
and observed the current attitudes of the people toward the
Monopoly.

He learned that the previous director had been

burned in effigy in the Plaza of Tucuman and his conclusions
made him fear that he "could not find a subject who would
submit to the (tobacco) offices without violence."^
Nevertheless, he set about his job:

the reestablish-

%jibro de Infoxmes de la Visita de Tabacos y
DescripciOn de las Provincias del Rio de la Plata y una
RazOn al Reyno de Chile, 1779 (hereafter Libro de Informes),
ANB, Ruck 81.
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ment of the Monopoly under rules issued by Jos£ de Galvez
on March 17, 1778, at El Pardo.

These regulations outlined

the duties of the Administrator, Accountant, and Warehouse
Inspector, the three principal officials of the Tobacco
Monopoly, whom Sanz was to appoint in each province.

The

regulations charged the administrator with receiving tobacco
shipments and immediately depositing them in the local
tobacco warehouse, also to be designated by the Director.
Most of the rules dealt with weighing and storing tobacco,
and with accounting procedures for noting receipts and dis
patches of the tobacco.

Spanish attention to checks and

balances is evident in rules requiring that there be three
separate warehouse keys (one for each of the officials),
that all three officials sign shipment orders and receipts,
and that all witness the weighing of incoming and outgoing
shipments.

The administrator was to be held responsible for

the tobacco stored in his warehouse.
The establishment of the Tobacco Monopoly in the
Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata would involve an inspection
tour of the entire territory, an awesome assignment in 1777.
Sanz would have to travel by ship, riverboat, on horseback,
and on foot to reach the remote provincial seats.

He would

face danger from Indians, illness, and the general hardships
of travel.

The jungles of Paraguay and the eastern lowlands

of present-day Bolivia, not to mention the freezing plateaus

■'■^Reglamento de la Real Renta de Tabacos y Naipes,
copy in Libro de Informes, ANB, Ruck 81.
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and cordilleras of Alto Peru contrasted sharply with the
Mediterranean breezes of Sanz's native Malaga.
After much study and preparation, Sanz boarded a
ship for Montevideo in July, 1778.

He established the

Monopoly in that city and in missions along the Paraguay
River and then returned to Buenos Aires, completing the first
leg of the visita.

Sanz left the capital again in February,

1779, accompanied by his family and an amanuensis.

He had

also secured from the viceroy a military escort, consisting
of a corporal and four soldiers, to prevent a recurrence of
the Tucruman debacle.

The party stopped first at Santa Fe,

then continued up the river to Asuncion, back to Corrientes
and Misiones, and COrdoba before returning to Buenos Aires
late in the year.

The next year, he resumed the visita

going westward to Mendoza, and crossing the Andes to Chile.
From Valparaiso, he sailed north to Arica, and ascended from
there to Upper Peru.

In the highlands, Sanz visited such

small provinces as Juliaca near Lake Titicaca and Azanzaro
in the Yungas, where to his amazement and disgust, "not even
the name of the Monopoly is known."

Sanz completed his

mission in Upper Peru and returned to the capital in June or
July 1781 after traveling more than five thousand leagues
over extremely difficult territory. IT
The Director's first stop on the second leg of the

1-^Sanz to Valdfez, March 16, 1789, no. 11, AGX,
Charcas 439.
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visita was Santa Fe, where he established the tobacco ware
house in February, 1779.

Sanz appointed men to fill the

three principal Monopoly offices, and set their salaries.
In accordance with his orders, he specified that neither the
new officials nor members of their families would be allowed
to have other business interests.

After this successful

beginning, Sanz journeyed up the Paraguay River to continue
the visita.
When Sanz arrived in Paraguay in March, 1779, that
colony was unique in Spain's empire, and it had a tradition
of independence.

Spanish interest in Paraguay had waned

when no minerals were discovered there, and further decline
ensued when Buenos Aires was removed from Asuncion's
control in 1617.

Paraguayans then hoped that the trade

route from Buenos Aires to the Andean silver mines would
pass through the Chaco, but the established route that
developed passed far to the west of Paraguay, leaving the
population to fend for itself.

Paraguayan distaste for

Spanish rule and taxes surfaced in 1721 with the Comunero
Revolt, which lasted until 1735.

Moreover, most of Paraguay

had been controlled by Jesuit missionaries whose autonomy
was one of the reasons for their esqpulsion from the colonies
in 1767.13
Since there was little in Paraguay to interest Spain,

•^Libro de Informes, ANB, Ruck 81.
13Harris Gaylord Warren, Paraguay, An Informal History
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1949), p. 136.
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royal interference in local affairs was minimal.

The

Asuncion Cabildo was the primary agency of local government,
and it exercised executive and legislative as well as
judicial functions, trying civil and criminal cases.
Cabildo elections were free, and for many years, the body
had endeavored to defend local interests against Spanish
bureaucrats like Sanz.^

He described the capitulares

(members of the cabildo) as "not usually patricians, but
individuals who perhaps sought refuge in this Province, or
bankrupt merchants obliged by poverty to remain there."

He

added that the community never decided anything that the
15
aabildo had not determined beforehand.
The lack of currency or specie hampered economic
activity in the colony, and barter was common.

Bills and

taxes were paid with com, beans, manioc, hogs, fowls,
cotton cloth, and tobacco.

The cabildo assigned values for

specific amounts of produce and for iron wedges which some
times circulated as money, but speculation was prevalent.
Sanz noted in a letter to the Tobacco Monopoly headquarters
that "tobacco is the good most commonly exchanged, although
yerba mate and cotton are more highly valued (at twice the
value of tobacco)."

The Royal Post Master in Asuncibn

informed Sanz that tobacco, yerba mate, and cotton were

l4Ibid.
15Sanz to Real Renta de Tabacos y Naipes, April 13,
1779, copy in Libro de Informes. ANB, Ruck 81.
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accepted as postage payment and that the rates in tobacco
were:
For a one-page letter, four pounds of tobacco;
for a two-page letter, five and a half pounds of
tobacco; for a three-page letter, eight pounds of
tobacco; for a one-ounce letter, eleven pounds of
tobacco.^®
The capitulares profited, according to Sanz, from
their power to set exchange rates by contracting to buy
tobacco from fanners at a certain rate, and then using the
product to pay their own debts and taxes at a higher rate.
Moreover, inferior tobacco, often unfit for consumption,
sometimes circulated until it disintegrated.
The Paraguayans evaluated barter goods in terms of
"imaginary pesos" instead of real, silver pesos.

Like the

silver peso, the imaginary one was divided into eight reales,
but it was worth only a fraction of the real peso, and dif
ferent individuals or agencies converted imaginary pesos to
silver at different rates.

Sanz's objective in Paraguay was

to induce the producers to sell their tobacco to the Monopoly
for real pesos.

This would eliminate the use of tobacco as

a barter good, and supply silver currency to the province to
replace it as a medium of exchange.

Paraguay would then be

a part of the economic system of the Viceroyalty of Rio de la
Plata, and more susceptible to central political control

Agreement between Nicolas de Ygareda, Director of
the Tobacco Monopoly, and Fernando de Pinedo, Governor and
Captain-General of Paraguay, Asuncion, 1775, copy in Libro
de Informes, ANB, Ruck 81.
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from Buenos Aires.

The capitulares predictably resisted the

new Director and Sanz faced the first of many conflicts
during his career.
Sanz attended a meeting of the cabildo on March 26,
1779, and announced that the Monopoly would purchase all
available tobacco from growers at ten silver reales per
arroba (25 pounds) for pito (the name given to the common
grade) tobacco, and fourteen silver reales per arroba of oja
(a better grade) tobacco.
the official price.

This was a two real increase in

The capitulares thought the price of

tobacco should be set much higher, and they expressed strong
displeasure at Sanz's interference.

Knowing that they would

not document defiance and open hostility to an official of
the crown, Sanz requested that they put their objections in
writing. The resulting exchange is a part of Sanz's visita
report, and demonstrates the motives of the capitulares as
well as Sanz's ability as a polemicist.
The capitulares1 petition is dated April 5, 1779.

17

They reviewed the acts of the March 29 cabildo meeting and
emphasized that the city "does not in the least pretend to
contradict, with this petition, royal orders," but only to
exercise its divine and natural right to discuss.

They then

stated that tobacco had never had a fixed value in silver in

17Representaci6n de los Capitulares de la Provincia
de Paraguay a D. Francisco de Paula Sanz, Director de la
Real Renta de Tabacos y Naipes, Asuncion, April 5, 1779,
copy in Libro de Informes, ANB, Ruck 81.
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the province.

The ecclesiastic and secular courts accepted

an arroba of pito tobacco as three silver pesos in payment
of court costs and fines, and the same rate applied for
tribute and debt payment.

However, the Municipal Junta of

Temporalidades valued an arroba of pito at twelve reales,
and the royal post office gave 17% silver reales credit for
each arroba.

It had been accepted for as little as six

reales per arroba.

The capitulares lamented that sometimes

tobacco prices were set by law and sometimes by the demand
in Buenos Aires and Corrientes.

Therefore, it would be

impossible for the royal government to set a fair exchange
rate.

The cabildo appealed to Sanz not to set the price of

tobacco for three reasons:

first, if growers were required

to sell to the government, they could only sell good quality
tobacco, and the volume of their product and profit would
decline greatly because growers must pluck and discard most
of the leaves to insure that the remaining ones were first
rate; second, all of the growers were members of the militia
and therefore did not have the time necessary to produce high
quality tobacco; third, it was impossible to keep and breed
horses because of maurading Indians and the only way that
growers could procure more animals was to transport tobacco
to Corrientes where they could trade an arroba for six silver
pesos or a horse.

If Sanz imposed a standard price on

tobacco and forced growers to sell only to the crown, an
arroba of tobacco would not buy half as many horses and the
militia could not effectively defend the province.

Finally,
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the capitulares complained that the growers were made even
poorer by merchants from Buenos Aires who made inordinate
profits by trading their goods for tobacco in Paraguay and
then selling the tobacco in the capital for many times the
value of their trading goods.
Sanz responded to the cabildo petition on April 10,
1779.

18

His reply addressed the capitulares1 objections

one by one and demonstrated the Director's ability to debate
effectively and diplomatically.

He reminded the cabildo

that all other European monarchs controlled tobacco in their
countries and he quickly made the point that the King was
offering Paraguay the right to produce tobacco for the
entire

viceroyalty, and that this would bring about the use

of royal stamped money.

He contended that this would aid the

province by permitting it to buy goods from other parts of
the viceroyalty.

Using tobacco for money was wasteful

because it encouraged farmers to grow only that plant in order
to amass arrobas of it to pay their debts.

Since tobacco was

difficult and eaqpensive to cultivate, the farmers would gain
by using their time and land to cultivate other crops for
their own use and for sale.

The adoption of silver currency

would give the farmers more time to cultivate other crops.
Furthermore, the tobacco then produced in Paraguay was of
such poor quality that it was difficult to sell outside the
province.

^®Sanz to Asuncion Cabildo, Asunci6n, April 10, 1779,
copy in Libro de Informes, ANB, Ruck 81.
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To the argument that since the courts accepted fines
and tribute payments in tobacco at one rate and the Royal
Post Office accepted them at a different rate, there should
be no official rate of exchange for tobacco, Sanz answered
that some of the laws that set these rates were over two
centuries old. He pointed out that in the case of mulattoes'
tribute payments, the low rate used was an effort by the
Crown to ease the burden of its mulatto subjects.

Those

rates were never intended to transcend business and commerce.
Moreover, the Crown would be harmed by generally accepting
tobacco at such low rates.

Sanz also warned that the Crown

would not purchase inferior tobacco, but that this was no
cause for alarm because higher quality tobacco, when properly
cured, was heavier and worth more than the current product.
The Director demolished the capitulares' case that a
single official rate of tobacco for silver would cut the
number of horses that Paraguayans could buy to defend their
province.

He wrote that to buy a horse, a grower would have

to pay transportation fares and freight costs for his tobacco
down the river to Corrientes, or else buy a canoe for forty
or fifty pesos.

Once there, the grower would have to pay for

transporting the tobacco in carts from the docks to the ware
houses where he would have to pay storage fees while he
sought someone willing to exchange a horse for an arroba of
tobacco, and that only a poor horse could be bought for that
price anyway.

Transporting the horses overland back to

Asuncion was another problem because duties had to be paid
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to cross the Parana River, and all the while the animals and
their new owners would be exposed to considerable danger.
Sanz concluded that the growers would be better off to sell
their crop in Asuncion and then buy horses there for as much
as sixteen pesos a head.
In much the same way, Sanz met the argument that
merchants from Buenos Aires made exorbitant profits.

He

cited transport costs and duties that they would owe, and
added that if growers transported their own crops to the
capital, they would lose time and money.
The response of the capitulares concluded with a
defense of the use of silver money in Paraguay and a pro
jected scenario for the economic development of the province.
Sanz predicted that the growers would benefit by producing
high quality tobacco and selling it to the government because
the entire province could then count on a specific income
each year
tion.

without the wild fluctuation caused by specula

Since the farmers would not have to amass tobacco to

pay their debts if silver money were used in the province,
they could produce other crops and sell them.

The profits

gained from this would permit farmers to pay debts and to
hire peons to assist them.

Sanz hoped that the tobacco

growers, motivated by the desire for profits, would begin to

l^This "specific income'1 can be compared with the
modern concept of Gross National Product.
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process Brazilian torcido negro^0 tobacco, a much sought
after commodity that could be exported to attract still more
silver to the province.

The laborers hired to produce

torcido negro would receive wages, and this would help to
decrease poverty in Paraguay.

The Director of the Tobacco

Monopoly believed that the circulation of silver money would
break the wasteful chain of circumstances that had forced
growers to accumulate bales of useless tobacco leaves, and
to offer them as payment to merchants who had to accept them
to pay off their own debts in Buenos Aires.

He wrote:

[You] understand better than I the necessity of
money and the benefits that could result from its
use here, and you know that the best way to intro
duce it is as the King proposes; that is, by
selling the tobacco to the Crown for silver. The
growers are dependent on what tyou] resolve because
until now, they have not been presenting their crops
to the Monopoly. If [youl make the benefits known
to them, they will do so.21
Finally, Sanz warned the cabildo that he had instruc
tions from the Superintendent General in Buenos Aires to
OO

offer the tobacco contract to "other part s." ^

He hoped that

this would not prove necessary because he was interested in
improving conditions in Paraguay.

He added that the

proposed contract would be limited to just three or four

20The term meant "Twisted Black" and referred to an
esteemed type of Brazilian smoking tobacco ,that was manu
factured in rope-like twists.
2^Sanz to Asuncion Cabildo, Asuncion, April 10, 1779,
copy in Libro de Informes, ANB, Ruck 81.
22Sanz to Real Renta de Tabacos y Naipes, Asuncion,
i^pril 12, 1779, copy in Libro de Informes, ANB, Ruck 81.
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years so that the price paid for tobacco could be raised
later if the revenues to the King were sufficient.
The capitulares realized that the installation of
the Tobacco Monopoly in Paraguay was inevitable because the
decision had already been made in Spain.

Their resistance

was aimed at persuading Sanz to set a higher purchase price
on tobacco so that they, as tobacco growers themselves, or
as holders of huge quantities of the product, could profit
and take advantage of the small tobacco growers.

Sanz

expressed this suspicion in a confidential letter to the
Tobacco Monopoly headquarters.

In another letter to the

Monopoly headquarters in Buenos Aires, Sanz complained that
the capitulares of the cabildo had tried to discourage the
small farmers from selling tobacco to the Monopoly by
spreading rumors of low payments and cheating by Monopoly
officials.

As a result of the capitulares1 campaign, many

merchants were hesitant to accept tobacco as payment for
their goods, fearing that they would not receive fair treat
ment when they presented it to the Monopoly in exchange for
silver.

A representative of the cabildo even confronted

Sanz at the house where he was staying and warned that he
would "have to answer to the growers for his. action."
i

The cabildo members again wrote to Sanz' in response
„
to his Contestacidn.
This time they conceded that the

f

^Capitulares de Paraguay to Sanz, Asuncion, April
17, 1779, copy in Libro de Informes. ANB, Ruck 81.
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establishment of the Monopoly and the adoption of silver
money would benefit the province, but they took issue with
the price Sanz had set saying that they wanted more money
for their tobacco.

They expressed offense at Sanz's threat

to withdraw the contract for supplying tobacco and wrote
that their original petition was not a challenge to Sanz's
authority.

The city had merely "gathered and presented

without delay, oral and written evidence for the considera
tion of your faculties (although these faculties have yet to
be seen)," information which Sanz himself had requested.
The capitulares regretted that Sanz was offended and offered
obedience to whatever practices or terms he established.
They concluded with a threat to appeal to a higher authority
than the Director of the Tobacco Monopoly.

"The City remains

with the indelible hope that the doors of justice are fair
and generous in the palaces of the Royal Piety, where the
City will direct copies of this communication."
Sanz was not bluffing when he threatened to offer
the tobacco contract to another region.

He secretly wrote

to Monopoly headquarters that when he was satisfied that he
had done all he could to get the Paraguayans to accept his
offer, he would make the same offer to the province of
Misiones.24

He added that he would not offer the Paraguayans

more money than he already had for their tobacco without the

24Sanz to Real Renta de Tabacos y Naipes, Asuncion,
April 17, 1779, copy in Libro de Informes, ANB, Ruck 81.

superintendent's permission.

64
Sanz apparently received that

permission because he revised the price to twelve reales
(one and a half peso) per arroba for pito tobacco, and two
pesos per arroba of oia, and the cabildo accepted the offer.
Sanz also warned the superintendent that he expected the
cabildo to appeal to the viceroy or even to the Council of
the Indies in Spain, but he expressed confidence that if his
own written arguments were also presented, the authorities
would consider unjust the "clamors and complaints of the
capitulares."25
Sanz left Asuncion in late May, 1779, knowing that
he had won his first colonial confrontation.

The Governor

of Paraguay, Pedro Melo de Portugal, had appropriated an
abandoned Jesuit school for the tobacco warehouse, and he
had also set aside land near Asuncidn for an experimental
tobacco farm that Sanz wanted to establish.

The growers had

already presented so much tobacco at the warehouse or factory
by May 17, that Sanz had had to issue an edict limiting each
grower's deliveries of larger than twenty arrobas to one
every eight days, "to avoid the confusion that has occurred
in the receipt of tobaccos at the Factory."^6

By the time

he left, they had delivered more than 7,000 arrobas of

2^Gregorio Funes, Ensayo de la Historia Civil de
Buenos Aires. TucumAn. y Paraguay (Buenos Airess Imprenta
Bonaerense, 1856), p. 223.
2®Sanz, "Edicto para Evitar Confusion en el Recibo
de Tabacos, Asuncion, May 17, 1779, copy in Libro de
Informes, ANB, Ruck 81.
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tobacco, and officials had not even had time to arrange the
tobacco inside the warehouse.

Two months later Sanz wrote:

I note with the greatest satisfaction before I
left Paraguay the large deliveries that the growers
and merchants were making to the Factory, and the
care with which they were planting and raising more
tobacco plants, offering to sell their future produc
tion to the government.27
So much tobacco was offered for sale, that when Sanz arrived
in Corrientes, the Factor of Asuncion advised him that they
were out of silver to pay the growers.

Sanz had to send the

factor more currency from the royal treasury in Corrientes.
After subduing the Asuncion Cabildo and successfully
setting up the Royal Tobacco Monopoly there, Sanz traveled
to other cities to install the Monopoly, to establish ware
houses and to appoint officers.

By the time he reached

Tucumdn in February, 1780, Sanz had traveled many leagues
over roads that were at times barely perceptible, and had
spent many nights in rude "hospitals," huts for travelers.
A weary and ill Sanz wrote from TucumOn that in "all the
sixty leagues from C6rdoba to TucumSn, one finds nothing but
the greatest misery that I believe exists in the universe,
jo

and the people are rustic to excess."**0

He fretted about

their lack of religion and culture and said:

"I met a young

woman who had never confessed and had attended mass only

27Sanz to Real Renta de Tabacos y Naipes, Corrientes,
July, 1779, copy in Libro de Informes, ANB, Ruck 81.
o q

Sanz to Real Renta de Tabacos y Naipes, Tucum&n,
February 13, 1780, copy in Libro de Informes. ANB, Ruck 81.
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once in her life, and most of the people speak no Spanish,
only what they call 'Quichoa' or the language of Cuzco."

He

adjudged the village of Santiago (del Estero) as "quite
miserable," and its straw huts as undeserving of the name
house.

He had suffered a bad fall from his horse on the day

he arrived in Santiago, and after finishing his official
duties there, he headed for TucumSn.

He described the

miserable journey:
The second day of the trip, X fell ill with a burning
fever. I had to continue traveling, although with
frequent pauses since it was difficult for me to stay
on the horse. There was not even a farm but at which
to stop, and I forced myself to the limit to reach
Tucuman because I had heard that there was a well
known French doctor there; but five leagues before I
reached that city, I was attacked by such strange and
severe symptoms, that X thought my life was in its
final stage. I had to stop at a miserable farm where
there was nothing to eat. Acting as my own physician
and druggist, I took a vomitive, then felt well enough
to walk the last five leagues; but on the way I
became ill again and felt even worse when I arrived in
TucumSn and discovered that the doctor had already
left. Thanks to the medicine I concocted there, I
rested and ate and the fever left, although I was still
weak.29
Sanz recovered and continued to set up tobacco
factories in Upper Peru.

In Puno, he found that the indo

lence of the tobacco administrators was "incredible" and they
answered his suggestions to change their ways with, "It has
always been done this way."

Sanz appointed new officials

and proceeded to La Paz where he found corruption and abuse
in the tobacco administration.
Much tobacco was grown in the Yungas, high valleys

29Ibid.
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to the north and east of La Paz, and sold illegally in the
city.

Sanz discovered that most of the tobacco that the

Administration in La Paz did sell was made into paper
cigarettes by Administration workers, who sold them at
excessive prices.

They also illegally procured cheap

tobacco from the Yungas, and profited by selling it at the
official rate.

To remedy the situation, Sanz encouraged

Administration workers to make and sell cigarettes officially,
and thus increase the Monopoly's profits.

He also persuaded

the incumbent tobacco administrator of La Paz to resign to
avoid prosecution, and finally, Sanz proposed that a ronda.
or police force, patrol the roads leading up from the Yungas
and capture contraband tobacco.
More intense problems awaited Sanz in southern Alto
Peru.

Indian insurrections had been raging for a year when

he entered the region.

The province of Cochabamba was an

important objective of Tupac Amaru because it was the major
food-growing area for Upper Peru, and many battles were
fought within its borders.

In the city itself there were

seditious movements that included creole as well as mestizo
and Indian elements.

Citizens were taking precautions in

January, 1781, to defend the city if necessary, and they were
preparing to send aid to other parts of the province.

Sanz

was in Cochabamba at that time, and to raise revenue to
purchase cannons and pay soldiers, he increased the price of
cigars to twenty-four for one real from 40 per real.

This

caused an outcry among the Indians and mestizos who had came
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to be greatly feared since the massacre at Oruro.

Lampoons

appeared overnight accusing Sanz and the Monopoly of imposing
unjust tax burdens on the common people.

The distressed

citizens held a cabildo abierto. and convinced Director Sanz
to lower the price of cigars to forty for a real and to sell
tobacco at its former price.

This measure calmed the

Indians and mestizos temporarily, and Sanz continued his
visita to La Plata.

Royalist troops eventually suppressed
the uprisings in Cochabamba after much bloodshed. 30
The next month, Sanz was in La Plata where the
insurrection posed an even more serious threat.

The Indians

under DSmaso Catari had besieged the city, food was running
low and an attack seemed imminent.

Adding to the distress

was the disagreement among the citizens over what to do.
The audiencia judges wanted to send soldiers and citizens
out to confront the Indians, but military commandant Ignacio
Flores refused to do so.
had become desperate.

By February 16, 1781, the situation

Francisco de Paula Sanz and Alfonso

Gonzalez Perez favored attacking the enemy, and on that
morning, they led a group of forty mounted men out of the
city to face the Indians who were camped on the sides of the
Hills of Punilla.

The Spaniards soon realized their disad

vantage and one of their number returned to La Plata for help.
As the rest of the volunteers retreated, foot' soldiers from

(Norman:

^^Lillian Estelle Fisher, The Last Inca Revolt
University of Oklahoma Press, 1966), p. 160.
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the city under Flores marched out to join them.

They fought

the insurgents to a standstill until lack of ammunition
forced the Spaniards to withdraw and return to the city.

On

February 20, after the Indians had sent an insulting message
to the city, the vascillating Flores was again goaded into
action.

Over one thousand soldiers aided by armed citizens,

including priests and women, returned to Punilla and
desperately charged the Indians* position in the heights.
The Spaniards broke through the natives1 defense, killing
three hundred and forcing the others to flee.

Thus the siege

■51

was finally ended.During the siege, Sanz had shown bravery and initia
tive that had sparked Flores and the others to act.

When it

was over, Sanz returned to Buenos Aires where he continued
to administer the Royal Tobacco Monopoly.

oo

He probably

possessed by this time (1782) more first-hand knowledge and
experience of conditions throughout the viceroyalty than any
other official.

This expertise coupled with his record of

thoroughness and bravery helped him gain a promotion.
Royal authorities in Spain had created the Vice
royalty of Rio de la Plata in 1776 to strengthen their control
over the area.

For the same reason, they appointed Manuel

31pedro de Angelis, RelaciOn HistOrica de los
Sucesos de la Rebelibn de Jo's6 Gabriel Tupac Amaru en las
Provincias del Pertt. en el Ano de 1780 (Buenos Aires:
Imprenta del Estado, 1836), pp. 13-14.
^Sanz to Valdez, Potosi, March 16, 1789, no. 11,
AGI, Chareas 439.

Ignacio Fem&ndez Superintendent General of War and Finance
in 1777.

Fernandez had been intendant general of the army

in the Cevallos expedition.

A royal decree of March 21,

1778, officially bestowed the title on Fernandez and defined
his duties.

The Superintendency in Buenos Aires, a branch

of the General Superintendency of the Indies in Madrid, was
to have complete independence from the viceroy in matters of
finance, in the economic aspects of military affairs, and in
the control of the funds of cities in the viceroyalty.

To

help Fernandez to carry out his duties, the Crown created a
junta superior de Real Hacienda from senior members of the
Tribunal of the Superintendency and the fiscal of the
treasury.^

After 1785 when the Crown created the Audiencia

of Buenos Aires, certain audiencia members were added to the
junta.

The Crown also created in 1785, the post of teniente

letrado (legal assistant) to advise the superintendent and
to substitute for him in case of vacancy.
FernAndez was aggressive in carrying out his duties
as superintendent and in protecting his prerogatives.

In

disputes with the Buenos Aires Cabildo over control of a
defense fund, FemAndez moved quickly to receive royal
confirmation of his pre-eminence in municipal finances.

He

denied the Cabildo*s right to administer finances, and the
Crown upheld his contentions in a royal order of March 12,

33John Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration, 17821810. The Intendant System in the Rio de la Plata (New York;
Greenwood Press, 1969), pp. 125-26.
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1779.

Femdndez also forced the Cabildo to establish

standard weights and measures in the interest of fair
commerce.
He completed his term as Superintendent General of
War and Finance for the Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata in
1783.

A royal decree of March 24, 1783, named Francisco de

Paula Sanz to succeed him in that post and also gave Sanz
the post of intendant governor of the Intendancy of Buenos
Aires.

Sanz was thirty-seven years old.

Meanwhile, in

1777, Juan Josd Vdrtiz y Salcedo had replaced Cevallos as
viceroy, and it was with him that Sanz would have to share
the administration of the viceroyalty.

This situation could

produce friction, and only a year before, Vdrtiz’s secret
report to Galvez (on the applicability of the Ordinance of
Intendants) had expressed misgivings about the superinten
dent's proposed financial autonomy, especially in the event
of a disagreement between the two authorities.

A royal

order assured Vdrtiz that in an emergency situation, the
superintendent would be obliged to cooperate with the vice
roy.
years.

Femfindez had worked well with V6rtiz for nearly five
Sanz also seems to have cooperated with Vdrtiz since

there were no serious disputes or record of friction between
the two during the one-year period they served together, and
several ambitious projects were undertaken in that year.
Article 59 of the Ordinance of Intendants stated
that "the upkeep of roads, the cleanliness, uniformity and
decoration of the streets, plazas, and buildings of the

cities,“ were the responsibility of the intendants.

Sanz,

as Intendant Governor of Buenos Aires, took this duty
seriously.

Inspired by a plan for resurfacing the streets

of Madrid, he proposed to do the same thing in his capital,
and in 1784, he set
program.

forth a twenty-four point resurfacing

House owners were to beautify the fronts of their

homes and to maintain the sidewalks that passed in front of
their property.

This requirement also applied to churches.

Streets were to be paved with large square stones at public
expense.

Sanz prohibited anyone, including church officials,

from allowing pigs to run through the streets, from dragging
garbage through the

streets on hides as was the custom, and

from dumping sewagefrom buildings into

the streets.

The

punishment for these crimes included twenty peso fines, jail
terms, and the loss of offending draft animals.

To prevent

unhealthy mud puddles in the streets, the Intendant pro
hibited the entry of freight carts, and established a freight
depot and warehouse on the edge of the city
Addressing Joaquin Antonio de Mosquera, chief
engineer of the city improvement project, Sanz wrote, "In
some streets, I have seen manure taken from the gutters and
left there until it decomposes or until the water carries it
away.

He added that those who owned the horses were not

S^Testimonio de las Providencias de Gobiemo dadas
por el Sr. D. Francisco de Paula Sanz durante su mando de la
Capital de Buenos Aires, 1788, AGN, Biblioteca Nacional 200.
35Ibid.
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entitled to offend the public in this manner, and he recom
mended that horse owners pay for the removal of the droppings
to the countryside where perhaps they could be of some use.
Sanz affirmed that the manure, although unpleasant, was not
a health hazard.

The real danger came from the dust, and he

suggested sweeping and dampening the streets as a remedy.
Sanz's bans, proclamations, and correspondence regarding
street repair and improvement in Buenos Aires were extensive
and some improvement resulted.
However, individuals and groups resisted the twentyfour ordinances.

One citizen wrote to Sanz that his neighbor

had ridiculed official efforts to remove manure from the
front of his house, and had called Sanz a fool, saying
"vaya VM (Sanz) a la mierda."

Og

Religious groups such as

the Franciscans objected to the obligatory contributions for
curbs, garbage collection, and sidewalks, and a royal decree
exempted that order from responsibility for the abovementioned
contributions.
In March, 1784, Nicolds del Campo, the Marquds de
Loreto, replaced V6rtiz as viceroy.

Five weeks after he took

office, Loreto exempted convents from paying for civic
improvements.

This precipitated a feud between him and

Superintendent Sanz that would last for the remainder of
Sanz's tenure in Buenos Aires, and would extend into many

3^Vicente Quesada G., Vireinato del Rio de la Plata,
1776-1810 (Buenos Aires: Tipografla de M. Biedma, 1881),
p. 451.
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different issues.

Loreto criticized Mosquera's and Sanz's

efforts as being too expensive and as presenting vast
opportunities for corruption.

The new Viceroy advocated

proceeding little by little with the project, beginning with
the worst puddles and ruts, instead of quickly completing
the entire job as Sanz wanted to do.

Loreto was against

paving the streets, saying that that would necessitate putting
iron tires on all wagons and shoeing all horses, and iron was
scarce in Buenos Aires.

Instead, he suggested covering

muddy areas of the streets with rubble and mortar and
covering that with sand, and using cleaned cow skeletons
37
from the slaughterhouse to fill in the holes.
Loreto had
clearly overstepped the bounds of his commission by becoming
involved in civic improvement, an area reserved for the
intendant.

In another case, Loreto's interference was

officially reprimanded.

Sanz complained in 1785 that the

Viceroy had prevented the departure for Arica of a ship
loaded with mercury, which was badly needed in Upper Peru.
Loreto was told that the superintendent had exclusive powers
in matters of mines and mercury. 38
The next issue upon which the Superintendent and the
Viceroy clashed was whether or not to continue permitting a
limited amount of trade with the Portuguese.

Under V£rtiz,

3^Juan Maria Gutierrez, "El Virreinato de Riode la
Plata durante la AdministraciOn del Marques de Loreto,"
Revista del Rio de la Plata, VIII (1874), 230-40.
S^Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration, p. 100.
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Negroes and tobacco from Portuguese ships had been imported.
Spanish authorities strictly limited the quantities of the
imports and collected duties.

A royal order of June 8,

1780, had condoned this practice and provided for similar
transactions in the future, at the viceroy's discretion.
V6rtiz later permitted Manuel Cipriano de Melo, a customs
official, to import Negroes and wood from Brazil to the
amount of 32,000 pesos held in credit by Spanish merchants.
Sanz, as intendant, had been a party to this arrangement,
but when Loreto arrived, disagreement ensued.

The Viceroy

argued that the Portuguese sold more than they were entitled
to sell to the willing Spaniards, and that this was harmful
to legitimate Spanish commerce.

Loreto conveyed his appre

hension to Sanz, who believed that the permits should be
continued.

Cipriano de Melo continued the importations,

and Loreto had him arrested.
Sanz protested to Jos6 de Galvez that Loreto's
arrest of Cipriano de Melo was unfair, since Melo was only
executing a policy that had been authorized by Sanz and
vertiz.

More significantly, Sanz was accusing Loreto of

interfering with the superintendent's authority.

Galvez

turned the matter over to the Council of the Indies, which
ruled that Melo should be freed.

A royal order of July 29,

1786, however, approved Loreto's suspension of imports, but
clearly stated that all matters of commerce, whether external
or internal, were the business of the superintendent, and
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ordered the Viceroy to hand over all materials on the case
to Sanz.^9
That Loreto's suspicions were justified, however, is
shown in another difference between the two officials, that
concerned Francisco de Medina, who wanted to purchase a royal
estancia or cattle ranch in order to salt meat.

Sanz

believed that since the royal court was in need of funds,
and because Medina had made a good offer and wanted the land
for a good purpose, the estancia should be sold.

Loreto

objected to the proposal, saying that Medina had been
involved in frauds earlier, and the sale was cancelled.
Bitter discussions ensued and in his memoria. Loreto accused
Sanz of using government money to aid Medina.

The two

officials sought other opportunities to provoke and censure
each other.
Still more contention arose because Loreto wanted to
end abuses in the treasury which had been occurring since
the administration of V6rtiz.

The most glaring example

involved Francisco Jimenez de Mesa, the Treasurer of the
Buenos Aires Customshouse.

Mesa could only produce a small

fraction of the money that records showed he was supposed to
have.

Loreto, in his memoria stated that such corruption

was common in the financial administration of the viceroyalty,
and he blamed the head of the branch of government,

40

Sigfrido A. Radaelli, ed., Memorias de los Vrrreyes
del Rio de la Plata (Buenos Aires: Editorial Bajel, 1945i,
pp. 308-15.

Francisco de Paula Sanz.^"
The wasteful slaughter of wild cattle by hide dealers
in the Banda Oriental, and how to deal with this problem
provided yet another battleground for Sanz and Loreto.

They

agreed that it was undesirable to allow the animals to be
exterminated, but Sanz wanted to prevent future abuses by
means of the inspection of ranches and the control of royal
ranges, while Loreto advocated a retroactive law whereby
past offenders would be prosecuted.

Other advisers sided

with Sanz, and the Superintendent sent investigators to the
Banda Oriental.

Loreto secretly sent his own people to

investigate the problem, and he also ordered the governor of
Montevideo to report on the suspect conduct of Antonio
Pereyra, a military commander there.

Still without con

sulting Sanz, the Viceroy removed the governor as investi
gator and named as his replacement Colonel JosS Reseguin who
had already been designated intendant governor of Puno in
Upper Peru.

This action was another encroachment upon the

authority of the superintendent because Reseguin, as an
intendant, was Sanz's subordinate.

Furthermore, Reseguin

became over zealous in Montevideo, arresting people and
interfering with the operation of the customshouse.

Sanz,

meanwhile, was humiliated by this disrespect for his
authority, and he complained to the Minister of the Indies
about Loreto's shadow investigation in Montevideo.

In Madrid,
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Galvez forwarded Sanz's and Loreto's communication to the
Council of the Indies.

It ruled that Loreto had indeed

ranged out of the realm of his authority.

A royal order to

Loreto echoed this opinion on June 3, 1786, and redefined
the Viceroy's duties emphasizing that they did not include
financial administration. 4-2 The mutual dislike of the two
officials intensified as time went by, and accusations were
common.

Sanz accused Loreto of "trying to manage this

kingdom . . .

as though it were his own domestic affair.1,43

The quarrel spread to other people and agencies.
The Buenos Aires Cabildo, still resenting the loss of its
control of city funds to the superintendency, sided with
Loreto while the Junta Superior de Real Hacienda, which had
been created by the Ordinance to assist the Superintendent,
supported Sanz.

The Audiencia of Buenos Aires also sup

ported the Viceroy.
The final disagreement occurred over a proposal to
move the offices of the commissioners of audit (tribunal de
cuentas) to a building formerly owned by the departed Jesuits.
Sanz supported the move, but the audiencia objected because
the Jesuit building was distant from their offices.
objected to the cost of purchasing the building.

Loreto

When Sanz

invited members of the audiencia to inspect the old building
that was housing the offices, the dean of the audiencia said

43Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration, p. 97.
43Ibid.. p. 99.
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that since it was Holy Week, there was no need for immediate
action.

Sanz impulsively replied, "Does the King not pay

your wages during Holy Week? 11 The matter was not resolved,
but the Council of the Indies reprimanded Sanz for his
bluntness.44
The separate branches of government in Buenos Aires
were aligned against each other so that actual administration
was hampered.

Divesting the viceroy of financial control

and creating the superintendency to exercise that function
had been a principal part of the reforms introduced by Jos6
de Galvez.

After his death in June, 1787, Fr. Antonio

Vald6z y Baz&n, who had a more conservative outlook,
succeeded Galvez as Minister of War and Hacienda of the
Indies.

Vald6z was distressed by the dissention in the

colonies.

Barely six weeks after Galvez's death, Vald6z

ordered Jorge Escobedo, Superintendent of the Viceroyalty of
Lima and former Governor of Potosi, to relinquish his post,
and the function of superintendent reverted to the viceroy.
On October 2, 1787, the same message was sent to the Super
intendent of New Spain.4^

In view of these changes, Sanz

must have realized that his position as superintendent was
tenuous, and on May 9, 1788, Spanish authorities wrote him:
The King, desiring that for now, the office of
superintendents subdelegado de la real hacienda de

44Ibid., p. 104.
4^John Fisher, Government and Society in Colonial
Peru: The Intendant System. 1784-1814 (London: Athlone
Press, 1970), p. 60.
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Indias be united under the control of the viceroy,
and since this has already been carried out in Lima
and in Mexico: has resolved that it be carried out
in that capital [Buenos Aires] and I give notice to
[you] on the order of [the King] that on receipt of
this, [you] shall deliver the office of superintendent
that [you] exercise to the viceroy of those pro
vinces with all its corresponding papers and effects.
And once this is done, [you] will take charge of the
government of Potosi, enjoying the same salary that
[you] currently receive as superintendent [10,000
pesos] because of the care and prudence required to
administer the wealth of that city.46
The institution of the superintendency had been
based on the doubtful assumption that the viceroy would
willingly give up his control of finances and then cooperate
with the new officials.
outset.

There had been misgivings from the

Viceroy Pedro de Cevallos of Rio de la Plata feared

that stripping his office of economic control would weaken
him as a military leader.

Escobedo had also predicted the

inevitable clash of authority between the viceroy and the
superintendent.4?
The royal government had acted to end the squabbling
in the viceroyalty by discontinuing the superintendency and
returning the duties of the office to the viceroy.

The

other office that Sanz filled, Intendant Governor of Buenos
Aires Intendancy, was not abolished nor was it joined with
the viceroyalty.

When Sanz left for Potosi, the post was

filled by his teniente letrado. Dr. Vicente Garcia Grande y

46Ibid., p. 31.
47sanz to Vald6z, Potosi, March 16, 1789, no. 11,
AGI, Charcas 439.
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C&rdenas, and the duties and prerogatives remained unchanged.
When the royal messages arrived in Buenos Aires on August 23,
1788, Sanz prepared to leave for Upper Peru.

He arrived in

Potosi on December 15, 1788.48
After serving as superintendent of the viceroyalty
and Intendent Governor of the Intendancy of Buenos Aires for
five turbulent years, Sanz would have to have his record
scrutinized in a residencia.

This after-the-fact examination

of an official's performance was headed by one man, often a
member of the audiencia.

The Fiscal of the Audiencia of

Buenos Aires conducted Sanz's residencia, and it began in
November, 1789 after Sanz had left Buenos Aires.

The results

were announced on February 16, 1790:
In the residencia that has been conducted of Francisco
de Paula Sanz, intendant-governor of this capital and
province and of his asesor. Dr. Vicente Garcia Grande,
and his ministers and officials and all others who have
exercised royal jurisdiction and who are included among
those upon whom H.M. commissioned me to conduct
residencia: . . . I declare that . . . Sanz has fulfilled
as he should, the obligations of his position and is
held responsible for no wrongdoing, but on the contrary,
he has served in such a way as to merit the thanks of
the royal piety, as have his associates, and the Sr.
Residenciador verifies public satisfaction.49
Sanz had served for eleven years in the Viceroyalty,
first as Director of the Royal Tobacco Monopoly, and then as
Intendant Governor of Buenos Aires and Superintendent General
of the entire viceroyalty.

In these years he had proved

48Juicio de Residencia de Francisco de Paula Sanz,
Intendente de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, AGN, Tribunales,
Legajo 58, Expediente 7.
49Ibid.

himself in the face of physical hardships and danger and,
more importantly, he had fought bitter battles within the
colonial bureaucracy and had usually prevailed.

Accusations

of corruption and incompetence had withered in the light of
a residencia presided over by a member of the very audiencia
that he had often opposed.

Much more conflict and even

physical hardship awaited the forty-three year old Sanz as
he took office in the high and cold mining town.

Chapter XV
SANZ'S EARLY EFFORTS TO INCREASE PRODUCTION
AT POTOSI
The forty-three year old intendant governor-designate
of the wealthy intendancy of Potosi left Buenos Aires in
November, 1788, to take up his post in Upper Peru.

He had

traveled the same route before as Director of the Tobacco
Monopoly, slowly climbing across half a continent until he
reached the mountains and plateaus of Alto Peru.

Sanz

arrived during the rainy season, and he must have been
nearly to the city when he first spotted the barren solitary
peak of the Cerro de Potosi on December 15, 1788.
Those who had awaited the new intendant governor
proudly showed him the Casa de Moneda, the town1s finest
building, completed in 1773.

The massive stone building was

two stories high, covered an entire block and housed offices
of the exchequer and the intendant and the machinery to roll
metal and stamp coins.

Opening onto the building's first

patio were the living quarters of all of the officials of
the Casa.

An apartment in the building was the official

^•Sanz to Vald6z, Potosi, January 30, 1789, no. 1,
AGI, Charcas 439.
83

84
residence of the superintendent of the Casa, but Sanz as
intendant governor would inhabit the pretorial, a separate
building that faced the west side of the plaza.

The same

architects who had designed the mint in Lima also designed
the Casa de Moneda of Potosi,
similar in design.

and the two buildings were

Pedro Vicente Canete, who with his large

family occupied the superintendent's quarters in the Casa,
complained that while this design was appropriate for Lima's
o
balmy climate, it was barely habitable in frigid potosi.
Surrounding the second patio were offices, the rooms con
taining the coining machinery, and quarters for the Negro
slaves who powered the presses.
Silver production in Potosi had reached a low point
in the mid-eighteenth century.

This decline was the culmina

tion of a long-term trend that began in the previous century.
The recent Indian insurrection in Upper Peru had slowed the
recovery.

Royal authorities hoped that by placing Sanz in

charge of the financial as well as the political operations,
they would see an increase in production and hence in royal
revenues.
Potosi:

Sanz would hold four posts concurrently in
Intendant Governor, Superintendent of the Royal

Bank of San Carlos, Superintendent of the Casa de Moneda,
and Superintendent of Mita.
As intendant governor, Sanz would have many of the

Pedro Vicente Canete, Historia Fisica y Politica de
la Provincia de Potosi, ed. Gunnar Mendoza (La Paz:
FundaciCn Universitaria ’'Simon I. Patino,” 1952), p. 32.
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same responsibilities he had had in Buenos Aires where he
held that office as well as the Superintendency of the Army
and Treasury.

As the chief executive of the intendancy, he

was responsible for the defense and administration of Potosi,
and since economic affairs were of such importance there,
his other offices took on increased significance.
The Royal Bank of San Carlos began in 1747 as a fund
to foment silver mining and refining in Potosi.

Joseph

Hervoso, an inspector working for the Royal Treasury, was in
Potosi at that time trying to increase production without
costly disbursements from the Treasury.

He suggested that

the miners and azogueros establish and administer their own
fund for that purpose.’* On January 12, 1747, a junta of the
azogueros voted to accumulate the fund by withholding two and
three-quarters reales from each mark (usually about sixtyfour reales) that was sold to the Casa de Moneda.

In other

words, each mark brought by the mint would be discounted by
two and three-fourths reales, and this was to be the base
for the fund.

Azogueros would be eligible to make loans

from this fund to purchase mining equipment or mercury, to
hire workers or to pay the leguaje (travel expenses for
unpaid Indian workers assigned to them).

The association of

3
Joaquin Blanco Antolinez, "Proyecto EconGmico pide
providencias para evitar los Robos en esta real Casa [de
Moneda] Impugna, como es justo los crecidos aumentos de la
fundaciGn mayor: quiere aclarar el procedemiento de las
crecidas fallas de la oficina de Fielatura" (unpublished
manusacript, Potosi, 1808), ANB, Ruck 256. Cited hereafter
as "Proyecto EconGmico."
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azogueros named a protector of the fund from their number
who was to hold one of the three keys to the chest where the
money would be kept.
other keys.

Government officials were to hold the

Over the next four years, the azogueros

contributed with each sale to the mint, and loans were made
from the fund that accumulated.
In February, 1751, the zealous Ventura de Santelices
took office as governor of Potosi.

He noted from the accounts

that there should be 164,794 pesos in the azogueros1 fund,
but when he ordered the chest opened, he found only thirteen
pesos, six reales.4

Santelices continued to exact the

contribution from silver presented at the Casa de Moneda,
but he administered the fund himself.

He established a bank

in 1752, which the Crown approved, and he personally con
trolled its operation.

When the King chartered the bank,

there were 57,800 pesos in the fund— not enough to cover the
demand for loans by azogueros. Ventura Santelices therefore
transferred to the bank 10,000 pesos from the Royal Treasury,
c
along with 2,000 pesos of his own salary.
The Bank began
purchasing the silver that the azogueros produced, and
making yearly loans to them.

The Governor and his carefully

chosen assistants ran the Bank efficiently but arbitrarily,
without setting down formal rules and procedures.

They

carefully inspected the chests each week to be sure that

4Ibid.
5Canete, Historia Flsica, p. 198.
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they contained the proper amount.

He also guarded the iron

and mercury that the Bank lent to azogueros under the same
conditions that it lent money.

By February, 1762, when

Ventura Santelices left office, the baxik claimed 817,140
pesos worth of assets, and it had helped many azogueros.6
Jaime Sanjust succeeded Santelices and was more
trusting to subordinates than his predecessor.
occurred and irregular deficits resulted.

Abuses

The government of

Peru in 1766, commissioned Pedro de Tagle to investigate the
problem and to superintend the Bank.

He found that over a

quarter of a million pesos worth of silver and iron was
missing, so he replaced faulty administrators and in 1770,
issued provisional rules for the Bank's operation.

By the

time Tagle left office in 1775, the deficit had decreased
7

substantially.

The Royal Government, which had helped to support
the Bank with its funds under Santelices, disliked the
erratic fortunes of the institution.

In October, 1776,

Charles III ordered that the Bank lend no more than 50,000
pesos in money and material, or order to prevent "the risks
g

and disturbances of the past."

He also stipulated that the

superintendent not increase this limit until the fund was
larger.

Viceregal authorities in Lima sent Jorge Escobedo y

Alarcdn to Potosi in 1777 to investigate the latest losses

6Ibid.. p. 199.
7Ibid.. p. 202.
O
Blanco Antolinez, "Proyecto EconOmico," ANB, Ruck 256.
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and to assume the governorship and superintendency.

After

studying the Bank 1s accounts, Escobedo recommended that the
Royal Government take the Bank over and administer it.

The

Audiencia of Lima and the Council of the Indies approved
this proposal in the same year, and the Royal Bank of San
Carlos was founded in 1779.

Tagle's rules, Escobedo's

additions, and royal amendments were gathered and they later
became a part of the Ordinance of Intendants.
The Bank had two principal purposes:

to buy any

silver that was offered for sale in Potosi for subsequent
resale to the Casa de Moneda, and to lend money or materials
to the azogueros.

Officials of the Bank included the Admin

istrator, who purchased the metal and had to be an expert
metallurgist able to determine the purity of the metal from
just looking and touching; the Treasurer, who made payments
for silver received; and the Accountant who kept records of
transactions.

In charge of all Bank operations was the

superintendent.

He and the other officials held keys to the

chest where the money was kept, and they were responsible for
its safe keeping.

The superintendent was to preside at

meetings of the junta of azogueros. and he signed all weekly
accounts. Concerning his“responsibilities, the Ordinance stated;
The connection between the Casa de Moneda and the Bank,
and the cooperation necessary between the two, make it
convenient that both offices be held by one individual:
therefore the Superintendent of the Casa de Moneda will
also be the Superintendent of the Bank.^

^Ibid.
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The line separating the two positions was not clear, and by
appointing one man to fill both offices plus the intendant
governorship, conflicts like the one between Sanz and Loreto
in Buenos Aires could be avoided.
Soon after Jaime Villarroel filed the first silver
claim in Potosi in 1545, the early miners set up an official
furnace to smelt and assay gold and silver.

Nearby, they

built a workshop where workmen using hammers struck off a
few crude coins bearing the impression of the cross.
Viceroy Toledo during his visit to Potosi in the 1570's
recognized the need for a real mint in the mining region
because, in spite of the proximity of the mines, royal coins
were scarce and barter was common.

The few coins that were

available had to be imported from Spain.

Toledo wanted to

encourage commerce among the natives and bring them into the
economic system and thus under royal influence.

He also

wanted officials to be able to collect the royal fifth more
efficiently.

In 1572, therefore, he established the Royal

Casa de la Moneda de Potosi, which housed royal financial
offices and the mint.

Three years later the building for

the Casa de Moneda that Toledo established, was completed,
and it was equipped with three smelting furnaces and
machinery to strike coins.

Mechanization increased Potosi's

coin output and royal officials at the mint exacted taxes as
the silver was presented.

Silver production had increased

by the early 1500’s so that the Mint's capacity also had to

be increased.
When he founded the Casa de Moneda, Viceroy Toledo
also issued ordinances to govern its operation.

Under the

Toledan Ordinances, the Audiencia of La Plata had jurisdic
tion over the operation of the Mint.

Close surveillance of

the assaying and coining in Potosi from La Plata was not
possible and as a result, corrupt employees of the Casa de
Moneda began manufacturing coins of insufficient silver
content.

Several investigations of the illegal debasement

of currency took place during the seventeenth century, and
the problem continued into the next century.

By 1750,

corruption in Potosi had convinced authorities to unite the
offices of Superintendent of the Casa de Moneda with that of
Corregidor of Potosi. Ventura de Santelices was the first
man to hold this expanded office.
Santelices urged other reforms when he took office.
He believed that the two hundred year old Money House was
too small for the volume of business that it did, and that
its equally antiquated coining machinery should be replaced.
Ferdinand VX in 1750, approved the plan to construct a new
Money House in the same location as the old one.

Because of

funding delays, construction of the new Casa de Moneda did
not begin until two years later.

Spanish engineers super

vised the project, and it was not completed until 1773.
Charles III, upon learning that the total cost of the new
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mint amounted to 1,482,452 pesos, is said to have remarked,
“This building must be made of silver."^®
The third Casa de Moneda began operation with the
original ordinances that Toledo had issued.

These laws

determined the type of coins to be minted and gave the mint
the dual function of striking coins and exacting the royal
taxes on silver presented there.

The Ordinance of Inten-

dants included an extensive revision of the Toledan laws.
Since the time of Toledo, the Casa de Moneda had depended on
individual merchants to supply it with silver for coining,
but Santelices changed the procedure, so that the Bank of
San Carlos would supply the mint.
In the late eighteenth century, amalgamators still
refined silver in much the same wasteful way that they had
been doing it for two centuries.

Using the "patio process,"

Indian workers at the ingenios (refineries) spread the pella
(wet mixture of ground ore and mercury) on a paved floor, and
allowed it to warm in the sun stirring it occasionally by
treading on it.

Tending the pella was a particularly onerous

occupation because it exposed the half-naked workers to the
freezing climate as they slogged about in the cold mixture,
and many of them caught pneumonia.

Mercury poisoning and

inhalation of the dust also took their tolls.

There were

many "recipes" for speedy amalgamation, some of them calling
for the addition of iron, lime or salt, but all of them

10Ibid.
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based on guesswork.

After about a month, the mixture was

rewashed and the silver and mercury adhered together and
settled to the bottom of the washtub.

Next, workers wrapped

the mercury and silver in cloth and pressed it to extract
the mercury, and then heated the silver to remove the
remaining mercury.

Finally the amalgamators melted the

silver and poured it into conical-shaped molds.

They called

the ingots pinas or pineapples, because of their shape, and
presented them at the Casa de Moneda to be assayed and
.11
taxed.
The process was wasteful at every point of ore,
mercury, and manpower.

In the crushing mills, the wind blew

away dust that contained silver.

The paving stones of the

patios were oval-shaped, so that ore and mercury escaped
between them.

While metallurgy and mining technology had

progressed very little between 1575 and 1775, important gains
had been made in Europe, particularly in the mining regions
of Saxony, Poland, and Hungary.

Charles III was interested

in whatever would increase revenues from his colonies, and
in 1786, he ordered that German-trained experts by hired and
sent to instruct the operators of his mines in Mexico and
Peru.

Acting on the king's orders, Jos6 de Galvez named

Fausto Elhuyar, a Basque, to head the expedition. 12

•^Marie Helmer, "Potosi a la Fin de XVIIIe Siecle, "
Journal de la Soci6t£ des AmSricanistes (Paris), XL (1951),
21-50.
12Rose Marie Buechler, "Technical Aid to Upper Peru:
The Nordenflicht Mission," Journal of Latin American Studies,
I (May, 1973), 37-77.
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Elhuyar had studied metallurgy and mining at Freiburg
and in Sweden, and taught at the College of Mineralogy in
Asturias.

He was studying Ignaz von B o m's method of amalga

mation in Saxony when he received the appointment, which
also requested that he recruit German scientists to teach
metallurgy in Peru.

Elhuyar contacted the Swedish Baron

Thaddeus von Nordenflicht with whom he had studied, and who
had been in the service of the King of Poland; and the Baron
agreed to lead an expedition for Charles III, provided that
his Protestantism would be tolerated, and that he receive a
pension for life.

Royal authorities agreed to the condi

tions, and engaged three more German experts to go to Peru:
Daniel Weber, Anton Zacharias Helms, and Gottlob Fredrich
Mothes.

Meanwhile, Elhuyar went to New Spain.

Nordenflicht

and his party traveled first to Spain, and from there, sailed
for Buenos Aires, where they arrived in July, 1788.
The next month, Sanz, who was still Superintendent
General of the Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata, learned of
his transfer to Potosi. 13 Alert to the opportunity to
improve mineral production in his future intendancy, Sanz
requested that the Germans journey overland to Lima and
instruct in Potosi on the way, instead of sailing around the
continent.

Loreto grudgingly approved the change, and the

party set out from Buenos Aires-in October, 1788, and

■^Eduardo Matir6, El COdigo Carolino de Ordenanzas
Reales de las Minas de Potosi y DemAs Procincias del Rio de
la~Plata (1794) de Pedro Vicente Cafle't'e (Buenos Aires:
Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1973), p. 21.
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journeyed for nearly three months before reaching the mining
center.^
Some of the miners and other residents of Potosi
greeted the arrival of the European experts with optimism.
Like many Spanish colonials and Europeans during the Enlight
enment, they believed that huge amounts of precious metals
still existed throughout the Spanish Empire, and that their
successful exploitation awaited only the application of
sophisticated European technology.

Weber later wrote that

miners in Potosi were poor "not because their mineral veins
had stopped being rich, but because of ignorance of the arts
and the lack of a remedy for abuses and disorders, " and that
"there are hardly any other mines on earth that equal in
abundance those in this country."

Members of the expedition

quickly suggested some simple measures that, while hardly
examples of sophisticated European technology, did produce
improvement.

They pointed out that pulverized ore should

be sifted indoors to avoid loss in the wind, and they
suggested the use of square paving stones in the amalgama
tion patios to prevent waste.

They also noted that labor

was wasted by the unhealthy conditions that prevailed in the
. .
mining
process. 15
One of the major obstacles to mineral production in

■^Sanz to Loreto, Potosi, March 16, 1789,no. 5, AGI,
Charcas 439.
15Martir6, El COdigo Carolino, p. 21.
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Potosi was the flooding of mine shafts.

Gottlob Mothes

inspected the drainage shaft under construction in the
Cerro Rico, and pronounced it inadequate because it was in
the wrong position to drain the maximum number of mines.

He

suggested a new location for the shaft in his report for the
intendant governor.

Sanz studied the report and rode around

the circumference of the Cerro with Mothes to inspect the
proposed shaft site, and he ordered that construction begin
on the Socavon de Berrios, based on Mothes' plan.
The responsibilities of corregidores and intendants
had long included an annual inspection of the mines.

Before

Sanz, chief officials in Potosi had been content with a
prefunctory visit to a safe mine each year.

Sanz, however,

personally entered and carefully inspected many mines.
Furthermore, he ordered that mine owners keep exact records
of tunneling progress and expenses, so that he could monitor
their efforts.

This increased vigilance quickly stimulated

more tunneling in the Cerro. as well as a sharp rise in
silver production over that of the previous year. 16
The greatest losses and inefficiencies in the Potosi
mining industry occurred in the refining process, and
Nordenflicht believed that the greatest gains could conse
quently be made by improving that process.

In Europe, the

Baron had studied the "barrel method" of refining that his
teacher, Ignaz von Born had developed.

16Ibid,

The machine used in
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this process consisted of a wood and iron framework that
supported axles on which six, eight, or even twelve large
wooden barrels turned.

Each barrel could hold hundreds of

pounds of pella so that all the parts of the machine had to
be strong and well made.

To amalgamate, the operator filled

each barrel with ground ore, mercury, and water; he sealed
the barrels and then put the machine in motion with water
or mule power.

The machine agitated the mixture for one day,

during which amalgamation took place.

At the end of the day,

the operator removed the mercury and silver and separated
them in the usual way.

The potential advantages of the

barrel method, that it took only one day compared with about
thirty for the "patio process," and that it consumed less
mercury, naturally caused considerable excitement in
Potosi .1 7
The wonderful machines were expensive, however, and
Sanz diverted royal funds for the contruction of a prototype.
On March 16, 1789, Sanz wrote to Viceroy Loreto asking for
permission to use more royal funds for the machines and for
a mining academy.

Sanz's letter was optimistic, saying that

Nordenflicht1s experiments had shown that the azogueros
could produce

200

percent more silver, with new techniques.

With more royal aid, these improvements would materialize,
the Royal Treasury would benefit by collecting more taxes,

17Ibid.. p. 22.
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"and Potosi will return to its ancient wealth. "18

Sanz also

mailed a copy of this rosy report to Fr. Antonio Vald6 z,
IQ

Minister of War and Hacienda for the Indies.
The feud between Sanz and Viceroy Loreto had not
diminished with Sanz's removal from the capital, however.
After Sanz's departure, the Viceroy and Pedro Dionisio de
Galvez, who had succeeded Sanz as Director of the Tobacco
Monopoly, accused Sanz of having embezzled royal funds and
of having spent an excessive amount ten years earlier when
he made the epic visita.

Sanz pointed out that the sup

posedly embezzled money was in another account and he was
exonerated.

At Valdfiz's request, the Intendant Governor also

justified his expenses for the three-year visita, which
amounted to 66,792 pesos.

Hacienda authorities in Spain

again found in Sanz's favor and reprimanded Galvez for
Jn

making the accusation.

Loreto predictably opposed his old rival's projects
in Potosi, reprehending him for delaying the Norderflicht
Mission's journey to Lima, and for risking royal funds.

18Sanz to Loreto, Potosi, March 16, 1789, no. 5,
AGI, Charcas 439.
•^8Sanz to Valdfez, Potosi, March 16, 1789, no. 2,
AGI, Charcas 439.
20sanz, "Sobre las incidencias habidas entre el
Intendente [Sanz] y el Director de la Renta de Tabacos
[Galvez] con raotivo de la denuncia que 6 ste le hizo de un
Fraude de Tabaco y otra de fraudes en la Tesoria. . . , "
n.p., November 20, 1788, AGN, Reales Ordenes, Libro 18,
Foja 326.
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Sanz disregarded Loreto's scolding and continued to fund the
projects.

Moreover, Loreto's term as viceroy was coming to

an end, and his replacement, Nicolas de Arredondo, was
already en route to Buenos Aires from Lima at the time of
Sanz's communication with Loreto, and he stopped at the
mining center to inspect it.

Arredondo was interested in

Sanz's efforts to increase production, and encouraged him.
He wrote:
Through the singular zeal of the Intendant Governor,
I was instructed on the operations involved in the
new method of amalgamation ahout to be established
hy the mineralogists, which will begin to function
as soon as the necessary machinery has been com
pleted. There is no doubt but that if they correspond
to the promises of the experts, they will produce the
most advantageous results. . . .21
Sanz therefore was in optimistic spirits in his
first year as intendant governor,

Loreto was leaving the

viceroyalty and being replaced by the more sympathetic and
compatible Arredondo.

Sanz and many others had faith that

silver production was about to rise rapidly because of German
technology.

Many thought that the town would recapture its

former wealth and splendor.

Loreto's reprimand was forgotten,

and the King sent a c6 dula approving Sanz's efforts and
authorizing him to lend more royal funds to individuals
interested in building barrel machines.

Sanz heavily publi-

cized the initial test of the first machine.

2 ^Buechler,
2 2 Martir6

22

"Technical Aid," p. 56.

, El Cddigo Carolino, p. 82.
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In January, 1790, a large crowd had assembled to
witness the debut of the machine that would make them rich.
The operators self-importantly loaded each barrel with several
hundredweights of pella and the machine was activated.

The

curious witnesses did not have to wait long for the results,
because the frame of the machine broke when the barrels began
to turn.

Much disappointment, derision, and anti-German

feeling ensued.

The experts went back to work, and blamed

the failure on the lack of skill of Potosi's artisans and on
the poor quality of the materials available there.

After

five months, a second machine was ready, and this time it was
privately tested before a small selected audience.

The

results of the second test were unclear, but they indicated
that the machine could extract slightly more silver from the
ore than could the patio process, but more importantly, the
test showed that the barrel method economized on the con
sumption of mercury.

Sanz publicized the success and an

article in the Mercurio Peruano stated,

"We are pleased to

communicate to the public the news that good results have come
from the use of the barrel machine in Potosi.

We are inter

ested, as true patriots, in the advancement of the mining
industry upon which depend the health and restoration of this
Kingdom."2 3
Sanz and Daniel Weber, wanting conclusive and con
crete results with which to prove the superiority of the

23"Adiciones de la Sociedad," Mercurio Peruano, 1:23
(March 20, 1791), 220.
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barrel method over the patio process, and to train workers in
the new method, decided to initiate long-term experiments to
last through 1791. Before the experiments could begin, however,
Sanz became seriously ill and could not work for several
months.

During this interlude, conservative amalgamators

organized opposition to the experiments.

Most Potosi amalga

mators were little more than charlatans and the prevailing
ignorance of scientific procedures for refining silver hid
their incompetence and allowed them to cheat mine owners and
the government.

The adoption of the new more efficient

techniques advocated by the northern Europeans would either
force the amalgamators out of business or force them to learn
the new method.

Therefore, during Sanz's incapacitation, they

spread rumors that the Germans were dishonest and that the
machine would cause unemployment among the minqados.

They

also conspired to keep Weber from acquiring the ore necessary
for his experiments.2^
Weber resented the azogueros' behavior, and wrote
that he had to withstand "imponderable opposition and hostil
ity produced by the attitude of the party of azogueros in
this city."

He complained that:

In Potosi, the ministers and the inhabitants have not
only opposed me, but they have acted like ruffians
and have tried to throw down all of my efforts. The
opposition reached such extremes that there was no
place where they did not direct defamatory letters and

2 ^The remaining information and quotations in this
chapter were taken from MartirS, El Cbdigo Carolino, unless
otherwise cited.
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treatises against my honor, with the most injust treat
ment of my person. Meanwhile, I was working without
rest for their advancement and good.
The attacks were printed in the Mercurio Peruano of Lima,
where an anonymous writer who used the pseudonym "Serrano"
tried to "discredit the barrel method and at the same time to
discredit me with unjust impostures and falsehoods, the
product of a man seditious, cunning, and ignorant to the last
degree."

In order to protect his good name, Weber felt com

pelled to answer publically the affronts and he did so in
several issues of the Mercurio Peruano during 1791.
After Sanz recovered, he quickly reasserted his
authority and ordered the amalgamators to supply the needed
ore.

Two Basque merchants, Luis de Orueta and Juan Bautista

J&uregui had recently acquired holdings in Potosi, and
sponsored the construction of a twelve-barrel refining
machine near Potosi.

This machine worked properly and it

showed a definite advantage over the patio process.

For more

than a year, men using the machine consistently produced more
silver than men using the old method, when both groups
started with the same amount of pella.

Following the experi

ment, Weber wrote, "The advantages of an established and
improved system of barrel amalgamation are evident, and can
not be denied, when confirmed by fourteen months of contin
uous experience."
The Nordenflicht Mission to Upper Peru did not alter
production methods in Potosi for several reasons.

First, the

barrel machines were extremely costly and there was little
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financial capital available.in the jaded mining center.
Second, the machines were more practicable in Europe than in
isolated Potosi because shilled European blacksmiths,
carpenters, and coopers were able to assemble and maintain
the complicated machines and potosino artisans were unaccus
tomed to such exacting work.

Finally, many azogueros were

organized against the introduction of new techniques, and
they did not cooperate with efforts to establish it.

After

more than a year in Potosi, Nordenflicht, Helms, and Mothes
departed for Lima, while Weber remained in Potosi to super
vise the operation of the few barrel machines that had been
constructed.
In 1792, Weber wrote to Viceroy Arredondo.

His

letter showed bitter disappointment that the azogueros had
not readily accepted the instruction offered by the Teutonic
mission.

He complained that Potosi mining was only super

ficial and that much more ore could be extracted if the miners
were more knowledgeable.

He warned that the ores currently

being taken from the mines were just the remains of the under
ground bridges left by past miners, and that such an operation
could only end in disaster.

He blamed these difficulties

partly on the "indolence to which those who work in the mines
and refineries are accustomed, and on their capriciousness."
"The resulting disorder," he wrote, "inhibits production in
royal refineries and in those of the azogueros."

The Germans

saw the problem, therefore as originating with the ignorance
and laziness of the Americans.
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Sanz had made a genuine effort to improve Potosi's
silver production.

Even before taking office as intendant

governor there, he had maneuvered to get authorization for
the Nordenflicht Mission to stop in Potosi.

Once the Expedi

tion had reached Upper Peru, Sanz endeavored to find financial
support for their experiments.

When azogueros failed to

cooperate with the mission, he ordered that they do so.
Technical improvement imparted by foreigners was, in Sanz's
opinion, only one method of raising production.

When he saw

that new shafts and improved techniques would not generate
the expected increases in production and in royal revenue,
Intendant Governor Sanz began to pursue other remedies.
Attempts to apply two means of improving silver productiontighter administration and more forced Indian labor in the
mines and refineries— were important issues during much of
the remainder of his career.

Sanz's involvement with a

reform of the legal system, which included an extension of
the mita, dated back to his days as superintendent general of
the viceroyalty.
Fausto Elhuyar had translated the Mining Laws of
Saxony into Spanish some years earlier and this translation
served as a model for the progressive Mining Ordinance of New
Spain that Charles III issued in 1783.

The King considered

applying the same Ordinance to the newly created viceroyalty
of Rio de la Plata.

He believed that mineral production in

the new colony might improve if the new mining laws were
applied along the Ordinance of Intendants.

When copies of
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Ordinance of Intendants were distributed to the governors of
mining intendancies, a copy of the new mining code was
included with instructions that the officials study it and
give their opinion as to whether or not its adoption would
help silver production.
For two years no decision was made about applying
the Mexican Code.

Then in 1785, Jos6 de Galvez wrote to

Superintendent Sanz informing him that the King, concerned
with the decadent state of mining caused by "the lack of
method with which the mining centers are governed" and by
frequent and prolonged litigations between miners, had
decided to apply the Mining Code of New Spain to Rio de la
Plata.

Galvez continued that the application of the new code

would be left to local authorities.
The most important aspect of the Mexican Ordinance
was the creation of the Royal Tribunal General of the
Important Body of Mining of New Spain, which was to have con
trol of all the administrative and economic functions of
mining in New Spain.

In particular, it would be aware of the

discoveries, claims, ownership, extent of drainage, destruc
tion of pillars in mines, and all that should occur in
violation of the ordinance.

The Viceroy was to appoint

members of the powerful tribunal from the ranks of practicing
mine proprietors with at least ten years experience.25 In
the Rio de la Plata, Charles III intended that the Tribunal

City:

^5Maria Becerra, Derecho Minero de Mfexico (Mexico
Editorial Limusa-Wiley, 1963), p. 69.
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be established in Potosi and that necessary judges and
deputies be appointed in other mining centers when needed.
The Intendant Governor of Potosi would preside over the
Tribunal instead of a special Administrator General as in
Mexico.
Sanz knew that this radical change might be unpopular
in Upper Peru.

He also knew that Juan del Pino Manrique was a

favorite of the powerful Galvez.

The Superintendent shrewdly

withheld any comment on the desirability of applying the
Mexican Code in Potosi.

Without delay, he forwarded the

correspondence from Madrid to the Intendant Governor of
Potosi along with a flattering note asking for his recommenda
tions.
Six months after receiving this correspondence, Pino
Manrique sent a long reply to Sanz.

The Intendant of the

mining center was aided in the preparation of this letter by
his brilliant and ambitious teniente asesor, Pedro Vicente
Canete, whose advancement in colonial government was frus
trated only by his Creole birth in Asuncidn in 1754.

Their

report began by describing the organization and functioning
of the Tribunal General of New Spain, and speculating on how
such a body would work in Potosi.

They noted that since Pino

had served for years in Mexico, he was equally familiar with
both areas and qualified to comment.

Pino and Canete empha

sized the differences between Mexico and Upper Peru, especially
their contrasting geological deposits and levels of mining
development.

They wrote that New Spain had a first rate

106
capital city with a population of over half a million, and
that it was connected to the mining regions by good roads.
Potosi, on the other hand, was just a mining town of scarcely
40,000, and other mining sites, many of them almost inacces
sible, were scattered over a large area.

The mining towns of

Mexico were more permanent while in Upper Peru, the mining
camps were set up around one mine, and abandoned when the
mine was depleted.
Another reason that Pino and Canete gave for not
establishing a mining tribunal in Potosi was that Upper Peru
lacked knowledgeable, technically qualified miners to serve
on one.

Mexico, though, had the advantage of many competent

miners who were anxious to share their proficiency.

Moreover

there was much rivalry among the azogueros of Potosi over the
distribution of available assistance funds and mita workers,
and the intendant governor and his advisor feared that any
azogueros who were appointed would use their positions to
accommodate themselves and their allies and to harm their
enemies.

Therefore, they believed that it would be better

not to divide the power to administer funds and workers among
members of a locally elected tribunal, but to leave it concentrated in the hands of the intendant governor. 27

26Qunnar Mendoza, El doctor don Pedro Vicente Canete
y su Historia flsica y polltica de Potosi (Sucre: Univ'ersidad
de San Francisco Xavier, 1954), p. 127.
27Ibid
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The petition from Potosi contained other arguments
why a mining tribunal was inappropriate for Upper Peru.

The

Crown had proposed that the Casa de Moneda charge an additional
real for each mark of silver it acquired in order to finance
the tribunal.

This charge, according to Pino and Canete,

would work a hardship on the local producers, induce them to
sell illegally to private merchants, and thus cost the Crown
the royal tenths it would have earned.

The Mexican Ordinance

provided for redoing the subterranean architecture in the
mines, to which the Potosi officials replied that the Cerro
Rico was already so riddled with tunnels and caverns that any
attempt to improve the tunnel work could result in a disasterous collapse.

Another provision of the Mexican law that

they objected to was that only four percent of the Indian
population was subject to the mita. They argued that by
subjecting a larger number of Indians to the service, the
work would be divided and a smaller burden assumed by each
native.

Under the Toledan Ordinance, which they defended as

durable and adequate, a full seventh of the Indian population
was subject to the service.

A part of the Mexican Code that

they did agree with was the establishment of a mining academy,
but they requested the appointment of professors who were
familiar with Alto Peruvian ores, "which are distinct from
those found elsewhere, " and that modern European textbooks be
purchased.28

28ibid., p. 130.
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Pino and Canete concluded their report by reiterating
that a Mining Tribunal in Potosi was not feasible and sug
gested that the existing Azogueros * Guild of Potosi retain
its powers of recommendation but that it not be given
judicial powers.

The teniente asesor would retain these.

Concerning the Toledan laws that currently governed mining in
Upper Peru, they recognized the possibility for improvement
and recommended examination of the two hundred year old code,
former Governor Escobedo's provisions for the Banco de San
Carlos, and the Mining Code for New Spain; and the adoption
of appropriate parts of each group of rules.

Finally, Pino

Manrique volunteered to begin working on such a Mining Code
for Potosi using his own "short talents" and Canete's
assistance. 9 9
When Superintendent Sanz received the report in
September, 1786, he immediately forwarded it to Galvez in
Madrid, along with his enthusiastic approval of the plan for
a new mining code, and praise for the well-connected Pino,
saying that he was well qualified to compile the ordinances.
The next year when Galvez received the proposal and its
accompanying endorsement, he approved the plan for new
ordinances for Potosi and Charles III concurred.
Sanz on April

8

Galvez wrote

, 1787, saying that the King agreed that there

would be problems involved in applying the Mexican Code to
Upper Peru, and that only the appropriate laws of the Code

29Ibid.
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should be combined into a new code for Upper Peru.

The laws

were to be put into effect by the Viceroy as soon as they
were ready provided that no objections were raised in Potosi.
Pino Manrique meanwhile busied himself preparing the
Code.

He had quarreled with Canete over the expanded judicial

role of the teniente asesor that they had both advocated .
earlier, so the intendant governor compiled a code by himself.
Pino sent his laws to Sanz on November 16, 1787, and they
were similar to the Mining Code of New Spain that he had
maligned the year before.

They provided for the creation of

a tribunal of azogueros to administer mineral affairs in
Upper Peru.

With Galvez dead, however, Sanz was not as

receptive and praising of Pino Manrique1s work as he had been
earlier.

The Superintendent wrote the Intendant Governor

that he needed time to study his new Ordinance, and he
omitted the exaggerated praise of Pino that he had included
in previous letters.

Bureaucratic confusion in Spain and

bureaucratic stalling in Buenos Aires prevented the new laws
from being accepted in spite of Galvez's decree of April
1787, approving the proposal.

8

,

When Pino Manrique left Potosi

for Lima in 1788 he was bitter because nothing more was done
to pass his code.
In 1790 after Sanz had become intendant governor of
Potosi, Canete requested permission to continue working on
the code.

Sanz agreed that new legislation was desirable.

He mailed Canete's proposal along with his own endorsement to
Viceroy Arredondo who forwarded the information to Spain, but

no action was taken at that time.
The next year, the Crown sent orders transferring
Canete to the asesoria of La Paz.

When the orders arrived,

Sanz again endorsed the proposed legislation and requested
that Canete be allowed to stay in Potosi to complete the work.
The Spanish authorities took Sanz's advice and Canete
remained.
One of the reforms that Nordenflicht had recommended
was the creation of new and rational mining laws for Upper
Peru based on the ones in Saxony, Bohemia, and Harz district,
Prussia, and other regions of Europe.

Sanz and Canete used

the Germans1 criticisms of the existing mining code to induce
Spanish authorities to give them a free hand in the prepara
tion of a new code.

While the Mission was in Potosi, Canete

wrote to Pr. Vald 6 z and criticized production techniques in
Potosi, suggesting that they could be improved with better
laws.
Sanz made a visita to a mine and reported, "After
only a short observation, I began to recognize that the
economy practiced in the management of the mines has been
entirely empirical and common practice has had more bearing
on how silver was mined than have royal orders so that it
[common practice] has more importance than the law. " Sanz
went on to decry archaic methods, floods, landslides, and the

3®Sanz to Gardoqui, Potosi, September 26, 1792, AGI,
Charcas 440.
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ignorance that pervaded the industry.

He expressed hope that

the new body of legislation that he and Canete were charged
with compiling would resolve many of those problems.

Sanz

wrote that the passage of time and changes of technique had
rendered the Toledan Ordinance out of date.

In his report,

Sanz called the mita "the prime mover of mining in Potosi, "
and he proposed better laws to protect the Indians from abuse.
"I judge it indispensible," he concluded, "that a new judicial
code be formed in order to include needed provisions missing
from the present code, correcting the enormous abuses and
determining more carefully each official's function.
The request obtained the desired results.

On June 3,

1791, Minister Pedro Ldpez de Lerena of the Council of the
Indies sent a royal order to Viceroy Arredondo stating that
Charles IV had learned with satisfaction of the results
obtained with the barrel method, and he had decided to approve
whatever provision that Sanz wanted to issue to improve pro
duction.

He agreed to enlarge the fund of the Banco de San

Carlos to 200,000 pesos to help the miners and to pay for more
barrel machines.

In answer to Sanz's special request, the

Crown consented to his proposal to revise the mining laws in
Potosl, making them applicable to local problems and indicated
that the code that Sanz and Canete had produced would be
approved as long as the azoqueros concurred, since they would
be most directly affected.

Lerena also informed Arredondo

that it was the King's will that once he (Arredondo) approved
the new law, it should be put into effect.
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Not all of Sanz's efforts to influence powerful
authorities in Spain succeeded., however.

Jacinto Sanchez, an

agent of Sanz's in Spain, requested in 1793 that the Governor
be appointed a Minister of the Council of the Indies.
Sanchez cited Sanz's previous experience and dependability as
qualifications.

In the margin of Sanchez's letter, an official

noted, "see if the interested party [Sanz] has made a similar
application; if not, wait until he does so by way of the
viceroy, as he should."

Apparently, Sanz never personally
repeated the request, and he remained in Potosi. 31
Meanwhile, Canete and Sanz continued to work on the

new Mining Code and by 1794, it was completed.

However, a

royal c 6 dula dated February 5, 1794, named Pedro Melo de
Portugal to replace Arredondo as Viceroy, but he was not to
take office until the following year.

Sanz, therefore, sent

the finished Cddigo Carolino de ordenanzas reales de las
minas de Potosi y dem&s Provincias del Rio de la Plata to
Arredondo.

In his accompanying letter, Sanz criticized Pino

Manrique's code of 1787 as being too similar to the Mexican
Ordinance that Pino himself had denounced the year before
(1786).

Sanz continued that "laws well received are laws

well observed," and he noted that most of the azogueros
admired and praised the Cddigo Carolino.
The Code that Cafiete prepared with Intendant Governor

^Jacinto Sanches to Crown, Madrid, December 3,
1793, AGI, Charcas 434.
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Sanz's cooperation and approval was not an original piece of
legislation.

It was a compilation of parts of the old laws

for Peru issued by Toledo and other authorities, of the
mining code for New Spain of 1783, and of royal orders from
the past two centuries.

Parts of the Code that dealt with

local issues such as the favored treatment of those azogueros
who rented rather than owned their holdings, and the strict
regulation of capchas (gleaners who were allowed to enter the
mines on weekends) made it unique.

The lengthy code was 544

double-faced pages long and it was divided into three books
containing titles and ordinances.
Perhaps the greatest departure from previous regula
tions and certainly the part of the Code that caused the most
controversy was Title VIII of Book II.

Ordinances I and II

of this title called for a new repartimiento of Indians based
on the latest census figures.

Since there had been no new

repartimiento since 1692, a new census would reveal more
Indians and the seventh destined for the mita would consequently be larger.

In Ordinance VI, Canete denounced the

"notorious excesses in assignments (of Indians) made by
Viceroy Conde de Monclova in 1692, saying that forty workers
had been assigned to each silver mine and refinery to do work
that could be done by thirteen men working in shifts of four
with one alternate.

The result of this carelessness was that

the workers barely produced enough to pay for the food that
they ate and they suffered from the disorderliness. Canete's
remedy for the situation was to limit to thirteen the number
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of Indians assigned to each refinery.

"But since the present

state of the Cerro Rico de Potosi necessitates many more
workers than before for the removal of metals," seventy-five
Indians should be assigned to each head of a mine in addition
to the thirteen already assigned to all refinery heads.
In title VIII, Book II of the Cddigo Carolino, Sanz
and Canete accomplished a seemingly paradoxical end by
decreeing there would be an increase in the number of mita
workers in Potosi while declaring that too many of them were
employed in the refineries.

In order to acquire the approval

of the azogueros that was mentioned in the Royal Order of
June 3, 1791, Sanz and Caflete had the entire code read aloud
before a dozen representatives of the Gremio de Azogueros,
and all but one, Joaquin de la Quintana, signed it.

Quintana

wrote Viceroy Arredondo in 1794 that the azogueros 1 examina
tion of the Code had been precursory and that they had been
subjected to pressure from Sanz and Canete to sign it.

He

also alleged that only a few wealthy azogueros would benefit.
Quintana was quickly joined by Fiscal Victorian de
Villava of the Audiencia of Charcas in opposing the adoption
of the new Code.

Other azogueros later expressed to the

Viceroy displeasure with the new laws.

Arredondo in the next

few months received much correspondence in favor of and
against the Cddigo Carolino, and he did not want to put it
into effect just as he was leaving office.

He therefore sent

the Code to Madrid for the Council of the Indies to accept or
reject.

After the members of a junta of the Council read the
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laws, they criticized them for being too long and full of
inappropriate historical allusions.

They censured Canete for

presuming— with his lack of mining experience— to issue
singlehandedly a mineral code to supplant the one of the
great Toledo.

The junta did not formally reject the Code but

they struck at its heart by recommending that the mita not be
extended and that new grants of Indian mita workers be revoked.
The real issue in whether or not to accept the SanzCanete Cddigo Carolino was the extension of the mita.

Villava

had already written an eloquent indictment of the service-^
and hoping to sway influential opinions in the Viceroyalty and
in Spain, Sanz wrote a defence of the mita.

Most of Sanz's

energy for the remainder of the decade would be spent
debating this issue.

-^“Discurso Sobre la Mita de Potosi," La Plata,
March 9, 1793, copy in Ricardo Levene, Vida y Escritos de
Victorian de Villava (Buenos Aires: Peuser, S\a ., 1946),
pp. xxx-xxix. See Ch. V.

Chapter V
POLEMICS OVER THE MITA
After the Nordenflicht Mission had left Potosi and
Loreto had left Buenos Aires, San2 was ahle to devote his
time and energy to local issues.

The principal issue that

he faced during the 1790's was the preservation of the right
of Potosi miners to force highland Indians to work in their
mines.

Churchmen and statesmen over the years had attacked

the mita system as inhumane.

The latest opponent was

Victorian de Villava, Fiscal of the Audiencia of charcas.
Villava called the system not only barbaric, but also unpro
ductive.

These two Spaniards published broadsides and

exchanged caustic letters on the issue.

Their frantic

appeals were read by officials of the superior government in
Buenos Aires, and eventually reached the attention of
officials at the royal court in Spain.

By 1795 the debate

had become more specific and its focus had shifted from the
moral propriety of compulsory Indian labor to whether the
natives fared better working in the mines of Potosi or
laboring on Church haciendas in the adjacent province of
Chayanta.

In this latter phase of the debate, Sanz and the

azogueros argued one way while Villava and the priests of

Ch.ay anta argued another.
Attracting or compelling laborers to work in Potosi's
mines had been a continuing problem of the mine operators
there since shortly after the discovery# and the labor short
age continued into the eighteenth century.

A letter from

officials of the Caja Real to the Crown dated May 28, 1714,^
complained that after Viceroy Toledo had fixed the number of
Indians to be sent from each village to work in Potosi# that
number had been reduced greatly by Viceroy Conde de Monclova
in 1692.

They wrote that the number of mita Indians was

diminishing every day because of the falling population, but
that the priests still retained the same number of Indian
workers on their missions as always.

The officers of the

Caja Real suggested that fewer Indians be assigned to the
missions so more would be available to work in the mines#
since "it is certain that the larger the number of people
working in the mines# the more silver can be taken from them."
The idea that the priests deprived the mita of workers would
be a major theme of the azogueros and their advocates for the
remainder of the century.
Another document, "The Rules of the Presidio del
Cerro, " issued by Sanz in May of 1791,

provides more

^■Officials of the Caja Real to Crown, Potosi, May 28,
1714, Revista del Instituto de Investigaciones Histdricas
(Potosi, Bolivia), Vol. I (1959-60), 52.
^Sanz, Reglamento del Presidio del Cerro, Potosi,
May, 1791, Revista de Investiqacion, 53-61.
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evidence of the shortage of labor as well as an interesting
insight into Spanish colonial penology.

In this document it

was specified that criminals could be sentenced to the mines.
The regulations specified that the warden should keep records
of the names, nationalities, and ages of the prisoners, and
count his charges every day.

The warden was to take care to

prevent any association between prisoners to avoid a dangerous
escape conspiracy and "recognizing that some prisoners live
with too much familiarity, and that a bad example or scandal
might result, the warden will not permit them to associate
either inside or outside their cells."
The rules described in detail how the prison was to
be run, even stating what the inmates were to be fed and the
exact salaries of the warden and guards.

Subtly mentioned

within the text was perhaps the main point of the regulations:
"Since they are criminals who have deprived people of the
fruits of their industry, they must repay society by working
in the mines for six hours daily."
The need for forced workers in Potosi increased in
the 1790's.

Pressure from Spain to expand royal revenues

from mining was evident in the Bourbon Reforms.

The Council

of the Indies nearly applied the Mining Code of New Spain to
Peru.

This move was headed off by the maneuverings of Sanz

(then Superintendent of Hacienda), Canete and Juan del Pino
Manrique (Governor of Potosi). Under these laws, any unpro
ductive mine would have been confiscated.

Indeed, there was

pressure on azogueros just to make a living in that depressed
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hill which had already been intensely mined for 250 years.
Lucrative abuses of the mita were rampant.

In the last years

of Spanish control, some "miners" who no longer worked their
holdings still retained the right to receive mita workers,
whose services they sold to operating miners.

Others with no

intention of operating their mines chose to receive the
rezago or payment in money instead of labor.

This cash was

forcefully collected from subject Indians by enteradores.
officials charged with getting the Indians to the mines or
collecting their rezaqos.^

Productively or illicitly, the

mita Indians were responsible for a great deal of the silver
produced and the money earned in Potosi.

Sin mita no habr3

Potosi^ was a recurrent theme in representations of the
azogueros to the Crown and in the writings of Sanz.
A powerful and interested group such as the azogueros
who profited from the mita would understandably oppose any
effort to decrease or abolish the institution.

Therefore,

when Victorian de Villava released his damning Discurso
Sobre la Mita de Potosi on March 9, 1793, he triggered a
prolonged and arduous debate over the mita.

Sanz, already in

the process of expanding the mita, responded to Villava's
opening volley by issuing the ContestaciOn al Discurso Sobre

^Maria del Carmen Cortes Salinas, "Una PolSmica en
T o m o a la Mita de Potosi a Pines del Siglo XVIII. El
Discurso de Francisco de Paula Sanz a Favor de Ella,"
Revista de Indias (enero-diciembre, 1970), p. 173.
^Without the mita, there would be no Potosi.
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la Mita de Potosi, which was dated November 19, 1794.

Sanz

depended on the aid of his legal advisor Teniente Asesor
Pedro Vicente Canete for help with this and other writings
on the mita.

Villava answered Stanz and Canete promptly with

the Contrarr^plica a la Contestaci6 n de Paula Sanz released
on January 3, 1795.

These three documents constitute the

first round of the mita polemics of the 1790's.

The second

round began in 1795, and included personal insults, threats,
and legal connivance.
Villava, the catalyst of the debate, was the son of
a wealthy family in Aragon, where his father was a minister
of the royal audiencia.

As a young man, Villava was a law

professor at the University of Huesca, as well as a practicing
attorney.

In 1783, Villava applied for a post in the newly

reestablished Audiencia of Rio de la Plata but was disap
pointed and returned to the University.

He was interested

in economics, and in 1784 translated Readings in Commerce or
Civil Economics by Antonio Genovesi of the University of
Napoles.

Six years after losing his first bid for a position

in the colonies, Villava was designated Fiscal of the
C

Audiencia of Charcas.
The new official arrived in Buenos Aires in May of
1790 and was required to remain there for one year to act as
juez residencidor for the departing Viceroy Marqu6 s de

5Ricardo Levene, Vida v Escritos de Victorian de
Villava (Buenos Aires: Peuser, S.A., 1946), p. 14.
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Loreto.

Following the residencia, he proceeded to his new

post in La Plata.

In the highlands, Villava was appalled by

the spectacle of thousands of Indian mita workers in Potosi
and thousands more forced to work in religious parishes and
on haciendas.

Their suffering and economic waste inspired

the liberal Fiscal to write his Discurso Sobre la Mita de
Potosi.
Villava introduced his treatise by saying that much
had been written, pro and con, about forced labor since 1545,
and that almost always "the voices of Interests have pre
vailed and suffocated the voices of humanity."

Furthermore,

If my thoughts add nothing to what has already been
written, the soundness of my intention will excuse my
iirqpertinence: but if I am able to render doubtful
some of the propositions which have been accepted as
true and to verify others which have been held
doubtful, I will have accomplished the purpose of my
work.
The introduction continued that it had been supposed that
mining was public and that the indolence of the Indians was
incontestable; therefore, they could justly be forced to work.
Villava stated his purposes to be proving that the mines of
Potosi were not public utilities any more than were farms or
factories, and that the Indian was not indifferent to work
especially when he was assured of his earnings.

For clarity

and order, the Fiscal divided his Discurso into four points:
(1 ) that the work in the mines is not public;

(2 ) that even

if it were public, it would not justify forced Indian labor;
(3) that the Indian is not as indolent as is thought; and
(4) that even if the Indian were extremely indolent, he

should not be compelled to do this work.
Villava marshaled strong arguments in this succinct
and logically tight paper, which manifested his expertise in
the new science of economics.

His statement in part one

that gold and silver were valuable only as a medium of
exchange, and that vast accumulations of precious metals held
no advantage for a country, was a reflection of the Enlightment challenge to the established mercantilistic view of
economics.

Moreover, he recognized in the same section that

wealth produced by farming found its way into the economic
cycle just as mineral wealth did.
The Potosi miners and refiners were scandalized and
frightened by the theory and the proposals of Villava,
especially after the Discurso had been widely circulated.
They feared that Villava would focus opposition on the
crumbling institution and, with his position as fiscal and
his eloquence, strike at its legal foundation.

Indians and

their representatives took seriously the fiscal's other title,
protector of Indians, and began to address pleas to him for
relief from the mita.

When a copy of the Discurso reached

Sanz, he realized that a man like Villava could tilt the
balance of influential opinion against the mita.

g

Therefore

he and Canete gathered voluminous evidence to refute
Villava's Discurso. and to reduce its effect.

The result is

Sanz's Contestaci6 n al discurso Sobre la mita de Potosi
Q
Cortes Salinas, "Una Pol&nica," p. 175.
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which circulated during 1794.

n

The ContestaciOn is ponderous and at times overly
thorough.

It consists of ninety handwritten pages and nine

statistical tables, while the document it answers is only
twelve pages long.

Sanz used the same four-point format as

Villava and provided a conservative rebuttal for all of the
Fiscal's arguments.

Under the title, Sanz quoted Cicero,

"The well-being of the state is the first and principal law,"
which was one of Sanz's major themes.

Sanz's introduction

commended Villava's erudition and energy but regretted his
ignorance of the practical aspects of mining and the mita.
The Governor added that the Discurso had tinjustly maligned
the teniente asesor, the azogueros, and Sanz himself as the
cruelest of men.

The Sanz-Canete rejoinder expressed the

view of most of the azogueros in Potosi as well as a con
servative counter-view to Villava's economic liberalism.
The first point of the Contestaci6 n was "The work of
the mines of Potosi should not be considered with the other
private occupations of the republic, but should justly and
properly be called public."

By public," Sanz meant that

mines were always a part of the Spanish king's property.

He

cited examples of other European monarchs who retained
possession of their mineral deposits.

No individual, there

fore, could own a mine since they were "public."

Sanz

supported his second point that "The Indian is even more

7Ibid.. pp. 171-214
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indolent than described by the author of the Discurso." with
numerous examples.

He blamed the use of coca for the

"subjugation of the rational part of the Indian to his animal
instincts."

He pictured the natives as subhumans, just as

they had been presented by encomenderos and miners since the
time of Columbus.

Sanz emphasized that the mita brought the

Indian into contact with civilization, from which he would
benefit from religion and culture.

This argument had been

used before and was in contrast with the Enlightenment view
of man and the concept of the "Noble Savage."
Point III was entitled "Granting this indolence,
whatever its cause, the service of the mita is useful and
beneficial to the Indian."

Sanz alleged that the mita

benefited the Indians by keeping them profitably employed in
the mining industry, which saved them from trying to farm in
a land that was more suited for mining than for agriculture.
Sanz acknowledged that abuses of mita workers may have
existed in the past, but he gave assurances that working
conditions had improved greatly.

The title of the final

point, "The mita is advantageous to the State, consequently
the Indian can justly be compelled to work," sums up Sanz's
arguments and expresses how he viewed the situation.

This

point together with his first point, that the mines were
"public" suggested that compelling the Indians to work in
mines was justified since it was for the public good.
Shortly after Sanz's paper was released in November,
1794, Villava received several testimonies against the

125
service from disgruntled Indians and their legal representa
tives.8

Francisco de Viedma, Governor of Cochabamba, wrote

and described the choco (lung disease) suffered by the
Indians of his province who worked in the ingenios. He
emphasized the harmful effects of the mita on Cochabamba.
The Marquds de Casa Hermosa, Governor of Chucuito, wrote a
similar letter dated December

6

, 1794, and explained how the

Indians were either not paid or were paid in credit from
pulperias at an enormous interest rate.

He added that "What

is certain is that the Indians have a horror worse than
panic of the mita, " and that those who could, paid the
corrupt caciques as much as one hundred pesos to avoid the
service.
Hoping to win more support for his cause, Villava
quickly replied to Sanz's paper.

His Contrarreplica a la

"Contestacidn de Paula Sanz "9 was in keeping with his concise
style, but he occasionally resorted to sarcasm to scorn the
Potosi government, and the debate began to degenerate into a
feud.

He alluded again to his impertinence in criticizing

the mita but pointed out that, he was in the company of other
impertinent critics who included two former viceroys, Conde
de Lemus and Conde de Monclova, as well as King Phillip III.
Responding to Sanz's first point, Villava wrote that he did

8Informes dirigidas por diversas personas al Dr.
Victori&n de Villava contra la mita de Potosi, ANB, Minas
vol. 129, no. VII.
^Levene, Vida v Escritos, pp. XXXIX-LIV.
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not need the "great jurisconsult" to explain to him the
King's right of eminent domain, but that mine owners like
landowners had the right to sell, give, or bequeath their
holdings, something they could not do if they were merely
stewards.

The Fiscal showed mock surprise that owners of

land did not have subsurface rights, and could not even dig
wells on their property.

"I even thought that if someone

found veins of metal on his property, and revealed them to
the government as prescribed by the mining laws, he could
work the veins."
Villava scorned the new Code of the Intendents as
being just a change of names.

The Indian was still oppressed,

and "it is of little importance to him whether the oppressors
call themselves Governors, Subdelegates, Asesores, or
Corregidores."

"The-Indian is not stupid," he continued,

"but a product of his misery, oppression, and lack of con
fidence."

He complained that none of the mitigating laws of

the mita was obeyed, and that if Indians were used only to
transport ore, as Sanz wrote, "burros could easily be
substituted.

The truth is that the mitayo does everything

in the mines for a small amount of money, which only benefits
the azogueros."
The Fiscal questioned the validity of the copious
figures and tables which Sanz presented as evidence in the
Contestacidn.

Tribute lists were doubtful sources of popula

tion data because the number of contributors reported varied
from year to year with the zeal of the revis itadores (census
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takers) and the corruption of the subdelecrados (who some
times reported fewer Indians than there really were in order
to collect their tribute and keep it themselves). Villava
ridiculed the financial accounts that Sanz included in his
paper.

The total amount of chica reportedly consumed by the

mitayos. when divided by the number of Indians equaled more
than an arroba per day.
Repeating his economic arguments, Villava wrote that
agriculture and commerce were more important than mining and
that if there were no demand for food products, the mita
Indians should be free to plant timber or raise other products
for which a demand existed.

He concluded by stating that his

purpose in writing the Discurso was to comply with Law 23,
Book

6

, Title 12, of the Recopilacidn which stated that

royal officials, especially fiscals, must be on guard against
any enlargement of the mita and against abuses to the Indians.
These three papers, constituting the first round of
the mita debate, reached a large audience of educated and
interested individuals in Upper Peru.

The royal authorities

in Spain also read the papers with important consequences to
be discussed later.

Several themes ran through the exchanges.

The most important were:

whether or not serving in the mita

was harmful to Indians, the right of a person to be idle and
of the government to force him to work, whether mining was a
public activity, the value of precious metals for a govern
ment, and the economic usefulness of the mita.
Humane treatment of the Indians, although a minor
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point, was not the most important theme of the polonies.
More energy was devoted to the economic justification or
discreditation of the Potosi mita than to other issues.
Earning royal revenues was, after all, the principal purpose
of Spain's colonial empire.

Villava, however, questioned

the value which had always been placed on the accumulation
of gold and silver.

Steeped in liberal economic thought, he

advocated farming and commerce as better means of producing
and accumulating wealth.

He also held that precious metals

were only good as a circulating means of exchange.

Sanz, on

the other hand, upheld the traditional view that specie
represented strength and that governments should amass large
treasuries.

The two men's differing opinions of the decadant

state of Potosi showed the mercantilistic and liberal view
points on the purpose of colonies.

Villava saw Potosi as a

desolate area devoid of impressive public buildings, and he
recommended that people be allowed to pursue their own
economic interests which would in turn benefit the entire
Kingdom.

To Sanz, however, Potosi was already serving the

realm as a "fountain which diffused wealth throughout the
Kingdom." The mita debate is of interest because it is an
example of a confrontation between the mercantilistic and
the liberal conceptions of the importance of specie and of
how colonies should be used.
Villava, with his university background in political
economy and law, was clearly superior to Sanz and Canete as
a polimicist; but Upper Peru was not a university debating
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hall and Sanz was not intimidated.

He was fortified with

nearly twenty years of experience in colonial administration.
The teniente asesor had already prepared the Cddiqo Carolino
which would have expanded the mita to nearly double its size.
The governor had secured royal permission1 0 for an increase
in mita workers small in number but large in consequence.
This "neuva mita" was to consume the energy and even the
health of both antagonists for the next several years.

Legal

maneuvering and evasion were Sanz's strong points, and he
would be able to thwart Villava and the impotent Audiencia
of Charcas on several issues and at least keep the mita from
being decreased.
After the first exchange with Villava, Sanz reworked
and reissued some of the arguments that the mita was not
harmful— indeed that it was beneficial to the Indian.

But

most of the pro-mita debate that came out of the Potosi
pretorial in the late 1790's affirmed the azogueros' right to
bring even more Indians to Potosi from Chayanta, to the north.
In 1789 the King had rewarded several wealthy azogueros with
the right to use additional workers from the seventh of the
Indian population that was to be sent from that partido "to
reward the merit, disbursements, suffering, and fatigue that
they had expended in the construction of an extremely costly

10Real Orden al virrey de Buenos Aires, Madrid,
May 5, 1793, ANB, Minas vol. 41, foja 15.

refining [barrel] machine .11
The Potosi azocyueros. however, were not the only ones
interested in the Chayanta Indian's labor.

In November,

1794, Pedro Francisco de Arizmendi, the subdelegate (regional
governor) of the partido of Chayanta, described the diffi
culties of the Indians in his district, including fatigue
and disease resulting from serving in the mita.

Arizmendi

noted that in addition to having to worh in the mines, the
Indians from his province were called upon to perform
excessive services for the priests of Chayanta.

To lighten

their burden, he recommended fair application of the existing
mita laws by the secular authorities, and moderation by the
priests.

12

The priests objected to the larger labor con

tribution expected of Chayanta, and the partido sent only the
usual allotment to Potosi in 1794.

The Potosi government

(Sanz and Caflete) reacted by setting up a pezquiza (investi
gation) and a hearing, with the ultimate purpose of bringing
legal action against the priests.

This raised the point of

whether ecclesiastics should be subject to secular law, and
added a new dimension to the debate.
Villava responded to this tactic by circulating an
essay called "Reflections on the Proceedings in Potosi
Relative to the Conduct of the Priests of Chayanta, " which

1-*-Sanz to Audiencia of Charcas, Potosi, December 22,
1796, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. XV.
1 2Arizmendi

to Audiencia of Charcas, Pocoata, April
22, 1795, ANB, Minas, vol. 129, no. XV.
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was signed "the Marques of Parana, " and dated Asuncion,
February 10, 1795.^

Villava did this to foster the belief

that his position was gaining the acceptance of important
people throughout the viceroyalty.

He began the essay by

accusing Canete of "Usurping the sacred fueros (exemptions
from secular laws), deprecating ecclesiastic authority,
sustaining the triumph of the ’Maximum Tyrant'" by intro
ducing the pezquiza. He called the judicial decree "nothing
more than a cunning condemnation of the priests without
trial and without legally examining their depositions, " and
a case of a secular magistrate passing judgment independently
of the prelate on the priests.
The "Marques of Par anA" concluded that there may
actually have been "delinquencies and excesses" on the part
of the priests, just as the writ from Potosi had charged.
He added, however, that if this were so, "only their prelate
has been charged by God and the King with correcting and
reforming their customs."

Moreover, in only a few extreme

cases in the history of Spanish law have secular authorities
been given the power to try priests, and the priests of
Chayanta had only been charged with moderate resistance to
the orders of the subdelegate to send the Indians— not an
extreme crime.

According to Villava, Sanz's and Canete's

^Villava [El Marqufis
las actuaciones obradas en la
a la conducta de los Curas de
La Plata], February 10, 1795,

de Parana], "Reflexiones sobre
Intendencia de Potosi, relativas
Chayanta, " Asuncion [actually
ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. VI.
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prosecution of the priests went against Spanish legal tradi
tion and even violated the law, and therefore the two could
be accused of treason.

The author of the essay also charged

that the officials in Potosi were "endangering the govern
ment, making justice groan, disturbing the tranquility, and
arousing the malice of the Indians," by talking against the
priests who held authority over them.

He concluded that the

priests had a moderating influence on the Chayanta Indians,
having helped them since 1634, by building schools for them
and by teaching them to stop living in concubinage and
drunkenness.
Villava's pseudonymous essay of 1794 set the tone of
the. debate for the next few years, and raised the major
issues that he would argue with Sanz and Canete.
priests' right to use the Indians

1

The

labor versus the Potosi

government's right to include the natives in the mita seventh
was the principal point of disagreement.
Sanz and Cafiete defended their action of prosecuting
the priests in answering the charges leveled by the Fiscal.
Sanz wrote the Audiencia of Charcas and informed it that its
Fiscal doubtless had the best of motives for the fears of an
insurrection that he had expressed to the Sovereign, "in
spite of the fact that the other members of the audiencia,
the viceroy, and I are absolutely ignorant of them. " Sanz
wrote that perhaps these motives had their origins in the
fact that some self-interested individuals (the priests)
wanted to make the audiencia fear that an uprising in
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Chayanta was imminent, and it was that false suspicion that
caused the audiencia to issue prohibitions against the
extension of the service in that province.1^

In another

letter to the audiencia, Sanz wrote that just before the new
mita was to be dispatched from Chayanta, the four priests
there in an effort to thwart the action, raised the voice of
opposition to the service among the Indians, and warned that
a rebellion was possible.

Villava repeated this warning to

the audiencia, and they acted on the information.
Sanz had conceded that Chayanta "is the most belli
cose province in these regions," and that it was the first
to "raise the standards of independence in 1780 and 1781."
He warned that Indians in other mita provinces closely
observed what was happening in Chayanta and could again
imitate her example.

Therefore the mita should be orderly

dispatched since "who knows if they have already planned a
general sedition, and the object of their indignation might
be Potosi.

Those against the mita (the priests and Villava)

have painted Potosi as a city of tyrants and assassins who
are enemies of the Indians ' health."X6

^ S anz to Audiencia, Potosi, December 22, 1796, ANB,
Minas vol. 129, no. XV.
15Sanz to Audiencia of Charcas, Potosi, March 15,
1797, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. XV. In which Sanz recounted
the Audiencia's action.
^Expediente instruido por [Sanz] sobre defectos con
que corre hoy la mita del cerro y la ribera de dicha villa en
los distintos partidos que la contribuyen, Potosi, December
9, 1795, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. V. Hereafter cited as
Expediente instruido por Sanz.
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Pedro Francisco de Arizmendi resided in Pocoata, the
seat of the partido1s government, and was perhaps better
able to understand and assess the situation there.

In a

letter to the audiencia, he noted that rumors were being
spread by "bad-intentioned people" that his territory was on
the verge of an uprising and he felt obligated to explain to
the audiencia what he believed was actually happening.
Arizmendi did affirm that a disturbance had occurred in
Pocoata, but that it was only the efforts of an ambitious
Indian, Victoriano Ayra, aided by his followers to assume a
vacant cacicazco. They spread rumors that there was no
royal order for a new mita from Chayanta, and that the
enlarged assignment was just the result of an intrigue by
the caciques, subdelegates, and the Governor of Potosi, and
these rumors had stimulated the disturbance.

Arizmendi

complained that the Indians in his district were overworked
from having to serve both the Church and the azogueros in
Potosi.

He asked both of these groups to curtail their

demands on the natives and requested that the audiencia
establish precisely what each group could demand from the
Indians.

"If an agreement is made between the secular and

the ecclesiastical authorities, harmony, peace, and produc
tivity will prevail in Chayanta.

But if not, I will not be

responsible for the upheaval that will result." 17'

•^Arizmendi to Audiencia of Charcas, Pocoata, April
22, 1795, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. XV.
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Sanz perceived the situation in Chayanta as one in
which there was potential danger of an Indian revolt, but
not immediate danger.

He agreed that the Indians were over

worked, but not because they fulfilled their obligation to
serve in the mita.

The Governor blamed the priests for

burdening the Indians excessively, to the detriment of the
mining industry, and he believed that those same prients
were spreading rumors of an impending uprising.

Indian

revolts in Upper Peru, whether real or imagined, were reason
for alarm since Potosi had barely escaped devastation during
the 1780 uprising, and La Plata had been besieged (see
Chapter III).

Therefore in 1795, when a Chayanta Indian

named Lupa appeared in La Plata and told stories of a revolt
brewing against the mita in Chayanta, the citizens became
apprehensive.

Villava and other opponents of the mita,

however, were eager to use this information as evidence in
the growing debate and warned that mita requirements should
be reduced.
Sanz, in a dramatic effort to defend the increased
t

use of Chayanta workers for the mita, decided to inspect the
partido personally to determine whether the possibility of a
revolt existed.

Another purpose of his visita was to observe

and comment on the priests' treatment of the Indians.

The

Intendant Governor asked the Archbishop of Charcas to
accompany him on the tour in order to investigate this, but
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the Prelate refused. 18

Sanz later chided him for not going,

saying that he supposed the churchman "feared that the
iq

results would cover him with guilt, shame, and confusion,"

and that the artful priests used him in their own interests.
The visita was carried out in October, 1795 and, in order
not to alarm the Indians and cause them to flee or even
precipitate a revolt, Sanz decided to forego the bodyguard
of soldiers that normally accompanied him abroad, and took
only his secretary.

20

The Governor began his tour in Pocoata where the sub
delegate of the partido customarily dispatched the mitayos.
This time, Sanz ordered that all Indians who were subject to
the mita should gather in the town's plaza, as usual.

There

in the midst of the natives, Sanz
. . . inspected each Indian according to the rolls of
his respective neighborhood. I heard their problems
and satisfied their complaints. I was always surrounded
by countless unfortunates who showed their humility and
satisfaction at seeing me among them without wearing my
sword. I did not perceive among the two or three
thousand who surrounded me, nor even among those
destined for the mita, the pathetic picture of the
departure for Potosi that the Fiscal painted in his
first Discourse against the service. I would like
to have had him at my side so that he could have seen

*^®Expediente instruido por Sanz, Potosi, December 9,
1795, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. V.
■^Sanz to Audiencia of Charcas, Potosi, December 22,
1796, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. V.
^°Sanz to Pedro Melo de Portugal, Mataca (a country
home where Sanz had gone to recuperate from an illness),
October 24, 1795, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. IX.
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all of the Indians dancing in circles and cele
brating .21
Sanz then personally dispatched the workers whose turn it
was to go to Potosi, and he reported no difficulty in doing
so.
Later in a report to the audiencia, the Intendant
Governor indicated that there was no reason to fear a revolt
from these Indians against their mita duties.

He reminded

the oidores that even in April, 1781, when the revolt broke
out in Pocoata, the mita detachment was sent to Potosi
tranquilly and promptly, and the mitayos helped to defend
the city against their rebellious compatriots.

Also Sanz

wrote that the caciques as a group and individually had dis
credited Lupa, the Indian who spread the story of revolt in
the partido, and that Lupa's parish priest had characterized
him as an imposter.

pp

Sanz observed that the Indians there

were always prompt to serve in the mita and that they did not
show displeasure.
The Governor did not neglect the other purpose of
his visita, to observe the priests' treatment of the Indians
in Chayanta and to report any abuse he encountered.

After

he had dispatched the mita at Pocoata, he met with all of
the caciques in the partido in the only church in the town.
Many of them had petitions against the excessive number of

2 1 Ibid.

22Sanz to Audiencia of Charcas, Potosi, December 22,
1796, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. V.

-their people who were employed in the obligatory church
functions and services.

To justify their petitions, they

presented Indians who had served the priests that year and
the year before, and these workers testified that they had
received very little pay.

Sanz heard the complaints,

expressed indignation, and ordered the Indians not to per
form any more labor for the priests.
Several Indian leaders bitterly complained to Sanz
of the excessive duties that their priests exacted from them.
They reported that the churchmen had used violence and
threats to force the natives to pay for burials, weddings
and Masses.

They asked to be freed from the obligation to

provide the priests with food in addition to what they
already had to contribute for church services and fiestas.
Sanz added that some areas simply did not have enough
population to send mita workers to Potosi, and had therefore
received special ten-year exemptions from the service.
Others, however, like the community of Acazio, had more than
enough Indians to fill their mita quotas, but were unable to
do so because the priests employed them in personal
24.
services.^
As he continued the tour, Sanz commented on other
improprieties that he observed in the behavior of the
"shepherds toward their flock."

^ Sanz to Melo de Portugal, Mataca, October 24, 1795,
ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. IX.
24Ibid.
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In one after another of the parcialidades [of Chayanta]
I followed the same procedures xn reporting on the state
of the partido. Afterwards, I retired to form my
opinion on the basis of what I saw, as was my obligation
as a minister of the government and as a Catholic.25
He expressed outrage at the "indecorous and hateful super
stition that the priests scandalously practice in the name
of our sacred religion," and he described an All Saints 1 Day
ceremony in which the priests displayed the dead bodies of
relatives of their parishioners as they asked for alms, and
charged the Indians three or four pesos for a benediction
from Christ, the Virgin, or any other saint.2^
Sanz cited these observations to support the charges
that he and Cahete had made earlier, that the priests abused
the Indians and inculcated in them the idea that the mita was
unjust and that the Potosi azogueros were tyrants.

He

accused them of imprisoning the Indians so that the officials
could not send them to Potosi, while the Fiscal did nothing
to prevent it.

Sanz concluded his report by writing that the

priests "look for more and more opportunities to inflict
0*7

their natural ferocity on the natives."'w

The Potosi officials speculated on the motives of the
priests and Villava for committing these abuses and they con
cluded that the priests simply wanted to continue enjoying
their control over the natives of Chayanta and to profit
from their unpaid labor.

The statement made by Sanz that

"the mita has as many opponents as there are people interested

25Ibid.

26Ibid.

2?Ibid.

140
in profiting from the Indian," sums up his feelings about
the matter.

He and his assistant also accused the Fiscal of

the Audiencia of Chareas of trying to eliminate the mita in
an effort to make himself famous.

The hand of the verbose

Canete is apparent in the hyperbolic language and classical
allusions of a brief that characterized Villava as having
undergone an “admirable metamorphosis that transformed him
from protector of the natives into the staunch advocate of
tyrants and oppressors," and of proceeding
. . . with unbelievable energy desiring to make him
self famous . . . by following the Luciferian maxim
celebramus nomen nostrum, which in antiquity disinte
grated those insensitive people who insulted the
Allmighty by laying the foundations of the Tower of
Babel, that monument to their l u n a c y . 28
Sanz and Cafiete blamed Villava for disrupting and
endangering the new mita detachment which was working quietly
and peacefully in Potosi.

Finally, they expressed sympathy

for the plight of the Indians who had to endure such cruel
treatment from their priests, and they again complained that
the Fiscal, as protector of the natives, was doing nothing
about it.

pQ

They claimed that if church abuses could be

ended, much improvement would result in the condition of the
Indians, and not incidently, the increase in the number of
Indians subject to the mita would benefit the mining industry,

^Expediente instruido por Sanz, Potosi December 9,
1795, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. V.
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the most profitable in the region, and royal revenues would
rise .^0
Reflecting on his visit a, Sanz wrote that it had
assured him of the harm done to the Indians by the multitude
of contributions in money and labor that the priests forced
them to make.

While he agreed that some funding was neces

sary to provide for the religious needs of the Indians,
substantial reductions could be made in their compulsory
contributions.

He intended to "erase all impressions of the

theocracy which they [the priests] want to prevail in these
on
remote provinces."J4To improve the Indians * situation, Sanz ordered that
the caciques, under pain of deposition from their positions,
not assign to the priests Indian servants, muleteers, fieldhands, overseers, or any other workers who could otherwise
be serving in the mita, and that instead, they assign to each
priest three boys and two Indian women for cooks and that
these servants be paid just salaries

02

The vis ita to Chayanta and the accounts of the
priests' mistreatment of the natives there were efforts by
Sanz and Caftete to retain the use of the laborers of the

30Sanz to Melo de Portugal, Mataca, October 24, 1795,
ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. IX. ^
33-Sanz to Audiencia of Charcas, Potosi, March 15,
1795, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. XIV.
^ S a n z to Melo de Portugal, Mataca, October 24,
1795, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. IX.
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Orueta and J^uregui assignments.

By publicizing the

excessive contributions in labor and in money that the
priests exacted from the Indians, they hoped to convince
royal authorities that the natives would receive better
treatment as paid mitayos than as "slaves to the theocratic
despots," and Sanz did not fail to defend the way the
Indians were treated in Potosi.
The governor wrote to Pedro Melo de Portugal, Vice
roy of Rio de la Plata, to persuade him and other authorities
that the mita was not as detrimental to the Indians as
Villava had written.

The report contained a description of

the natives' celebration prior to leaving for the mita,
which contrasted with the somber description of the event in
a Mercurio Peruano article that Villava had mentioned in the
Discurso.
Sanz contended that virtually all of the deaths and
illnesses among the mitayos in the past had resulted from
choco, or lung disease, which was contracted only in the
crushing mills.

The risks entailed in the other mita occupa

tions in Potosi were minimal, since only two Indians had
died in accidents on the Cerro during Sanz's administration.
Sanz wrote that he conferred with the leader of each allyo
(Indian village) to try to learn the cause of choco, and
that he talked with each Indian who suffered from the malady,
and he had determined that it was caused by working in
unventilated crushing mills.

Next, he moved to allay the

mitayos 1 fears saying that the offending mills were being
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rebuilt with sufficient ventilation to prevent the
disease.33
Later, he wrote the audiencia and defended the mita
and the conduct of the Potosi government:
The Governor and the Asesor head a government that
tries to impede whatever abuses can be introduced
and that come to its [the government's] attention.
[The Indians] can complain of any mistreatment and
be satisfied immediately. [.The government] takes
care that the mitayos are paid with cash given into
their own hands, without even half a real's deficiency,
they have a hospital in which to recover should they
become ill. Each Indian is assigned to a religious
parish for his own well-being, and he is assisted
with whatever spiritual or temporal needs he might
have. In other areas where free labor is used, such
as some of the mines in Cochabamba, there are no such
advantages, and the Indians are paid in goods and
credits? and they are overcharged at stores where they
use these credits. More inhumanity is experienced
at non-mita mines than at Potosi.34
Another argument that Sanz developed to prove that
the mita did not "depopulate" areas subject to the service,
as Villava had suggested, was to compare the population
figures of the partido of Chayanta in 1786 with the figures
for 1792.

He ordered in 1797, that the lists of tribute-

paying Indians be compiled for those two years.

The results

showed that in 1786, there were 8,419 tribute-paying Indians
in the ten parishes of Chayanta and they paid 49,034 pesos,
but that in 1792 there were 9,658 Indians, an increase of
1,239 over the earlier year, who paid 69,648 pesos in
tribute.

This growth had occurred in spite of the contribu

tions in manpower that the partido had made to the Potosi

3 3 Ibid.

S^informe, Sanz to Audiencia of Chareas, Potosi,
March 15, 1797, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. XIV.
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mita, and of the extension that was declared in 1789.

35

The Potosi government was embarrassed by the fact
that one of the most detailed and damning accounts of the
Indians 1 sufferings sustained in the mita service had been
written a few years earlier by none other than the pro-mita
teniente asesor, Pedro Vicente Canete as a part of his
Historica Fisica v Politica de la Provicia de Potosi.
Villava seized upon a copy of this work before it was printed
and quoted from it to support his arguments against the mita.
He wrote that he doubted that the book would ever be printed
unless the section describing the mita were deleted.

"It

seems strange," he continued, "that the person who wrote this
[Canetej would condemn those who now write against the mita,
but do not say half as much as he did against the service."'30
This put Sanz in an awkward position, and he
responded by disclaiming any responsibility for the contra
diction between what his government stood for and what Canete
had described.

He explained that Canete had made clear to

the azogueros that in his book he was referring to abuses
that occurred at the time he was writing, and he pointed out
that the present government was taking precautions and
remedies to insure the comfort and well-being of the workers.

3 5 Ibid.

3®Villava to Sanz, La Plata, June
Minas vol. 129, No. XV.

6,

1797, ANB,
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The AzocrueroB 1 Guild then ordered Canete to write an appen
dix3^ for his book "that would explain the present state of
OQ
affairs of the mita and what was being done to improve it.
The problem of Canete's book was temporarily but not per
manently laid to rest in this manner.
The arguments on both sides had become repetitive by
this time (1797) and Sanz apoligized, "If I repeat the facts
and my reflections, it is because until now [Villava^ has
done nothing about the first or answered the second, and I
want the superior authorities to understand that he flees
from difficulties that he cannot solve.

Why does he not

explain to us why the Indians have come peacefully to serve
O Q

in the mita, even during the years of Rebellion?"

In the

meantime, Sanz had been maneuvering to arrange a de facto
acceptance of the new mita.
Villava and the anti-mita forces had apparently
gained a victory with the issue of the royal order of August
3, 1796, which stated that the king (Charles IV) together
with a junta from the Council of the Indies, concurred with
the Fiscal of the Audiencia of Charcas, its President, and
the Archbishop of the district, and they resolved that the

37See "Apendice," Pedro Vicente Canete, Historia
Fisica y Politica de la Provincia de Potosi, ed. Gunnar
Mendoza (La Paz: Fundacidn Universitaria "Simon I. Patino,"
1952).
3®Sanz to Audiencia of Charcas, Potosi, March 15,
1797, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. XIV.
39Ibid
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provisions of the Governor of Potosi should be suspended,
but that no alteration be made in the ancient Ordinance
governing the matter or in "the present state of the
mita."^®

The audiencia joyously received this order, and

distributed copies of it throughout the territory, much to
Sanz's and Canete*s dismay.
Control by the authorities in Spain over colonial
officials was necessarily loose because of slow communica
tions, and it was sometimes possible for officials to
interpret in several ways recently-received communications
that had been written in Europe half a year before.

Upon

receiving the August 3 order, Sanz understood it differently
from the way it was construed in La Plata.

On March 15,

1797, Sanz wrote the Audiencia regarding the August 3 pro
vision.

One of the Indians who had complained to Villava

about the establishment of a new mita in Chayanta was Felipe
Acarachi of the Chayanta community of Sacaca, and Villava
had based some of his arguments to the Crown on this man's
complaints.

In his letter to the audiencia, Sanz contended

that Acarachi had falsely supposed that members of his com
munity would be serving in a new mita, when actually the
mitayos of Sacaca were to substitute for those of the
parcialidades of Auguimarcas and Chullpas, which had been
relieved for ten years from contributing workers because of

^Royal Order, San Lorenzo, August 3, i796, ANB,
Minas vol. 129, no. XV.
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their low populations.

Sanz appealed to the audiencia to

keep the mita as it was and to allow the contribution of
workers from Chayanta to continue, adding that if the
service was discontinued or diminished, he was with this
writing disclaiming any responsibility for "grave and irre
parable damage that one must infer will befall this azoguerla.
the public, the royal treasury, and the State."

The

Governor also indicated that this appeal and warning would
find its way to the Crown.^

Earlier, he had sent a similar

warning to the Crown which was dramatically punctuated by a
request that he be relieved of duty so that he would not
have to witness the imminent destruction of Potosi.^

The

request was not acted upon.
The audiencia was unmoved by Sanz's posturings and
his gloomy predictions.

They issued an order in February,

1797, that echoed the August 3, 1796 Royal Order, and
enjoined the subdelegado of Chayanta from sending more
Indians to Potosi.

This gave Sanz another point on which to

disagree with the audiencia.

In March 1797 he wrote the

audiencia that at almost the same time he had received the
tribunal's February 7 order, he had also received an order
from the Viceroy of Rio de la Plata, Pedro Melo de Portugal,

^Sanz to Audiencia of Charcas, Potosi, March 15,
1797, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. XIV.
^Sanz to Audiencia of Charcas, Potosi, December 22,
1797, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. XIV. Letter to Crown
mentioned herein.
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telling him to continue sending the mita workers to Nicolds
de Urzaingui, who had been granted their labor in 1789,
after he had sponsored the construction of a barrle machine.
Sanz said that he had to choose
. . . between the disposition of the Viceroy to
carry out the operation already mentioned, and the
disposition of that regal Tribunal Cthe audiencia]
that expresses the exact opposite of that resolu
tion. . . . This government is looking for a way to
obey both authorities without detriment to either
one.
It was not difficult for Sanz to decide which authority to
obey.
In a June 11, 1797, letter to the audiencia,

44

Sanz

gave a legal and a practical reason why he was unable to
comply with the Tribunal’s February 7 order.

Law XII,

Title I Book II of the RecopilaciOn, which formed the basis
for his legal argument, stated that the viceroys were to have
control of matters of government.

Since the welfare and

conservation of Indians were outside the boundaries of
justice, and hence outside the audiencia's jurisdiction,
Sanz believed that they fell within the boundaries of
government, which was headed by the viceroy, whom Sanz felt
he was bound to obey in the matter.

In the practical

explanation that he gave the audiencia for not complying
with its order, Sanz acknowledged that he had received the

^Sganz tc> Audiencia of Charcas, Potosi, March 15,
1797, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. XIV.
44sanz to Audiencia of Charcas, Conapaya, June 11,
1797, ANB, Minas vol 129, no. XV.
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auto on the day after it was written.

"But in spite of

everything," he continued with dubitable regret, "the order
did not arrive in time to be executed, even though it remains
obeyed.

The assignment of the Indians took place during Holy

Week, and the Indians for that mita were sent within
fourteen days.
Spanish colonial law, even after the Recopilacidn
and other Bourbon Reforms, was still voluminous and its
application was complicated.

The famous adage, "se obedece

pero no se cumple" (it is obeyed but not executed), accu
rately describes Sanz's response to the unwelcome order from
the audiencia.

With the help of the astute lawyer Canete,

the Intendant Governor of Potosi could resist indefinitely
the pressure from the distant and impotent audiencia to
decrease the mita, and he could even sidestep royal orders
from Spain.

The Crown issued another order on October 22,

1797, that.reiterated the August 3 order of the previous
year, and stipulated that harmful treatment of the Indians
should cease.^

Sanz had claimed throughout the debate that

the mitayos were not mistreated, and he promptly reaffirmed
that stand.

He had also built a case that he was complying

with the earlier order and not actually enlarging the mita.
Villava had energetically opposed the mita since
shortly after his arrival in Upper Peru.

He had apparently

45Ibid.
4®Royal Order, San Lorenzo, October 22, 1797, ANB,
Ruck 557A.
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bested the Potosi government in several debates on the sub
ject, and royal authorities in Spain consistently upheld his
positions.

However, Sanz, counting on years of experience

in the Spanish colonial bureaucracy and on Canete's advice,
was able to outmaneuver his rival and keep him from dimin
ishing the mita.

Villava did contribute to the rejection of

the Cddigo Carolino, writing that it camouflaged an increase
in the mita, but overall, he was frustrated.

In July 1797,

some mita Indians complained to Villava as protector of
natives.

His disappointment was evident in the notation he

made on the complaint:
Considering that it is useless to appeal to the
audiencia, since its royal provisions are not obeyed
by the government of Potosi; and considering that I
am now very tired of hearing complaints— complaints
that I can do nothing to remedy— let the Indians take
their case to the Tribunal of God or wherever they
choose.47
Moreover, Villava's health was troubling him.

In 1800, he

wrote the viceroy that he had been ill ever since his arrival
in Upper Peru, and that a persistant cough and progressive
deafness necessitated his retirement.

He was relieved of

duty the same year, and he died in La Plata two years later.
Thus Sanz had managed to retain the mita intact by
using a variety of methods and by taking advantage of

4?viliava to Audiencia of Charcas, La Plata,
September 5, 1797, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. XV.
4®Levene, Vida y Escritos, pp. 42-43.
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circumstances.

Following a brief respite, the intendant

governor would soon resume his diligent endeavors to improve
silver production at the mining center.

Chapter VI
SANZ'S EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN PRODUCTION
IN POTOSI:

1797-1808

After the mita debate had subsided in the late 1790's
because of Sanz's determination and Villava's flagging health,
the Governor turned his attention elsewhere.

Surely he must

have journeyed to the retreat at Mataca for rest and altitude
relief.

While he was in Potosi he was engaged in the day-to-

day operation of government and financial affairs. For example,
in 1798, he was asked by a local priest, Salvador Ximdnez y
Padilla, to help to construct a workhouse for poor Indian
women of Potosi.

Sanz lent his support to the project and

secured royal permission on January 15, 1799, to fund the work
house with 300 pesos annually from the royal treasury.

He

supervised operations in the Money House, and monitored
accounts in the Bank of San Carlos.

But, as always, the state

of the mining industry remained his foremost concern, and in
1798, problems began to materialize in Potosi that thrust
Sanz back into the familiar role of dealing with crises.
In that year, Potosi began to suffer a drought.

Lack

of water was a serious problem for the mining industry, which
depended on a steady flow from the reservoirs above the city.
152
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Water was used to turn most of the machines that ground the
ore; it was mixed with ground ore and mercury to form the
pella, and that mixture was washed several times during the
amalgamation process.

Same of the new "barrel machines" were

also operated by water power.

So important was flowing water,

that Sanz and his contemporaries often referred to Potosi as
this "rivera," and in 1781, refining operations were halted
for seventeen weeks because of dry weather.^"
While Sanz and the azogueros were preparing to face
a drought, another problem was developing which Sanz deemed
even more serious than a dry spell.
mercury.

This was the shortage of

Since 1776, when Potosi was separated from the Vice

royalty of Lima, miners there could no longer legally acquire
mercury from Huancavelica, which remained in the older vice
royalty, because trade between the two areas had been pro
hibited.

Potosi's mercury was shipped from Almad6 n in Spain,

to Upper Peru.

Since 1796, when Charles XV signed the Treaty

of San Ildefonso with France, Spain had been at war with
England, and the British Navy controlled the sea routes.

Some

shipments from Spain to Buenos Aires were intercepted, and
many more were curtailed until the Treaty of Amiens was signed
in 1802 and the sea lanes were open again.
In 1803 Sanz wrote two reports to Miguel Cayetano

■*-Sanz to Cayetano Solar, Potosi, November 26, 1803,
no. 48, AGX, Charcas 441.
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Soler,

2

Superintendent General of Hacienda in Madrid, in

which he described the difficult times that Potosi had just
come through and the measures that he (Sanz) had been obliged
to take to "save Potosi from destruction."

Sanz began to

fear a shortage of mercury in 1798, when he ordered the
azogueros to cut back on their use of the commodity.

The

Governor realized that in spite of efforts to conserve, the
supply would soon be exhausted because no mercury was arriving
from Europe.

He wrote the viceroy of Lima, Marques de Osomo,

and requested that he lend the Potosi azogueros 1,000
quintales^ of mercury.

When this aid arrived, Sanz wrote

that he had only had fifty quintales left in the storeroom of
the Bank of San Carlos.

This subsidy was exhausted in a few

months, and in 1799, the Governor again turned for help to
the neighboring Viceroy, who asked the intendant of Puno to
lend Sanz whatever he could.

Two azogueros went to Puno and

acquired 100 quintales of mercury, which they sent to Potosi.
They continued to the Presidency of Cuzco where they borrowed
another 300 quintales, enough to keep the refineries operating
for a few more months.

Shortly after this mercury was

received in Potosi, O s o m o died and the Audiencia of Lima
ruled that no more mercury would be allowed to leave that
viceroyalty.
Sanz to Cayetano Soler, Potosi, November 26, 1803,
nos. 48 and 49, AGI, Charcas 441. The information and quota
tions on the following seven pages was taken from these two
reports unless otherwise cited.
^Hundredweight.
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Sanz became concerned at this point.

He reported to

Cayetano Soler that small amounts of mercury were being
smuggled into Potosi from the Viceroyalty of Lima and sold to
the azogueros at exorbitant prices.

The Gremio de Azogueros

sent representatives into the neighboring viceroyalty to try
to buy mercury at any cost.

Sanz admitted that he did nothing

to prevent these illegal acts because "the existence of
Potosi depended on a supply of mercury."

The intendant of

Puno was not as tolerant as Sanz, however, and he arrested
the representatives from potosi and confiscated their mercury.
By 1800, the

water reservoirs had run dry, and on

April26, Sanz wrote to the

Viceroy of Rio de la Plata, the

Marques de Aviles, advising him that it was likely that
mineral production in Potosi would soon cease.

He warned his

superior that abandoning the mines even for a short time
could be disastrous, since water could seep into productive
mines, or cave-ins could occur in mines that were not main
tained.

Sanz emphasized that if production halted, the

azogueros would need funds to keep their mines and ingenios
in a productive state, and to pay their mitayos so they would
not desert.
As Superintendent of the Bank of San Carlos, Sanz
4
was entitled by royal order of October 1, 1776, to distribute

^Real cedula de IncorporaciOn de el Banco de Potosi
a la Real Hacienda, v Ordenanza para su Regimen y Gobiemo. de
Orden de S.M. (Madrid: Imprenta de.d. Benito Cano, 1795),
p. 30.
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50,000 pesos annually among the members of the Gremio de
Azogueros, without his (the superintendent's) being able to
increase or decrease the sum.
tered by the Gremio itself.

This fund was to be adminis
On January 17 of each year the

body was to meet and decide how to use the money to improve
production.

Different uses included the purchase of mercury,

iron or gunpowder for the mining community, or the dividing
of the fund among themselves to improve their holdings or pay
their mitayos.

Since he had been in Potosi, Sanz had super

vised the annual distribution of this 50,000 pesos, which
came to be known as "ordinary aid."
the Crown and not a gift.

This aid was a loan from
e
Therefore it had to be repaid.

This repayment occurred in the form of discounts from the
silver ingots that the azogueros presented at the Bank of
g
San Carlos.
For example, if an azoguero presented one mark
of silver (usually worth seven pesos, four reales) he was
paid seven pesos, three reales, and the royal treasury kept
the remaining real.
Since 1796, however, Sanz had maintained that the
ordinary aid was insufficient.

On September 26 of that year,

he petitioned the King for permission to increase the aid,
and he had already taken it upon himself to allow the Gremio
to borrow 5,000 pesos per week to be paid back out of the
weekly discounts, pending the resolution of his petition.
This practice continued, and in 1798, the Gremio borrowed

5Ibid

6Ibid., p. 34.

5.000 additional pesos to pay for the publication of the
Ordinance of the Bank of San Carlos.

The Junta of the Real

Hacienda in Buenos Aires learned of this loan^ and of the
5.000 peso weekly loans from Treasury officials in Potosi.
On February 12, 1799, they wrote Sanz and ordered that the
deputies of the Gremio replace the 5,000 peso publication loan
within four months, or Sanz would be held responsible.

The

azogueros complained that the decrease in weekly aid would
harm their operations, especially since mercury was now
scarce and expensive.

Sanz wrote the junta, by way of the

viceroy, the first of many letters in a long campaign to
defend the larger loans to the azogueros. He emphasized that
as governor, he was responsible for the well-being of Potosi,
and that meant preserving and fomenting the mining industry.
He wrote as he had written before in other debates that "the
well-being of the entire viceroyalty, the royal treasury, and
the State are affected by the productiveness of Potosi."
Sanz added that he was replacing the 5,000 pesos
borrowed for the publication of the Ordinance, lest he incur
the disapproval of the Fiscal of the Junta, Jos6 Marques de
la Plata.

The Governor implied that Marques de la Plata, an

enemy of his since the feud with Viceroy Loreto, was disap
proving his activity in Potosi for purely personal reasons,
at the expense of the economic well-being of the realm.

On

June 15, 1799, Viceroy Avil6 s wrote Sanz to convey to him the
junta's directive that he obey the earlier provision.

In

August, Sanz replied to the junta that if he obeyed their
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order and reduced the aid to the azogueros. he and the vice
roy could not be responsible for the dismal consequences,
which he again described in detail.

He concluded that he was

suspending the provision, and continuing the weekly aid.
Sanz bombarded the junta and the Viceroy with more
descriptions of the desperate situation in Potosi, throughout
1799 and 1800.

In July of 1800, after a long silence from

the junta, Sanz received another communication from it stating
that he should cease the extra loans.

He called a meeting of

the Gremio de Azogueros on August 11 to inform the members.
He reported that the miners were so dismayed at the news that
they presented him with the keys to their mines and refineries
saying that they could not operate without the funds.

On

August 19, 1800, Sanz again informed the viceroy of the grave
situation in Potosi, reminding him that it had worsened with
the English capture of a Spanish frigate bound for Buenos
Aires and loaded with mercury.

Apparently this report

impressed the junta because on October 28, 1800, it informed
the Governor that he could continue the weekly loans of 5,000
pesos— which he was doing anyway— but that the azogueros had
to repay the cost of the mercury they had already received
from the Bank.

The azogueros disliked the junta's second

provision and Sanz dispatched another of his by now standard
letters of desperation.
In September 1800 Sanz received a report from the
Marquds de Otavi, the Administrator of the Bank of San Carlos,
which verified the Governor's bleak assessment of the state
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of mining in Potosi.

Otavi recommended that each of seventy-

four azogueros and ingenio operators receive a weekly loan of
250 pesos in order to keep operating and to retain their
mitayos. This amounted to 18,500 pesos per week.

In an edict

that Sanz issued on September 18, 1800, he urged the azogueros
to save mercury in their operations.

He wrote authorities in

Buenos Aires that he was considering the adoption of Otavi's
plan for increased aid to azogueros.

Sanz justified this

increase by citing a royal order dated April

8,

1798, which

charged him with "making this profitable Gremio flourish,

11

and

authorized him to "make whatever general or particular grants
are necessary to do so."

Sanz reported to the viceroy that he

was sure that more silver would be coined as a result of the
increase.
The junta did not respond to Sanz's measure for
several months.

In the meantime, on December 14, 1801, silver

production in Potosi came to a halt because of the lack of
water and mercury.

Five days later, Sanz informed the viceroy

of the cessation, and on December 23, 1801, he increased
weekly loans to 18,500 pesos.
On February 22, 1802, Sanz received word from the
Junta de Hacienda that he was "authorized to continue advancing
weekly loans to the miners and azogueros until the loan
totaled 300,000 pesos.

By April 1802 the allotted 300,000

pesos had been used up, and Sanz wrote the junta that he was
continuing the loans anyway.

He received no reply and repeated

the message on June 26, 1802, saying that he would disclaim
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any responsibility if the junta disapproved his action.
Finally, on September 11, 1802, the junta, worn down by Sanz's
adamant persistence and reluctant to take the responsibility
for the ruin of Potosi, approved the measures he had taken.
On November 30, 1802, Sanz summarized for the Buenos
Aires Junta de Hacienda the measures he had taken, but in
February of the next year, the body reversed itself again and
reprimanded the Governor.

To Sanz's delight, the same mail

that brought him the reprimand also brought news that 750
quintales of mercury had arrived in Buenos Aires, and would
soon be sent to the mining center.

Obediently for once, Sanz

reported that he had cut the aid to the azogueros by half,
confident that Potosi would be producing at full capacity
once again.
In the summary of the dispute over the loans that
Sanz wrote for Cayetano Soler, he enclosed a production table
that showed the profits that the Bank had realized for the
Crown in spite of the loans that had been granted.

He

defended his actions by indicating that the Crown could reap
no greater profit for such a small investment.
Not all of Sanz's

adversaries in the question of

increased loans to azogueros were in Buenos Aires.

One of the

most prolific and potentially dangerous attackers of govern
ment's measures was Sanz's old partner in the mita debate,
Pedro Vicente Canete.

The conflict with Cafiete began in

1800, when Sanz and the azogueros were trying to demonstrate
to the authorities in Buenos Aires that the situation in
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Potosl was extremely serious.

Sanz had prepared a statement

attesting to the benefit that would result from increased
loans to the azogueros.

To lend credence to the testimony,

thirty citizens of Potosl who were not members of the Gremio
signed it.

Canete not only refused to sign the letter, but

also denounced the loans to the viceroy.

Sanz deemed this

behavior "strange" adding that he was shocked that the
teniente would behave in this way when it was obvious that if
the loans stopped, mining operations would also halt.

The

azogueros were furious, and voted to recuse Canete.
After this incident, the teniente vacillated between
supporting aid to the azogueros and denouncing it.

In November

1800 he told the Gremio that members would be justified in
receiving up to

1,000

pesos in aid, in view of the disaster

that had fallen Potosl in the form of drought and the mercury
shortage, because such emergency aid was provided for in the
~
Ordinance. 7 For more than two years thereafter, Canete
cooperated with Sanz and the azogueros.
The next dispute occurred in 1303 at the annual January
17 meeting of the Gremio de Azogueros. which the teniente
asesor attended.

Because of the difficult circumstances that

had existed in Potosl for the past several years, the
azogueros voted to extend the extraordinary aid that the
Governor had granted.

Canete claimed that without his approval

the election was void, and he refused to sign the loan autho
rization.

If the loans were nullified, the azogueros would
7

Ibid., p. 35.
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lose a great deal of financial support. Canete would not
retreat from his position and he claimed that it was a
judicial matter since it involved a conflict between the
authorities in Buenos Aires and those in Potosl.

There is no

mention in the Ordinances however, of the teniente asesor's
right to approve or disapprove the loans decided upon by the
Gremio.
Canete1s disapproval of the Gremio1s vote caused a
great deal of commotion in Potosl.

The azogueros held their

election again without Canete's presence, and the results were
the same.

They also voted to recuse the teniente again.

Sanz and the azogueros immediately began to flood the
superior government in Buenos Aires with complaints about the
teniente.

The communications stated that his lack of coopera

tion had caused an uproad in Potosl that was harmful to
mineral production.

The Viceroy later noted that his office

had received from Potosl 3,500 pages of evidence concerning
the discord in Upper Peru^caused by Canete.

For his part,

Sanz noted that he had been puzzled by Canete's behavior since
the teniente had returned in 1797 from a two-year vis ita to
La Paz.

The Governor believed, however, that his assistant's

grudge against the Gremio stemmed from an earlier incident in
which the Gremio refused to allow publication of Canete's
o
book Historia del Gobi6 m o de Peru because it contained some
"false remarks about the mita" (see Chapter V) , until certain

^Historia Flsica y Polltica de la Provincia de Potosl.
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offensive chapters had been removed.

The azogueros did

allocate 3#000 pesos for the printing costs, but when there
was a delay in publication, "Canete declared war on the Gremio
and threatened to ruin it."
The discord surrounding canete continued and
increased in 1803.

Officials in Buenos Aires were concerned

by the volume of urgent messages from Potosi.

Sanz wrote

that there was difficulty keeping order among the citizens of
the mining center, and that he had done what he could to
restore peace, but CaKete would not be placated, continuing
to accuse falsely the Gremio and Sanz himself.

Finally, the

Governor felt obligated to write the superior government in
Buenos Aires requesting "a measure that corresponded to
removing a cancer that was growing between the minister
Q

(Canete) and the Azogueria."
The viceroy, Joaquin del Pino, in an effort to calm
the situation, turned the matter over to the Audiencia of
Buenos Aires.

That body, meeting in an executive session

called an acuerdo on July 26, 1803, agreed that Canete needed
to be removed from the stormy situation in Potosi pending the
outcome of the dispute, but that he should not be. demoted.
The acuerdo decided therefore, to transfer Canete to La Plata
where he would occupy the same position.

The teniente asesor

of charcas, Vicente Rodriguez Romano, would go to Potosl to

9Sanz to Cayetano Soler, Potosi, November 26, 1803,
No. 51, AGI, Charcas 441.

occupy the asesoria there.

10

Both of the asesores were dismayed by the proposed
exchange.

Rodriguez felt that he was being unjustly demoted

from a presidency to an intendancy, and he feared that his
health would suffer in the change of climate from La Plata to
Potosi. Canete made a similar complaint about the change in
climate, but he'seemed more frustrated at having been outmaneuvered.

However, on September 12, 1803, Canete left

Potosi ostensibly bound for his new post in La Plata.^
He headed southward, however, toward Buenos Aires,
where he hoped to meet with the viceroy and the audiencia in
order to present his case.

Sanz quickly learned of Canete's

deviation and informed Viceroy Pino, who ordered the intendants along the route to intercept Canete and send him back
to Charcas.

This was possible because Canete was traveling

slowly, accompanied by his son who suffered from epilepsy.
He later claimed that the purpose of the trip was to seek
medical attention for the boy in the capital.

On October 17,

1803, the teniente was detained in C6 rdoba, three-fourths of
the way to Buenos Aires. 12
From COrdoba, he wrote to Jos6 Antonio Caballero,
the Minister of Grace and Justice in Madrid, and complained
about his transfer from Potosi, which he said had occurred

10Ibid.
11Ibid.
1o
/
Joaquin del Pino to Crown, Buenos Aires, December
26, 1803, AGI, Charcas 713.
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without a hearing or the customary residencia. He then
accused Sanz of unnecessarily distributing royal funds to the
azogueros who, grateful for the favors, paid him a bribe of
10,000 pesos.

Canete continued that he had not been a threat

to public tranquility in Potosi as was indicated in the
azogueros1 3,500 pages of testimony, which he deemed "decep
tion and gossip."

Canete submitted his own testimony to the

contrary, in which the Gremio de Duenos de Ingenios, the pro
tector of Indians, the captain of the mita, and several
priests in Potosi stated that Canete was impartial, coopera
tive and calm.

He explained that the Governor and the

azogueros resented him and wanted him removed because he saw
and reported their deception.

The teniente wrote that he

could not return to Upper Peru because the trip would endanger
13
his son, and he had to continue to Buenos Aires.
He wrote
a similar letter to the viceroy.^

Officials in COrdoba were

not swayed by Cafiete’s arguments and ordered him to return to
Charcas.
The determined official headed north for a few leagues,
but then doubled back and resumed his original course.

He

arrived in Buenos Aires in December, on the same day as the
letter from the Intendant of COrdoba which informed the
Viceroy that he had sent Canete on his way back to Charcas.

■^Canete to Caballero, COrdoba, October 20, 1803,
AGI, Charcas 713.
■^Canete to Pino, COrdoba, October 20, 1803, AGI,
Charcas 713.

166
Viceroy Joaquin del Pino was furious when he learned that
Canete had disobeyed his orders, saying that the audacious
asesor was ungrateful for the "promotion" he had received.
Pino took the side of Sanz and the azogueros in the dispute
over the loans in Potosi, and he blamed Canete for risking
his son's life in the useless journey.

Pino reported to the

Crown that he believed that Canete's removal from Potosi had
secured the tranquility of the mining center, adding that
having read Canete's petitions, he had found them to be full
1 C

of "shameful intrigues."A 3
After Canete had left Potosi for Buenos Aires, Sanz
repeated his version of the dispute to Cayetano Soler.

Sanz

regretted the teniente's rash action and hoped that it would
not h a m his career.

He wrote that the job of teniente

asesor was very complicated, and in Potosl it required long
experience with minerology, which Vicente Rodriguez Romano
lacked.

The Governor therefore recommended that Dr. Pedro

Francisco Arizmendi, Subdelegado of Chayanta and Sanz's ally
in the struggle with the priests of that partido be made
asesor.1^

In December 1803 Pino noted that the asesorla of

Potosi was being filled by a lawyer whom the Governor had
recommended— presumably Arizmendi.17

15Pino to Crown, Buenos Aires, December 26, 1803,
AGI, Charcas 713.
1®Sanz to Cayetano Soler, Potosi, November 26, 1803,
no. 51. AGI, Charcas 441.
17Pino to Crown, Buenos Aires, December 26, 1803,
AGI, Charcas 713.
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Meanwhile, Canete was returned to Charcas, this time
with a military escort that Pino had ordered.

He did not

occupy the asesorla there but served in the post of honorary
oidor of the Audiencia of Charcas.

In 1804 Canete wrote to

Pino's successor, the Marqufes de Sobremonte, and described
his unfair treatment.

He also wrote to the Crown.

His pleas

were ignored and, resigned to remaining in La Plata, he set
about trying to get an appointment as a permanent member of
18
the audiencia.
After Canete had left Potosi, Sanz turned briefly to
personal affairs.

Writing to Cayetano Soler, the Governor

related how in 1788, when he was superintendent in Buenos
Aires, the Crown had allowed two of Sanz's nephews from
M&laga to come and serve as his secretaries.

When Sanz was

transferred to Potosi, the nephews accompanied him; one
worked in the Casa de Moneda and the other at the Bank of San
Carlos.

The nephew at the Casa de Moneda, however, died of

fever in June, 1803, and Sanz requested that the surviving
nephew be appointed subdeleqado of Chayanta, to replace
Arizmendi.

Sanz included the oja de servicio or r6 sum6 of

his relative and reminded Cayetano Soler that he had never
19
before asked the King for a favor.
During the last year of the dispute with Canete over

xoCanete to Crown, La Plata, September 26, 1804,
AGI, Charcas 713.
■^Sanz to Cayetano Soler, Potosi, November 26, 1803,
no. 50, AGI, Charcas 441.

royal aid to the azogueros. the familiar problem of Potosi's
shortage of forced Indian labor arose again.

Jos& Gonzalez,

Intendant of Puno on the shores of Lake Titicaca, refused in
1802 to send his intendancy's allotment of 434 Indians to
Potosi.

The number of Indians was small and Puno was distant

and not even a part of the Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata.
Gonzalez's defiance, however, caused a disturbance in Potosi
because the azogueros saw a dangerous precedent emerging.

If

the Intendant of Puno were allowed to withhold workers, other
officials might be tempted to follow his example.

Three

officials of the Bank of San Carlos wrote to Sanz about this
matter in April 1803.

They noted that Gonzalez's action

defied the King's order that had originally established the
mita.

The officials argued that since laborers were neces

sary for production, and production was necessary to pay
taxes, withholding workers was the same as depriving the
Crown of revenue.

The petitioners echoed an earlier argument

of Intendant Sanz's that all economic activity in Upper Peru
depended on the well-being of mining in Potosi.

"Par from

being useless as the Governor of Puno believes," they wrote,
"the mita is necessary because without it. economic activity
would stop.

They concluded by asking Sanz to forward their

petition to the Crown, and to the Viceroys of Peru and Rio
de la Plata.^

2 0 E1

Marqu6 s Otavi et al. to Sanz, Potosi April 21,
1803, copy in Revista del Instituto de Investigaciones
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In December 1803 Sanz wrote Viceroy Pino, who in
turn informed authorities in Spain of the situation.

After

receiving word from Spain on the matter the new Viceroy,
MarquSs de Sobremonte, wrote Sanz that the King was aware of
the severe lack of laborers in Potosi occasioned in part by
GonzAlez's refusal to send the Indians.

Sobremonte agreed

that Gonzalez's obstinacy was harmful and he authorized Sanz
to do whatever was necessary to remedy the situation.

The

Viceroy also told Sanz that the King disapproved of the con
duct of the Intendant of Puno in the case, and had resolved
to correct it.

In his letter, Sobremonte included an order

that Gonzalez should thereafter obey the Superintendent of
the Mita .2 *1
Three weeks later, Sanz answered Sobremonte that he
had received word of the royal opinion.

He expressed concern

that Gonzalez would not obey him (Sanz) or even the Viceroy
of Rio de la Plata, because Puno was not under their juris
diction but under that of the Viceroy of Peru.

Therefore,

Sanz asked that Sobremonte submit copies of all their corre
spondence on the subject to the Viceroy of Peru with a request
22

that he correct Gonzalez's behavior.

Histdricas (Potosi, Bolivia), no. 1 (1959-60), pp. 64-67.
Cited hereafter as Revista de Investiqaciones.
^Sobremonte to Sanz, Buenos Aires, September 3,
1804, copy in Revista de Investiqaciones. p. 6 8 .
22

Sanz to Sobremonte, Potosi, September 26, 1804,
copy in Revista de Investiqaciones. p. 69.
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In spite of these pleas and orders, Gonz&lez did not
send the 434 Indians to Potosi.

Using the same tactics that

Francisco de Paula Sanz had once used to pursue very different
goals, the Intendant of Puno skillfully used the law and
circumstances to avoid executing unwelcome orders, although
he doubtless "obeyed" them.
At first, he did not comply because the orders came
from officials who had no jurisdiction over him— just as Sanz
had predicted.

Gonzalez's next defense was to claim that he

could not send the Indians without the travel expenses from
Potosi, which the azogueros alleged that they were unable to
pay.

Later, the confusion caused by the British invasions of

the Iberian Peninsula made it less likely that officials
would act to force Gonz&lez to comply.
Sanz complained to the viceregal government again in
April, 1806.33

The next year, nearly four years after the

officials of the Bank of San Carlos had first protested
Gonzalez's refusal to send the mitayos. the workers still had
not arrived.

In February, 1807, they again wrote Sanz to

complain of the sorry state of Potosi's mining industry i
Thirty-three refineries had stopped operating and four
azogueros had gone bankrupt, owing the Bank 181,964 pesos.
The officials listed other difficulties that had befallen the
mining center and they predicted an economic collapse, the

3^Sanz referred to this communication to Sobremonte
in a later petition to the next viceroy, Santiago Liniers,
Potosi, November 27, 1808, ANB, Ruck 301.
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blame for which they placed on Gonzalez.

To avoid this they

begged Sanz to appeal once more to the authorities to force
Gonzalez to comply.^

In another letter, they restated the

old argument that "without mitayos there would be no Potosi, "
and that the lack of Indians caused by Gonzalez's defiance
was "worse for us than plague or war.
On November 27, 1808, Sanz wrote to the new Viceroy,
Santiago Liniers, that the mita contingent had finally been
sent from Puno but with fewer mitayos than should have come.

26

Whether Gonzalez's resistance was motivated by humanitarian
concern for the Indians of Puno or simply by the desire to
use them in that intendancy's lakeshore silver mines is
unclear.

It is certain, however, that he deftly avoided

fully carrying out the orders to send the workers.

He could

continue to do so indefinitely, just as Sanz had avoided
complying with the Royal Order of August 3, 1796, not to
enlarge the mita.
Sanz realized this, and he asked the viceroy in
November, 1808, to enlarge the base from which the mitayos
were drawn .^7

A month later, Viceroy Liniers approved a plan

^Otavi et al. to Sanz, Potosi, February 21, 1807,
copy in Revista de Investiqaciones, pp. 70-71.
2 5otavl et al. to Sanz, Potosi, September 16, 1807,
copy in Revista de Investiqaciones, p. 72.

26ganZ to Liniers, Potosi, November 27, 1808, ANB,
Ruck 301.
27Ibid.
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that Sanz had long advocated.

Under this plan, India*,/, in

provinces where the population had grown since the mita
seventh had been computed nearly a century before would be
"eligible" to substitute for missing Indians in provinces
28
where the population had fallen.
In the meantime, Sanz had
been occupied with other ways of increasing production.
The Junta de Hacienda in Buenos Aires had not for
gotten the extraordinary loans that Sanz had granted the
azogueros between 1798 and 1803.

The Gremio de Azogueros in

1805, owed the Royal Treasury 1,280,000 pesos for ordinary
assistance from the Bank of San Carlos.

Members had also

contracted a debt of 1,071,400 pesos in extraordinary aid,
for which Sanz had fought so hard during the years of drought
and scarcity of mercury.

The Junta de Hacienda issued

rulings on February 26 and 27, 1805, ordering that the loans
be repaid by discounting the silver that the azogueros pre
sented at the Casa de Moneda at the rate of two reales per
mark instead of one real that had been charged.

Furthermore,

Viceroy Sobremonte stipulated that if an azoguero died owing
money to the Royal Treasury, his goods were to be seized and
sold, and if the value of his possessions did not cover his
debt, it would be assumed by the other members of the
Gremio.29
The azogueros viewed these measures as harmful to

^^Liniers to Sanz, Buenos Aires, December 28, 1808,
ANB, Ruck 301.
29
Plan del actual estado de la Mineria de Potosi,
February 23, 1810, ANB, Ruck 301.
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themselves and to production, and so indicated to Sanz who
relayed the protest to the superior government in Buenos
Aires on May 27, 1805.

The petition did not receive an

answer so Sanz repeated it in April of the next year.

At

that time the regente of the Audiencia of Buenos Aires acted
as Superintendent of Hacienda of the viceroyalty, and in
December 1807, he partially fulfilled the request from Potosi
by moderating the provisions of February 26 and 27, 1805.

He

temporarily lowered the discount rate at the Casa de Moneda
back to one real per mark, and suspended the provision that
or)

the Gremio assume the debts of deceased azogueros. ^
The azogueros were not satisfied with these measures
and explained to Liniers that they had not improved the
situation in Potosi because of their temporary nature.

Sanz

wrote that the azogueros desired the security of knowing that
the provisions would be permanent, so that they could make
their plans and proceed with production.
requested such assurance from the viceroy.

The Governor
31

In September 1808 Liniers responded favorably to
Sanz's request.

He wrote that the need of the Royal Treasury

for hard currency was so great that he was obliged to take
measures to amass more specie.

He therefore authorized Sanz

to provide the Gremio de Azogueros with the relief that it

30Sanz to Liniers, Potosi, September 27, 1808, ANB,
Ruck 301.
3lIbid.
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needed to put it in a productive state and thus increase
royal revenues, "Trusting to your zeal and the knowledge that
the Crelief program] will proceed with consideration of
increasing the Royal Treasury. 32 Sanz, using this authority,
declared on November 25, 1808, that all azogueros who had
received loans from the royal treasury were exempt from any
other obligation than the discount of one real per mark of
silver.

Furthermore, their goods were no longer subject to

seizure by the government.0
The shortage of mercury, which had plagued Potosi
before the Peace of Amiens, threatened the community again
in 1804 when the British seized four Spanish ships on the
Atlantic.

As a result of the new hostilities, mercury prices

in Upper Peru soared.

A latter dated November 28, 1808, and

signed by Sanz and twenty members of the Gremio de Azogueros,
addressed the problem.

They stated that in order to return

to "normal production" in the shortest possible time, it would
be necessary to lower the price of mercury to make it worth
while for refiners to handle lower grade ores.

Since most of

the ore refined in Potosi at that time was low in silver con
tent, a relatively large input of mercury was required; and
with the prices of mercury and tools as high as they were,
Sanz reasoned that the azogueros could not profitably process

32Liniers to Sanz, Buenos Aires, December 28, 1808,
ANB, Ruck 301.
33Plan del actual estado de la Minerla de Potosi,
February 23, 1810, ANB, Ruck 301.
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much of the ore in Potosi.

He therefore recommended that the

superior government lower the price of quicksilver from
seventy-three pesos per quintal to forty or at most fifty
pesos.34
In another letter to Viceroy Liniers, Sanz admitted
that at first glance, it would surely seem scandalous to those
who defend the interests of the royal treasury for someone to
propose lowering the price of mercury to fifty pesos per
quintal. They would think that the royal treasury would be
losing 23,000 pesos on each

1,000

quintales, and they would

classify any such proposal as foolish and extravagant.

But

Sanz repeated an earlier claim that revenues would increase
as a result of such a measure.

"Let us compute," he wrote,

"the loss of the 23,000 pesos in comparison with increased
revenues of at least 25,000 pesos that the treasury will
realize with the additional marks of silver that the azogueros
will produce."

Sanz wrote that he could prove that by

lowering the price of 1,000 quintales by 23,000 pesos, Liniers
could produce 2,000 pesos for the King.

This figure did not

include the revenues gained by discounting the additional
silver produced as it was presented at the Casa de Moneda, and
by taxing the additional amount of specie as it circulated
and recirculated.^

■^Sanz et al. to Liniers, Potosi November 28, 1808,
ANB, Ruck 301.
^Sanz to Liniers, Potosl, November 27, 1808, ANB,
Ruck 301.
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One month later, Liniers informed Sanz that his
request to lower the price of quicksilver from seventy-three
pesos to fifty pesos per quintal had been approved.
the Viceroy placed two conditions on his approval.

However,
First,

the lower price was to be on a trial basis, and to remain in
effect only for as long as good effects could be observed in
the Gremio de Azogueros and in the royal treasury.

The second

condition that Liniers imposed was that those who bought
mercury at the reduced price would be held responsible for
the original price of the mineral pending the approval of the
K„ i.n g . 36
Not all of Sanz's activities during this period had
to do with advancing the cause of the Gremio de Azogueros.
In 1805, the Governor received a plea for help from some
missionaries in Tarija to the south of Potosi.

Some of their

missions had been raided by the nomadic and aggressive
Chiriguano Indians of the region, and the priests asked Sanz
for protection.
Upper Peru

The Governor, who had fought Indians in

twenty-four years before, left Potosi with a

small troop of soldiers and traveled to Tarija.

There Sanz

personally aided in the training of the "neophyte" soldiers
of the missions, who were probably Indians themselves.

The

head of the Colegio de Misioneros de Tarija, Fr. Esteban
Primo Ayala, wrote to the Crown on December 25, 1805, and

^^Liniers to Sanz, Buenos Aires, December 28, 1808,
ANB, Ruck 301.
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praised Sanz for his assistance.

The priest thanked the King

for having appointed "this zealous minister [who] had not only
contented himself with training and exhorting our troops, hut
he has also inspired the entire town to be zealous in royal
service. ”37
Since his appointment to the governorship of Potosi
in 1788, Sanz had sought to be exempted from posting the bond
of 10,000 pesos that was required by the Ordinance of Intendants.

Finally, on September 7, 1806, Cayetano Soler wrote to

Sanz that since he had been transferred to the governorship
of Potosi from the superintendency of Buenos Aires, and had
not been appointed directly from Spain, the King had issued
a royal order excusing him from paying the bond.

Sanz
OQ

gratefully acknowledged the order in March, 1808.
The eleven years between 1797 and 1808 were difficult
for Potosi and for the rest of the viceroyalty.

In 1802

silver production in the Imperial City fell by nearly forty
percent of what it had been the previous year, because of
drought and difficulty in getting the materials and labor
necessary for production.

Sanz could do nothing about the

lack of water, but he addressed the other problems with his
customary energy and wiliness, and in spite of the difficul
ties, the Bank showed a profit in each of these years (see
Chart) .

3 7 Fr.

Esteban Primo Ayala to Crown, Tarija, December
25, 1805, AGI, Charcas 434.
3®Sanz to Cayetano Soler, Potosi, March 27, 1808,
AGI, Charcas 434.
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Table 1
Potosl Production Figures Under Sanz and Under
His Two Immediate Predecessors*

Year
I
1779
1780
1781
1782
1783
1784
1785
1786
1787
1788
II
1789
1790
1791
1792
1793
1794
1795
1796
1797
1798
III
1799
1800
1801
1802
1803
1804
1805
1806
1807

* Marks of 1
'Costs Includ-' Net profit
1
1
1
Mark of gold 1 ing thefts
for Crown
silver
1
1
1
t
(pesos)
presented
(pesos)
Administrations of Escobedo and Pino Manrique
1
'
211,439
2314, 4 p. 1
544,763
190,856
1
a
'
3539
228,050
208,880
581,020 1
t
r
'
244,470
69,081
447,994 1
1604
a
1
214,400
'
86,734
410,262
2204
1
a
171,385
485,547
1841, 6
182,058
’
1
t
177,009
'
1529, 2
163,948
485,344
a
1
1
1628,
145,737
162,085
428,988
'
6
1
»
166,622
151,024
'
438,266 *
2451, 4
a
1
165,085
'
503,544 1
1874, 6
200,694
1
r
'
454,817 1
1936, 2
158,761
171,643
20932, 4
1900,256
1570,617
4780,550*
Administration of Francisco de Paula Sanz
1
a
'
152,442
137,126
420,334 1
0000
1
a
1
' 468,609
2204
221085
168,673
1
a
1959, 6
'
174,934
513,550 •
193,452
a
1
'
219,118
503,386 t
4068
145,274
1
•
r
512,211
1167
155,229
'
215,293
r
1
1758
168,812
'
515,261 1
185,344
1
I
204,734
'
497,511 1
2190
169,320
a
•
i
214,975
’
189,091
483,300
2034, 4
i
i
’
2867, 4
216,342
168,642
518,592 1
t
a
a
2069
’
252,281
498.505
164,520
4903,459*
20317
1868,787
1747,900
r
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'

470,310
457,537
481,268
266,852
276,793
376,720
213,168
370,523
432,126
3336,697

a
1
1
1
f
1
1
1
t

2843
3353
3501
2409
2083
2647
5771
4550
4953
31750

i
i
I
i
i
V
t
i
i

164,934
154,006
157,473
148,870
150,385
114,962
158,944
115,321
135,336
1300,231

a
a
t
*
r
a
i
a
r

137,202
206,313
212,780
83,778
276,694
206,746
213,844
218,630
218.435
1764,422

,
*Source: Joaquin Blanco Antolinez, "Proyecto
Economico pide providencias para evitar los Robos en esta real
Casa [de Moneda] Impugna, como es justo los crecidos aumentos
de la fundacion mayor: quiere aclarer el procedemiento de las
crecidas fallas de la oficina de Fielatura" (unpublished
manuscript, Potosi, 1808), ANB, Ruck 256.
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In dealing with the three major issues that arose
throughout this period, Sanz remained the staunch ally and
advocate of the Gremio de Azogueros.

The first of these

issues, increasing financial aid to the azogueros, occupied
most of Sanz's time during the period.

He clashed with the

Junta de Hacienda in Buenos Aires and with his long-time
associate, Pedro Vicente Canete, over the subsidies, and he
eventually prevailed.

Similarly, he succeeded in convincing

Viceroy Santiago Liniers to lower the price of mercury by
nearly a third in 1808.

And although Jos6 Gonz&lez never

sent all 434 mitayos from Puno, Sanz procured the right to
expand the service in provinces that had grown In population
to make up for the deficiencies in other provinces, and that
was potentially a more important victory.

'Sir'

Sanz prevailed in all of these disputes by following
the same formula he had followed during the tobacco visita,
his disputes with Loreto, and the mita debates.

He por

trayed the side that he favored in an argument to coincide
with royal intersets, he wrote his arguments in an urgent
tone and he repeated the arguments time and time again until
he wore down the opponent.
The first decade of the nineteenth century was also
the last decade of operation for Spain's empire in South
America, and the last decade in the life of Francisco de
Paula Sanz.

Events in Europe, in Buenos Aires, and in La

Plata were happening during this same period which would
soon divert Sanz1s attention from aid to azogueros. production

figures, and t-he mita, and occupy him with attempting to
save the unity of the viceroyalty and of the Empire itself.

Chapter VII
SANZ AS A REACTIONARY IN UPPER PERU
During his long administration, Sanz had continuously
flaunted the authority of the Audiencia of Charcas.

This

tribunal had once been the most powerful governing body in
South America, with jurisdiction over most of the southern
part of the continent.

The creation of the Viceroyalty of

Rio de la Plata in 1776, and the issuance of the Ordinance
of Intendants in 1783, however, drastically reduced the
jurisdiction and power of the tribunal.

The creation of two

more audiencias, one in Buenos Aires and one in Cuzco,
shrunk the area subject to the body's control.

Under the

laws, executive and economic powers that formerly rested in
the audiencia passed to the intendants.

By the end of the

eighteenth century, the once-powerful tribunal had become
little more than a court of appeals, with the distinction it
retained its president.'*'
Even with a vigorous and able fiscal like Victori&n
de Villava for a champion, the oidores (judges) of the
Audiencia of Charcas were unable to impose their will on
nearby Potosi.

They had repeatedly ordered the intendant of

1Charles Arnade, The Emergence of the Republic of
Bolivia (Gainesville: University-of Florida Press, 1957),
p. 3.
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Potosl to exempt certain Indians from service in the mita,
and Sanz had repeatedly sidestepped or disregarded their
directives until Villava admitted in frustration that the
audiencia was powerless. 2
To compensate for this decline in authority, the
oidores, who had always demanded personal respect, became
more particular about etiquette.

A traveler in Upper Peru

in the late 1700's remarked on the artificialness, vanity
O
and condescension of the oidores.
They went about the city
dressed in judges' robes called togas; in fact, their unof
ficial title was ministro toqado, and they required people
whom they met on the streets to bow respectfully.^
Jealous of their authority and prestige, the oidores
and the fiscal began to dispute with the president of the
audiencia in the hope of gaining a bit more power for them
selves.

Since 1797, the president had been RamOn Garcia de

Lean y Pizarro, a Spanish soldier born in Africa sixty-eight
years earlier.

Since he also held the post of intendant of

Charcas, he legally held all executive power.

The oidores

resented this and, led by Villava, immediately began to test
him.

Old and easygoing, he let some of his power be taken

^See Chapter V.
^Alonso Carrion de la Vandera [Concolorcorvoil, El
Lazarillo de Ciegos Caminantes (Lima: 1773? reprint ed.,
Madrid: Ediciones Atl&s, 1959), p. 345.
^Amade, Emergence of the Republic, p. 3.
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over by the audiencia. 5

~
In 1804, Pedro Vicente Canete
began

service as oidor honorario in Charcas.

The energetic Canete

forgot his quarrels in Potosi and began to encourage the
President to regain his authority, which the oidores resented.
The next year, Pizarro ordered an attach on the marauding
Chiriguano Indians who had been raiding in the area, but the
audiencia refused to allocate funds for the offensive, and
the split between the authorities in Charcas became public.
After being censured by Viceroy Sobremonte over this inci
dent, the audiencia smoldered in resentment, and in 1806, it
tried to remove Pizarro from office when he became ill.
Canete had by then abandoned the President, fearing that
further association with the old man would harm his career.
Pizarro, however, was able to maintain his position with the
help of the newly arrived Archbishop of Charcas, Benito
Maria Moxd, who became his ally.

For the next two years, an

uneasy truce reigned between the oidores on one side and
g

Pizarro and Mox6 on the other.w
In 1808, more noticeable events were taking place in
Europe.

Napoleon had invaded Spain and Charles IV had

abdicated in favor of his son Ferdinand.

The authorities in

La Plata received this news on August 21, 1808, in a letter

^BstAnislao Just Lleo (S.J.), "Comienzo de la
Independencia en el Alto Peril" (Ph.D. dissertation. University
of Madrid, 1969), p. 132.
^Amade, Emergency of the Republic, p. 3.
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from Viceroy Liniers.

On September 17, they learned with

consternation that the Corsican was replacing the Bourbon
dynasty with one of his own.

The correspondence related

that Spaniards reacted violently to the usurpation and had
set up a junta in Seville to rule in the name of Ferdinand
VII.

Finally, they were informed that a representative from

the Junta of Seville, Jose Manuel de Goyeneche, a native of
Arequipa, was en route to Charcas to request their
allegiance.7
There was considerable disagreement in La Plata on
how to react to the news, and not surprisingly, the President
and the Archbishop disagreed with the oidores.

Pizarro

advocated supporting the junta's resistance to the French
invaders while the members of the audiencia wanted to with
hold support pending further orders from the King.

Mox6

meanwhile, had exhorted the clergy and the public to support
the junta.
At that time, there were among the law professors
and students at La Plata's Universidad Real v Pontlfica de
San Francisco Xavier and in the Real Academia Carolina.
radicals interested in separating from Spain.

They were

influenced by the revolutions in North America and in France,
and they had oh occasion distributed anonymous lampoons that
criticized the Spanish regime, with its inherent discrimina
tion against Creoles.

7Ibid.. p. 9.

These radical lawyers saw the events
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in Europe as an opportunity to weaken ties with the mother
country, and they sided with the audiencia hoping to under
mine any unity that the Junta of Seville might inspire.

They

also hoped to encourage the dissension among the ruling
institutions in La Plata.
Goyeneche's arrival was anxiously awaited in
Chuquisaca, and he reached the city on November 10, 1808.
The public, the President and the Archbishop greeted the
emissary with enthusiasm, but the oidores stayed away.

g

Afterwards, in private, Goyeneche surprised the two officials
with sealed letters from Carlota Joaquina, the aggressive
sister of Ferdinand VII, and wife of Joao, regent of
Portugal.

Carlota and Joao had escaped to Brazil as

Napoleon's general Juno entered Lisbon.

The letters were

opened the next day in the presence of the audiencia, and
all were astounded at the contents.

Carlota claimed to be

the guardian of the Spanish Crown while her father and
brother were under the control of Napoleon, and as such, she
was requesting the temporary allegiance of Spain's colonies.
The President and Mox 6 , eager to preserve the Empire, wanted
to accept the princess as regent.

The audiencia, on the

other hand opposed the move, and accused the two of delivering
g
Spain's colonies to the Portuguese.
For the next six months, from November 1808 until

^Valentin Abecia, Historia de Chuquisaca (Sucre:
Editorial Charcas, 1939), p. 331.
g

Amade, Emergence of the Republic, p. 16.
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May 1809, the radicals in Charcas did all they could to
increase the tension in La Plata.

They realized that if the

audiencia and the President were reconciled, and if they
submitted to Carlota, the radical goal of independence would
be much harder to attain.

Therefore, they encouraged the

audiencia and spread rumors among the townspeople to the
effect that Pizarro and Moxd were agents of the Portuguese
who wanted to maneuver Upper Peru out of Spain's control and
into that of the designing Carlota.

Pizarro, seeking to

strengthen his position, unwisely asked the professors at
the University for a vote of confidence, which was refused
overwhelmingly on January 12, 1809, leaving the President
more isolated and insecure than ever.^
Popular criticizm arose when Pizarro allowed
petitions to circulate calling for Charcas to join tempo
rarily with the Portuguese Empire.

Concerning the leanings

of the President and the Archbishop, it was later testified
that when news arrived that French troops had abandoned
Lisbon, Moxd celebrated a Te Deum and a Mass of gratitude
with Pizarro's agreement, and the city was illuminated for
three nights.

But when they learned that Madrid had been

vacated, no celebration was held.

The council of the

University met and drafted a resolution rejecting the
Portuguese, but Pizarro amended the document so that it

10Ibid., p. 23.
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lost its meaning.

11

Bolder lampoons began to appear in La Plata, which
not only criticized Pizarro and Moxd, but also questioned
the loyalty of Viceroy Liniers in Buenos Aires.

Liniers's

French background made him suspect there and in La Plata.
In March 1808 the Viceroy sent Francisco de Paula Sanz a
secret order to go to La Plata with an armed escort.

Sanz

was to find out who was responsible for discrediting the
President and the Archbishop and for maligning the Viceroy,
and to report on the other disturbances there. 12

Sanz, not

wishing to arouse further hostilities in the neighboring city,
did not comply in the manner in which he had been instructed.
Instead, he made an unescorted and clandestine visit to La
Plata on the night of April 30, 1809.

He spent from 7:30

until 9:30 in the Archbishop's residence discussing the
situation with Mox6 so that he could report to Liniers.

The

Intendant left La Plata quietly that night, but his visit
did not go unobserved, and it contributed to the suspicion
of the oidores and the fear of the citizens. 13
When Sanz returned to Potosi a letter from Montevideo

^Abecia, Historia de Chuquisaca. p. 333.
1 2 Ibid.

^^Expediente autdgrafo informativo sobre el acontecimiento del 25 de Mayo tiltimo su origen y antecedentes,
tramitado ante la Real Audiencia Gobernativa, La Plata,
August 9, 1809, ANB, Ruck 260. Hereafter cited as Expediente Autdgrafo.
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awaited him.

Governor Javier de Elio of that city had

repudiated the viceroy's authority on January 1, 1809, and a
governing junta began ruling the city in the name of
Ferdinand VII.

The junta tried to impose its authority on

other regions, including Buenos Aires,^ and on April 5,
1809, it sent a letter signed by fifteen Montevideo subjects
to Spanish authorities in Upper Peru ask ding for their
approval and cooperation.
Sanz was livid.

When he saw this communication,

He issued a statement on May 11, which

lectured the proponents of the junta on patriotism and
loyalty to the monarch and his viceroys.

He explained that

even though the Monarch of Spain, Ferdinand VII, was at that
time imprisoned by Napoleon, the Junta of Seville was tempo
rarily ruling in his place and in his name.

Sanz equated

the Montevideo junta's action with anarchy and concluded
that it caused him "embarrassment and irritation" for the
signers of the April 5 letter to assume that he could
15
support their action.
Meanwhile in La Plata, feelings grew more and more
hostile and approached a climax in late May.

On May 20,

Oidor Josg Agustin Uzzoz y Mozi publicly accused Pizarro of
misconduct and invited supporting testimony from the citizens.

^Ricardo Levene, A History of Argentina, trans.
William Spence Robertson (New York: Russell & Russell, Inc.,
1963), p. 253.
15
Sanz, Testamento a la Junta de Montevideo, Potosi,
May 11, 1809. AGI, Buenos Aires 40.
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An armed clash was now feared between the supporters of the
audiencia and those of the President.

On May 23# Pizarro

feared not only for his position, but also for his safety.
He dispatched an apprehensive message to Xntendant Sanz in
Potosi describing the dangerous situation in La Plata, and
asking him to be on the alert.

The opposition learned of

Pizarro's appeal on the following day, and on the night of
the twenty-fourth, the audiencia, some of the radical pro
fessors, and the cabildo met and decided to arm themselves
and patrol the streets in case Sanz attacked.

On the morning

of May 25, Pizarro again wrote to Sanz bringing him up to
date on what had happened since the last letter was written.
The President informed the Governor of "an attempt against
the viceregal government# and my own government, with all
the unfortunate results you can imagine. " ^ 6

Pizarro appealed

to Sanz to intervene, "This capital [La Plata] is in urgent
need of the troop stationed in your capital [potosi] .

I am

addressing you in the hope that you will immediately dis
patch the two companies [in Potosi] with their officers, and
then mobilize the militia.
The same day, the audiencia met and the Fiscal,
Miguel Ldpez Andreu recommended that they depose the Presi
dent.

Pizarro countered by asking for the deposition and

arrest of the disloyal members of the audiencia# the Fiscal,

^Sanz, Expediente Autdgrafo, ANB, Ruck 260.
17Ibid.
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and of Jaime Zudanez, the Attorney for the Indigent, who was
also on the staff of the audiencia.

Early in the evening,

Zudanez, who with his brother Manuel, was a leader of the
radical lawyers, was arrested in his home.

Four soldiers

and an officer conducted the lawyer through the busiest
streets to the casa pretorial, where he was imprisoned.
People who saw the spectacle and members of Zudanez's house
hold spread the word of the arrest.

Other members of the

audiencia, fearing arrest, hid themselves in and around the
city. 18 These events excited a general uprising among the
townfolk who had for so long lived in the strained atmos
phere of jealousies, hatred, and threat.
As the moon rose, a mob gathered in the streets and
marched toward the casa pretorial, and others went to the
house of the Archbiship who accompanied them to the casa,
where Moxd persuaded Pizarro to release Jaime Zudanez.

But

the rabble was out of control, and not even Zudanez, who was
now free, or the oidores who had come out of hiding could
quiet them.

Pizarro's allies began to ring the bells in the

city's many churches, which only added to the commotion.

The

mob then broke into Pizarro's residence, but was driven back
by his personal guards who fired a few shots into the air. 19
Mox6 fled the city when the violence began, and the old
President was left almost alone in the casa pretorial.

1 8 Amade,

19

Emergence of the Republic, p. 25.

Sanz, Expediente Autdgrafo, ANB, Ruck 260.
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The audiencia which had regrouped in a private home
sent Pizarro a message asking him to step down, which he
refused to do.

At four o'clock on the morning of the twenty-

sixth, the oidores declared that in spite of Pizarro's
response, the audiencia was assuming political and military
power, "in order to control the grave incidents of the night
before, caused by the poor judgment of his Excellency Sr. Don
on

Ramdn Garcia de Ledn y Pizarro. "

The proclamation named

the subdelegado of Yamparaez, Colonel Juan Antonio Alvarez
de Arenales, as the military commander of Charcas, and
ordered the company of regular soldiers stationed there, as
well as the militia to obey him. 21

After he had relinquished

power, Pizarro was taken prisoner and kept in the University
to protect him from the rabble which was still drunk with
the noise, excitement, and chicha. 22
On the twenty-sixth, the tribunal was still trying
to establish itself as the government in La Plata, and to
restore the city to order.

The mob, which had been used to

remove the President, had gotten out of control.

The

rioters put up a picture of Ferdinand VII in the plaza and
howled their support.

Then they hung a portrait of Pizarro

on the town gallows, along with a dead dog, and pelted both

20"Auto revolucionario de la Real Audiencia," copy
in "Documentos In6 ditos," Boletin de la Sociedad GeogrAfica
de Sucre (December, 1908), pp. 22-35.
22Just Lleo, "Comienzo de la Independencia," pp.
360-61.
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with rotten vegetables.

The oidores knew, however, that

sooner or later the rabble would lose interest or become
exhausted.

Their biggest worry was that Sanz would respond

to Pizarro's call for assistance and attack the city.

This

consideration was apparent in their resolution of May 26,
which suspended any orders from the viceroy or from any
other government, which might result in the harming of
citizens of La Plata.

The resolution blamed Sanz for the

commotion and alarm that were undermining their efforts to
govern the city.

The oidores warned Sanz that a copy of the

resolution was being sent to Colonel Arenales, and that he
pO

would resist any attempt to invade the city. J
Sanz had indeed received both of Pizarro's communi
cations, and on the night of May 26, he informed Liniers of
his intentions:
It seems that they have acted excessively in La
Plata, so that I believe it is necessary to leave
here today for Chuquisaca to investigate. To save
time, I have secretly sent part of the troops last
night, and I am following today to join them, on
[Pizarro's] recommendation. I want to get there as
quickly as possible to see if I can propose a means
of mediation to tranquil izarlos. I wish to avoid
taking the extreme measures that I am empowered to
take, which I would only put into practice in a
desperate case.2 4
The sixty-four year old Intendant Governor rode at
the head of his troops along the rough and precipitous road

^Sanz, Expediente AutOgrafo, ANB, Ruck 260
^4Sanz to Liniers, Potosi, May 26, 1809, copy in
Sanz, "Acuerdo con la Audiencia,“ Cuchiguasi, May 27, 1809,
AGN, Tribunales, Legajo 59, Expediente 1.
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from Potosi to La Plata.

On the evening of the twenty-

seventh, Sanz was met at the tambo (inn) of Cuchigua, ten
leagues from La Plata by Sergeant Manuel Arce, an emissary
of the audiencia, who presented Sanz with a copy of the
tribunal’s May 26 warning resolution.

Sanz also learned

that the audiencia was holding the octogenarian President
prisoner, and had ordered that he be beheaded and his head
25
displayed on a pike if the Governor invaded.
Sanz had
little choice but to send his troops back to Potosi, which
he did at nine o 1clock that evening. He then informed the
audiencia, through Arce, that he was complying with the
resolution and he requested a meeting with the oidores either
in La Plata or if more convenient, in Yotala, eleven miles
from the capital.^®
When Arce returned to La .Plata with the news that
Sanz was capitulating, the audiencia was jubilant.

The

turbulence in the streets had not yet subsided, so the
oidores decided that it would be wiser to meet with Sanz
there, rather than leave the city and travel to Yotala.

Arce

informed the waiting Indendant that the audiencia would
create a diversionary disturbance at one end of the city so
that Sanz could enter unobserved from the opposite end.

On

May 28, Sanz entered La Plata and met with the audiencia at
the cabildo and discussed Sanz's intentions, the purpose for
25
Just Lleo, "Comienzo de la Independencia," p. 366.
26

Sanz, "Acuerdo con la Audiencia," Cuchiguasi,
May 27, 1809, AGN, Tribunales, Legajo 59, Expediente 1.

his midnight visit to La Plata on April 30, and the fate of
the deposed President.

Four hours after Sanz's arrival, the

mob found out that he was in the city.

They gathered

menacingly at the cabildo, but cheered when they learned
that the Xntendant's purposes were peaceful.

Sanz was then

escorted by the oidores to the house where he was to be
lodged.

He stayed in La Plata for four days, and the

audiencia wished him to stay longer to symbolize the legiti
macy of their act.

During his stay, Sanz was unable to

secure the release of Pizarro, who was imprisoned, excom
municated, roughly interrogated, and had his goods confis
cated.

Realizing that the oidores would continue to hold
the President as a hostage, Sanz returned to Potosi, 27
probably in a state of exhaustion.
Word of the unrest reached Viceroy Liniers in Buenos
Aires in less than three weeks.

On June 18, 1809, he sent

Sanz a secret message giving him command of the regular
troops in Salta, Tomina, and Potosi, and ordering him "to
maintain tranquility in those provinces." 28 Liniers also
ordered that the audiencia act as interim government until a
new president was appointed— provided that the oidores did
not countermand the superior government. 29 Sanz received
27Just Lleo,"Comienzo de la Xndependencia," p. 367.
2®Liniers to Sanz, Buenos Aires, June 18, 1809, copy
in "Documentos Infiditos," Boletin de la Sociedad GeogrAfica
de Sucre (December, 1908), p. 45.
29Ibid.
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this communication in early July# and on July 9, he wrote
the Intendants of La Paz and Cochabamba asking for their
cooperation in case the Audiencia of Charcas tried to
"countermand the viceroy."3°

The next day, he wrote the

audiencia itself, informing it of his commission from
Liniers, and saying that he was prepared to return to La
Plata with troops if anything were done "prejudicial to the
superior government." 31
During that same July, Liniers was replaced by
Baltasar Hidalgo de Cisneros.

The new Viceroy, in a

response to a request from the Audiencia of Charcas, quickly
and on short information, gave the tribunal the right to
32T h e oidores interpreted
continue governing "for n o w .
this as official confirmation of their action on May 25.
Their freedom to rule as they pleased, however, was tempo
rarily restricted by the alliance that Sanz had established
with Francisco de Viedma, Intendant of Cochabamba.
The events of May 25, 1809, had repercussions else
where in the viceroyalty.

Stimulated by the Audiencia of

Charcas's successful seizure of power, the Cabildo of La Paz
deposed the Intendant, Tadeo Davila, on July 16, and began
governing the city.

A few days later, the cabildo was

replaced by a junta with Pedro Domingo Murillo as President. 33
30
Just Lleo, "Comienzo de la Independencia," p. 371.
3 1 Ibid.

(La Paz:

3 2 Ibid.,

p. 377.

33Jose Fellraan Velarde, Historia de Bolivia, 4 vols.
Editorial "Los Amigos del Libro," 1968), 1:260.
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Sanz learned of the events in La Paz on July 25, and on the
same day, he wrote the Audiencia of Charcas that he was pre
paring an expedition to "maintain tranquility" in La Paz,
and he requested help with any legal problems that might
arise.

The oidores promptly sent Sanz a sarcastic reply

telling him to wait for instructions from the viceroy.

Also

on July 25, Sanz wrote the government in Oruro that he had
two companies of regulars and
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militiamen under arms in

Chayanta^ ready to come to their aid should they have prob
lems similar to the ones in La Paz.

Sanz knew that news of

this "offer" would be communicated to the rebels in La Paz.
The revolutionary government in La Paz was ill-fated.
In August, Goyeneche, who had been appointed President of
the Audiencia of Cuzco, began to advance toward La Paz with
a well-trained army of 5,000 m e n . ^

The Intendant of Puno

declared his support of the royalists, and Sanz was ready to
attack from the south.

The La Paz cabildo tried to

extricate the city from the predicament on August 16, 1809,
by writing to Viceroy Cisneros that it had acted only because
it feared that DAvila and Sanz had been agents of Carlota
Joaquina and that they were actually loyal subjects of
Ferdinand VII.

Murillo sent the same message to Sanz and to

3^Sanz understandably had some difficulty recruiting
militiamen among the Indians of Chayanta, where so many
mitavos were drafted. Many guerrilla fighters for indepen
dence later came from Chayanta. See Fellman Velarde,
Historia de Bolivia, 1:259.
33Fellman Velarde, Historia de Bolivia, 1:273.
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Goyeneche, but the Peruvian was not moved .3 6

By October,

the situation of the revolutionaries in La Paz was hopeless,
and Goyeneche entered the town to punish mercilessly the
insurgents.37

*

The animosity between Sanz and the audiencia of
Charcas had not ended when the Governor left La Plata in
early June, 1809.

When Sanz requested their aid in dealing

with the July 16 rebellion in La Paz, they denounced him to
the viceroy.

Their derisive refusal to cooperate angered

Sanz, and ended official relations between the two govern
ments.

Sanz responded to the refusal by opening an investi

gation of the occurrence in La Plata since May 25.

He

interrogated the deposed President Pizarro's supporters who
had sought refuge in Potosi, and on August 4, he determined
that a revolutionary situation existed there.
he informed the viceroy of his findings.

On that date,

The next day, he

issued a general letter warning the oidores that he considered their activity rebellious. 38
LOpez Andreu, the Fiscal of the Audiencia commented
on Sanz's letter, reiterating that the disturbance on May 25
occurred because of Sanz's threatened invasion.

The audiencia

then passed a resolution declaring Sanz a traitor and ashing
the viceroy to remove him from office.

The Governor awaited

3 6 lbid.
3 ^Amade,

Emergence of the Republic, pp. 28-29.

38just Lleo, "Comienzo de la Independencia," p. 392.
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the viceroy's response, which was dated August 16, and
arrived the next month.

Cisneros approved of Sanz's actions

and reiterated Liniers*s order of June 18, that Sanz "restore
39
tranquility to these provinces."
He also revealed that he
had appointed Field Marshall Vicente Nieto to succeed Pizarro
as President of the Audiencia of Charcas and intendant.
With this approval, Sanz began preparations to
extinguish the rebellion in La Plata.

As had become his

custom before beginning a maneuver, he made sure of the
military support of Cochabamba's intendant.

Jos 6 Gonzalez

del Prada had succeeded to the office after the death of
Francisco de Viedma the month before.

In his letter of

September 13, to Gonzalez del Prada, Sanz wrote that he was
aware of "the truly criminal outlook of the city of La Plata
and its caudillos, and of the independence and insubordina
tion with which they are proceeding."^®

Sanz continued that

he planned to leave Potosi between September 20 and 22 with
500 to 600 men, and to await the Cochabamba detachment at
the Pampa de Punilla.^1

He planned to impress the citizens

of La Plata with a show of force on the twenty-eighth, so
that they would surrender without a fight.

In conclusion,

^9Cisneros to Sanz, Buenos Aires,August

AS38, Tribunales, Legajo 59, Expediente 1.
1809,

16, 1809,

^®Sanz to Gonzalez de Prada, Potosi, August 13,
AGN, Legajo 65, Expediente 6 .

^ T h i s was the same place where Sanz had fought with
the Catari Insurgents twenty-eight years before (see
Chapter III) .
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he reminded Gonzalez de Prada of his authority to "maintain
tranquility."^

On September 19, Gonzalez de Prada wrote

Sanz that although the ammunition caissons were not ready to
travel, he would make every effort to have the soldiers at
the meeting place in time."^
Ever since Goyeneche and Sanz had cowed the revolu
tionaries in La Paz, the audiencia and the radical lawyers
in La Plata realized that their only hope for continuing in
office lay in convincing the viceroy to restrain Sanz from
invading their city.

They addressed urgent appeals to

Cisneros and grimly began to fortify their city against
attack.

On September 20, Sanz issued a dour proclamation to

the citizens of La Plata.

He assured them that he did not

want to harm the inhabitants, for whom he had risked his
life during the Indian Insurrection of 1781, but that he was
personally leading a troop to La Plata to "reinstate your
loyalty and tranquility."

He assured them that he was a

loyal subject of Ferdinand VII, and that he only had a
quarrel with the seditious element.

He hoped to find them

faithful and loyal citizens, and if not, he was ready to
treat them as rebels and enemies of the Crown.^

4.2
Sanz to Gonzdlez de Prada, Potosi, August 13, 1809,
AGN, Tribunales, Legajo 65, Expediente 6 .
^Gonzdlez de Prada to Sanz, Cochabamba, September
19, 1809, ASH, Tribunales, Legajo 65, Expediente 11.
^Sanz, Proclamation to the Citizens of La Plata,
Potosi, September 20, 1809, AGN, Tribunales, Legajo 65,
Expediente 7.
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The next day (September 21) at 3:00 P.M., as Sanz
was preparing to leave Potosi with his troops, a special
messenger brought him a letter from Cisneros ordering him to
suspend preparations to attack La Plata, pending the arrival
of the new President, Vicente Nieto.

Sanz complied, informed

his allies in Cochabamba; and the seat of the audiencia was
45
again saved from attack by the Governor of Potosi.
Cisneros had earlier stationed Nieto in Salta in
case he was needed in either La Paz or Chuquisaca.

On

October 10, 1809, Sanz wrote him that he should hurry to
46
Chuquisaca to avoid travel during the rainy season.
The
new President finally arrived in La Plata on December 25.
Although the subdued audiencia and radicals received him
docilely and had already released the mistreated Pizarro,
the President arrested five oidores and some members of the
cabildo.
The revolutions in Charcas and La Paz had been
isolated and quelled.

Francisco de Paula Sanz's readiness

to act decisively with military force had helped the royalist
side accomplish these goals.

The Governor's reputation for

resoluteness and physical courage perhaps helped to deter
expansions or imitations of these movements elsewhere in

4 % a n z to Gonzales de Prada, Potosi, September 21,
1809, AGN, Tribunales, Legajo 65, Expediente 6 .
46
Camit6 Nacional del Sesquicentenario de la
Repdblica, Monografla de Bolivia, 2 vols. (La Paz: Biblioteca
del Sesquicentenario de la Republica, 1975), 1:110.
^Arnade, Emergence of the Republic, pp. 29-30.
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Upper Peru in 1809.

But the radical lawyers and the queru

lous audiencia in La Plata had struck the revolutionary
spark that would inflame the entire southern part of the
continent within a year.
In May 1810 word reached Buenos Aires that French
troops had overthrown the Junta of Seville.

On May 25,

exactly one year after the uprising in La Plata, Creoles in
Buenos Aires, including Mariano Moreno, who had studied with
the radicals at the Academia Carolina, deposed Viceroy
Cisneros.

They claimed that since the viceroy no longer

represented the Junta of Seville or the King, power reverted
to the people.

The Creoles established a governing junta of

their own in Buenos Aires, and set out to extend their
authority to the remainder of the viceroyalty.
The structure of colonial government throughout Rio
de la Plata remained even after the Viceroy and the audiencia
had been exiled from Buenos Aires.

In Upper Peru, Nieto and .

Sanz acted swiftly to consolidate forces and to make plans. .
On June 20, 1810, Nieto announced a congress of royalists to
be held in Chuquisaca.

Sanz sent the only delegate from out

side Chuquisaca, and the "congress" agreed with the Buenos
Aires Junta that without a viceroy there could be no viceI

royalty, but they sought a solution to the problem quite
different from the junta's.

Sanz wrote to Viceroy Josd de

Abascal in Lima, and declared that Upper Peru had reverted
to the jurisdiction of the Viceroyalty of Peru.

Abascal
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accepted Sanz's declaration and dispatched aid via Cuzco to
the royalists.^8
Former Viceroy Santiago Liniers and Intendant Juan
Gutierrez de la Concha of COrdoba also launched a counter
revolutionary movement in that city.

They contacted Sanz

and Nieto and planned to retreat to Upper Peru to join
forces with royalists there if necessary.

The Governing

Junta of Buenos Aires sent an expeditionary force to Cdrdoba
under the command of General Antonio Gonzalez Balcarce.

The

royalists realized that the junta's forces were overwhelming
and began the retreat to Upper Peru, but were quickly over
taken.

On July 28, Mariano Moreno ordered that Liniers and

Gutierrez de la Concha be executed.

Balcarce hesitated to

have the heroic ex-viceroy shot, so in August, Juan Jos6
Caste H i , a member of the junta, and also a former law
student at San Francisco Xavier, joined the force and super
vised the execution.
Meanwhile, Sanz and Nieto continued their efforts to
defend their intendancies and the rest of Upper Peru.

Sanz

had established the customary alliance with Cochabamba, but
on September 14, 1810, this was nullified when Gonz&lez de
Prada was forced to resign and Francisco de Rivero, the
military man who headed the provisional government in
Cochabamba announced his allegiance to the Governing Junta
4®Modesto Qmiste, Obras Escogidas de Modesto Omiste.
2 vols. (La Paz: Editorial del Estado, 1941), 2:86.
4%,evene, A History of Argentina, p. 246.
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of Buenos Aires.50

Santa Cruz and Oruro followed

Cochabamba's example, and the two reactionaries were not
isolated from Goyeneche, and surrounded by partisans of the
revolutionary junta.
The governing junta wanted to extend its control to
all the territory of the viceroyalty that it had replaced.
So in October, 1810, the expeditionary force, led by Castelli
and Balcarce, crossed into the Intendancy of Potosi.

Sanz

and Nieto had dispatched the main body of the royalist army
to Cotagaita on the only road between Argentina and Potosi
to intercept the invaders.

Nieto accompanied the force and

shared its command with General Jos£ de COrdova.

The two

small armies met at Cotagaita on October 27, and after four
hours of battle, castelli's and Balcarce's forces retreated,
leaving twelve dead.

COrdoba jubilantly wrote Sanz that

they had won a great victory.51
On November 7, at 2:00 A.M., Nieto wrote Sanz that
the enemy was still retreating, but actually Balcarce was
luring the royalists to the fields of Suipacha, where his
troops had been joined by reinforcements from Jujuy.

He

also attempted to spread the rumor that his troops were in
disorder.5^

At 11:00 A.M., COrdova attached, but the forces

from Buenos Aires were so well prepared, that within an hour,

50Fellman Velarde, Historia de Bolivia. 1:292.
51-0miste, Obras Escoqidas, p. 93.
52Xbid.. p. 95.
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they had routed the royalists.33 Nieto gave the order
j"Salvense corao puedanl "54 Many officers fled and soldiers
defected to the junta's camp.
After the battle, Felipe Lizarazu, the Count of the
Real Casa de la Moneda rushed back to Potosi, arriving on
the afternoon of the ninth, to deliver the bad news to Sanz.
The disappointed Intendant, wanting to avoid an uprising in
Potosi, released several individuals from jail who had been
held since the previous year for expressing sympathy with
the uprising in charcas, hoping to foster a general spirit
of forgiveness.3 3

On the tenth, the streets were filled

with people who expressed anger at the Governor and blamed
him for the disaster at Suipacha.

The frightened potosinos

stormed the cabildo, where Sanz was meeting with officials,
and demanded that the Governor account for the defeat.
Supporters of the Buenos Aires Junta in the cabildo then
called a cabildo abierto (public meeting), placed Sanz under
arrest, and took over the government.

The Governor was taken

to his home across the plaza and placed under guard.
Sanz's friends in Potosi did what they could to
arrange his escape.

One of the offices in his residence

connected with the roof of a neighboring house, and for three
successive nights, accomplices waited for him nearby with

33Diario AnOnimo, Potosi, ANB, Ruck 26.
54<‘Save yourselves however you can!"
33Diario Andnimo, Potosi, ANB, Ruck 26.
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saddled horses.

But he did not have access to the office

because he could not get a key.

His friends attempted to

smuggle him one with a servant whom Sanz had long trusted,
but the servant alerted the guards, and the Governor was
56
removed to the Casa de Moneda, where Cdrdoba was being held. °
On November 25, Castelli entered the city with his
unruly soldiers.

An anonymous diarist related that the army

was composed of Spaniards, mulattoes, Negroes, and Indians
and that "the mulattoes and Indians committed many crimes,
murdering and robbing citizens, while the Negroes, surpris6 *7

ingly, peacefully obeyed their officers.37

On December 2, Nieto, who had a 3,000 peso price on
his head, was captured and also imprisoned in the Money House.
Twelve days later, the citizens of Potosi noted some excite
ment among Castelli's men, and they learned that the prisoners
CD

in the Money House were going to be sentenced.
Castelli's sentence, in the name of the Junta of the
Provinces of Rio de la Plata and of Ferdinand VII, charged
all three men with conspiring with Liniers, Gutierrez de la
Concha, and others to divide the provinces, delivering parts
of the viceroyalty to the Viceroy of Lima, hiding important
facts from the public and telling the citizens falsehoods,
raising troops to oppose the government, and misusing govern
ment funds.

"For all of this, which is proven and well

documented, I condemn the said prisoners, Sanz, Nieto and

57Ibid.

58Ibid.
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Cdrdova, prisoners as a result of our armed victory, as
criminals guilty of high treason and usurpation, to suffer
the death penalty in a military execution, to take place
tomorrow, in the Plaza Mayor." 59
The diarist related that on the night of the four
teenth, officials read the sentence to the three prisoners.
Three priests were present to hear their confessions.

The

next days
. . . there were artillery pieces at the four corners
of the plaza, the soldiers with smoldering wicks ready
to fire the guns; there were sentinels on all of the
streets with orders not to let anyone on the streets,
and to shoot if they were disobeyed. The Money House,
the Plazuela del Rayo, Merced Street, and Bel6 n Street
were filled with guards. No one was permitted to come
out on his balcony or to open any door. Down the
street from the door of the old tavern, there were
placed three stools, each about three varas (yards)
from the other.
At nine in the morning, all the troops entered
the plaza. At 9:30, the prisoners were brought from
the Money House, manacled and blindfolded. Their
confessors led them, saying prayers and solemn psalms.
They stood in the plaza and the sentence was read by
the town crier. The [officers] made them kneel before
the flags. Then they were securely strapped to the
stools. Nieto occupied the stool furthest up the
street, COrdova the one in the middle, and Sanz the
lowest. On a signal, the soldiers fired and the
prisoners died. Nieto and COrdova were carried in a
hearse to the Misericordia, and Sanz to the Convento
del Carmen, where he was buried.60
As Sanz approached the revolutionary standards, he was
reported to have uttered these last words:
If these are the flags of my King, Fernando VII,
then give me the privilege of kissing them and

^9Fellman Velarde, Historia de Bolivia, 1:114-15.
^Diario Andnimo, Potosi, ANB, Ruck 26.
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this will be the ultimate demonstration of my love
and veneration for that august Monarch. My integ
rity and resolution remain indelible, and let the
world know that neither torture nor the most horrible
punishment can force me to change in the least these
pure sentiments. They cannot intimidate a soul whose
firmness seems to grow in proportion to the weakening
of the vital springs of my fragile body.61

6-*-Mariano Torrente, Historia de la Revoluci6 n
Hispano-Americano, 3 vols. (Madrid: Imprinta de D. Ledn
Amarita, 1829), 1:93.

Chapter VIII
EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION
Francisco de Paula Sanz had governed Potosi for
twenty-two years.

According to Modosto Omiste, a Bolivian

historian, Sanz had ruled kindly and without taking advan
tage of his nearly absolute power, and the same cannot be
said of most of his predecessors or of those who followed
him in power.

X

It is a reflection of the citizens' regard

for him that after Suipacha, they thought of his comfort and
imprisoned him at home rather than in the Money House until
they learned of his escape plans.

Castelli's placing of a

heavy guard at the four comers of the plaza on December 15,
1810, and his order that all windows and doors be kept locked
during the execution demonstrated that he feared that Sanz
had enough friends left to try to save his life.
A royalist historian. Colonel Andrfes Garcia Camba,
wrote that Castilli was not only unjust, but also ungrateful
when he ordered Sanz executed.

Garcia Camba alleged that

Sanz had befriended Castelli when he was young and poor in
Buenos Aires. The Spaniard paid for the youth 1s education

■^Modesto Omiste, Obras Escogidas, 2 vols,
Editorial del Estado, 1941), 1:105.
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(La Paz:
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through the doctor of law degree at San Francisco Xavier,
o
and was rewarded for his generosity by being shot.
Vicente
Fidel LOpez discounted this episode by pointing out other
inaccuracies in Garcia Camba's work,

but the story persisted.

Castelli's troops were excessively cruel in Potosi
both before and after the executions.

Any admiration the

potosinos had for the revolutionary cause was soon stifled
by their hatred for the soldiers who robbed, raped, and
murdered the citizens.4

A week after the executions,

Castelli left Potosi for La Plata and La Paz, and he stationed
a small detachment of soldiers in the mining city.

These

insensitive rebels continued to lord it over the proud
citizens, and occasional outbursts of violence resulted.5
After Castelli's army was defeated at Guaqul by Goyeneche
on June 20, 1811, it fled from Upper Peru by paths which
avoided towns and cities.

His soldiers straggled into

Potosi

in June and July, 1811.

But the potosinos had had

enough

of the unruly invaders.

On

August 5, a fight between

a soldier and some citizens of Potosi exploded into a deadly
brawl.The soldiers opened fire, and precipitated an

^Andr6 s Garcia Camba, Memorias. 2 vols.
Editorial America, 1916), 1:79-80.

all

(Madrid:

3Vicente Fidel LOpez, Historia de la Reptiblica
Argentina, 10 vols. (Buenos Aires: Carlos Casavalle
Editor, 1883), 4:208.
4 0miste,

Obras Escogidas, 1:110

5Ibid., 1:134-35.
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£
night battle that left 145 soldiers and nine citizens dead.
Soon after this melee, Juan Martin Pueyrredon, who
had replaced Castelli as commander of the rebel troops in
Potosi, attempted to bring about a reconciliation between
his motley army and the citizens of the city.

He realized

that the resentment would persist; and to make matters worse,
Goyeneche's army, after defeating Castelli's troops, was
advancing toward the Imperial City.

Late in August,

Pueyrredon decided to retreat from Upper Peru.

The Money

House contained about one million pesos in silver and gold
bars and coins, and Pueyrredon did not leave that prize
behind.

Expropriating 400 local mules to carry the plunder,

he made his way southward.

The rebel general and his few

soldiers had to fight off the enraged potosinos as they quit
7
the city.
The great treasure that Sanz had helped to
accumulate was thus lost to the royalist cause.
Goyeneche and his royalist forces entered the city
in September, 1811, and were welcomed just as enthusiastically
as Castelli's rebel forces had been welcomed ten months
earlier:
One of Goyeneche's first acts in this villa was to
honor with regal splendor the memories of the royalist
leaders shot by Castelli on December 15, of the year
before, in order to dazzle the masses and arouse
favorable sympathies in them.

Charles Amade, The Emergence of the Republic of
Bolivia (Gainesville: University of Florida Press', 1957),
p. 63.
^Ibid., p. 65.
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He ordered that the bodies of each leader be
exhumed and that a funeral for each take place on
separate days. On September 22, Cl81l] Sana's body
was removed from the Carmelite Convent, where it
had been buried, and taken to San Francisco Church
for the celebration of the exequies.8
The army attended in formal uniforms, formed in
two flanks along the streets where the body was to
be carried. They stood with inverted arms [weapons
in funeral position]. The muffled drums and muted
bugles played funeral music.
The nobility of the town also attended, dressed
in mourning. The archbishop, wearing a long purple
train, led the procession, and then the priests, the
prebendary, prelates, and other clergymen, secular
and regular, followed him. General Goyeneche in all
of his finery and the decorations of his grandeeship,
with the counts, marqueses, cabildo members,8 oidores,
knights of military orders, colonels, and lieutenant
colonels completed the cortege. Half a cavalry
regiment preceded the retinue, and the other half
served as a rear guard.
In the center of the church was a catafalque with
thousands of candles attached to it. On either side of
the bier were magnificent daises, one for the arch
bishop and one for Goyeneche.
Because of Sanz's stature in the community and the
affection with which the people of Potosi remembered him and
because of the excesses of the rebel troops, Sanz became a
martyr for the royalists.
The war for the independence of South America

8Before the author had found this passage, he sought
the grave of his protagonist in the Convento del Carmen in
Potosi. After a long negotiation with a faceless voice behind
the convent's turn (a revolving shelf that permits the entry of
goods but precludes face-to-face contact with the sisters)
and a contribution that disappeared into the turn, the author
was admitted to the dangerously ramshackle sanctuary. The
privileged visit was of course unfruitful, and no grave was
found.
Q
These same cabildo members had deposed Sanz on
November 10, 1810.
l°Omiste, Obras Escoqidas, p. 195.
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continued to rage.

The cities of Lima and Buenos Aires at

either end of the continent had become opposing poles of the
revolution:

The Peruvian city as a center for the royalists,

and the Argentine city as the seat of the rebellion.

The

vast territory between these two poles was the prize in the
struggle as well as the battlefield.

Spanish colonial insti

tutions in Upper Peru ceased to have significance as local
caudillos when fierce guerrilla armies began to take their
place.

Bellicose republiguetas controlled by opportunistic

guerrilla leaders were emerging.

The leaders had strong

antiroyalist leanings, and controlled the rural areas while
more organized armies vied for control of the cities.^
Midway between Buenos Aires and Lima was Potosi, the
largest and potentially richest city in the contested
territory.

After Sanz's funeral, royalists remained in

control of the Imperial City until 1813, when forces of the
United Provinces of Rio de la Plata under Manuel Belgrano
came up the road from Salta and retook Potosi.

Possession of

the disputed city alternated several more times during the
bitter sixteen-year transformation of Potosi from Spanish
intendancy to a part of the Republic of Bolivar, which
declared its independence on August
*

*

*

*

6,

1825.

*

In 1776 Charles ill created the Viceroyalty of Rio
de la Plata amidst hopes that this measure would tighten

Amade, Emergence of Bolivia, pp. 32-40.
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Spain's control over her colonies.

The following year,

Francisco de Paula Sanz received an appointment and made
the long voyage to the new viceroyalty, where he would serve
for the next thirty-three years.

During this time, he held

more different high-level administrative positions there than
any other individual.

As Director of the Tobacco Monopoly, he

traveled to every province and to practically every correqimiento (soon to become intendancies and partidos) in the
sprawling viceroyalty.

Besides exposing the young Director

to the immensity of the territory, and to its problems of
transportation and communication, the marathon visita brought
him into contact with most of the officials of the viceroyalty
and with their problems of administration.
Sanz's purpose on the visita was to establish the
Tobacco Monopoly.

He had a specific mandate from the King

and he was accompanied by a military escort, both of which
helped to blunt any resistance he encountered.

In Asuncidn,

however, he experienced the first of many disagreements with
other officials.

To subdue the AsunciCn capitulares, he

began to formulate his modus operandi for dealing with
bureaucratic opposition.

He wrote his arguments not only for

his opponents to read but also (and more importantly) for his
superiors in Buenos Aires and in Spain.

To do this, Sanz

stated his position clearly and simply, leaving out local
details.

He identified this position with the interests of

the royal treasury or the State, so that opposing it would be
like opposing the Crown itself.

The capitulares succumbed to
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this strategy, and Sanz retained it for use in future dis
agreements .
Back in Buenos Aires, Sanz witnessed the imposition
of the intendancy system and he was subsequently appointed
superintendent general, the second most important position in
the viceroyalty.

During his five years as superintendent#

Sanz was responsible for the financial and military affairs
of the entire viceroyalty.

He doubtless called upon his

intimate knowledge of the varied regions as he helped to
govern them.
During most of this segment of his career, Sanz
clashed with his superior# Viceroy Loreto.

Superintendent

Sanz continued to use the same strategy that had worked for
him before— identifying his interests with those of the
Crown~but this was more difficult when his opponent was the
King's representative.

Sanz had to learn to temper his

opposition carefully with respect for his rival's office.

In

1788# he was reprimanded for his bluntness with the tribunal
de cuentas, so that in later disputes, he was more tactful
with opponents.

Sanz honed his skill as a polemicist in

Buenos Aires, continuing to write with Spanish authorities in
mind, and he won most of his encounters with Loreto and other
authorities.

But the death of Jos6 de Galvez in 1787 reduced

Sanz's support at Court.

2he office he held was soon

abolished but Sanz was transferred to Potosi as Intendant
Governor in 1788.
Almost as soon as Sanz arrived at that mining center.
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he aligned himself with the Gremio de Azocrueros. He quickly
and forcefully acted to acquire financial aid from the royal
treasury for the construction of silver refining machines for
the azocrueros.

In 1793, he entered a debate on behalf of the

azogueros to increase the number of Indians serving in the
Potosi mita.

His principal opponent in this debate was Fiscal

Victorian de Villava of the Audiencia of Charcas.

The

Governor used tactics that had worked for him before, remem
bering to treat his opponent civilly.

He simplified the

issue and tried to show that a reduction of mita workers
would bring about a reduction in the amount of silver produced,
and in the revenue raised for the King.

He relentlessly

repeated these arguments in a flurry of discourses and
>*•

petitions over the next four years, until Villava threw up
his hands and retired.

Sanz continued to use the same tactics

in the interest of the azogueros. During the drought and war
years between 1798 and 1803, he persistently requested and
finally received aid for them from the royal treasury.
For his constant and loyal assistance, Sanz must have
been a great favorite of the Potosi azogueros. Whether or not
he received any financial gratuities from the group would be
difficult to prove but not so difficult to believe since large
gifts to helpful officials were common in the Spanish
colonies.

Sanz's assistant Pedro Vicente Canete accused the

Governor, after their relationship had soured, of accepting a
10,000 peso bribe from the azogueros. Sanz registered proper
outrage and denied the charge.
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The revolts In La Plata and in Buenos Aires were the
final problems that Sanz faced in his career.

His antagonists

in La Plata remained loyal to the Spanish colonial system, of
which they considered themselves a part; and they felt
obligated to obey the viceroy.

This made it easier for Sanz,

authorized by Liniers and later by Cisneros, to isolate and
quell the movement.

However, the Buenos Aires Junta of 1810

deposed the viceroy on May 25 and recognized only itself as
the supreme authority in the territory of the viceroyalty.
Sanz's old modus operand! was useless against the ruthless
Jacobins of the Buenos Aires Junta who disregarded his position
and authority.

Sanz was forced to depend on military force

instead of written arguments; that military force proved
inadequate, and Sanz became one of the first victims of the
Revolution of May 25, 1810.
*

*

*

*

*

*

In a dispute with Sanz, Canete once accused him of
being simplistic and repetitive, and of exaggerating the
urgency of his claims.
technique.

This accurately describes Sanz's

He simplified issues for his superiors in Spain

who lacked the time and interest to involve themselves in the
local squabbles of remote parts of the Empire.

Sanz explained

his position as coinciding with the interests (usually
financial) of the Crown and then he urgently and repeatedly
implored his superiors to follow his advice.

While he was

not innovative or brilliant, Sanz developed over the years an
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operational procedure that worked well in the complicated
interactions of the Spanish colonial system under the Bourbons.
When this system collapsed, Sanz's technique was no longer
workable, and he perished with the Viceroyalty of Rio de la
Plata.
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APPENDIX
THE VICEROYS OF RIO DE LA PLATA
Pedro de Cevallos

1776-1778

Juan Josa de V4rtiz

1778-1784

3.

Nicolas del Campo, El Marquas de Loreto

1784-1790

4.

Nicolas de Arredondo

1790-1795

5.

Pedro Melo de Portugal

1795-1797

Antonio Olaguer Feliu y Heredia

1797-1799

Gabriel de Avilas y del Fierro,
El Marquas de Avilas

1799-1801

Joaquin del Pino

1801-1804

Rafael de Sobremonte, El Marquas
de Sobremonte

1804-1807

Santiago de Liniers y Bremond

1807-1809

Baltasar Hidalgo de Cisneros

1809-1810

1.
2

.

6

.

7.
8

.

9.
10

.

11 .
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